FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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JULY, 1925

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The Editors

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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REFLECTIONS ON THE QUESTION OF WAR GUILT

By Thomas G. Masaryk

WHAT is the significance of the World War? What is the meaning of this enormous common manifestation in the history of Europe and of humanity?

The Marxian interpretation of war will not hold. Not that a specifically capitalistic interpretation of economic history is entirely wrong; but it is one-sided, incomplete, and uncertain. The conception of capitalism itself is vague; there were certainly wars before capitalism—and nobody has demonstrated the extent to which capitalism is responsible for the genesis and development of this latest war. Are we to understand by "capitalism" a whole and complete economic system or, specifically, finance? Or great industrial development? And in what countries? Capitalism is to be found in all countries, and capitalism has always opposed capitalism. Which capitalism is the deciding factor? We always return to one main question: Which of the combatant parties was conducting an offensive war, and which a defensive?—for this distinction is of great importance in estimating the character of the war.

Nobody doubts that economic interests have always been an important reason for making wars. But there are, in addition, other deciding factors. Historians are always teaching (as are also the historical Marxists) that in modern times wars are made in order that states, their rulers and their statesmen may increase their power and prestige, that they may extend their sway over portions of neighboring countries, and that they may get colonies. They talk much about imperialism, especially in the case of large states. The proponents of this point of view stress ambition, the desire to dominate, greed, and racial and national hatred as the motives for a military offensive.

An interpretation of the World War in the light of nationalism

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is likewise one-sided and vague. Nationalism differs in various countries, and again the question is raised as to what sort of nationalism was responsible. Who began the offensive, and who was on the defensive? What is implied by this "nationalism"? Certainly, nationalist quarrels and disputes were one of the causes of the war. But the war cannot be regarded as exclusively a war of nationalities. Nations are not yet quite synonymous with states; the states were at war, the nations only so indirectly, or as far as they were organized by their states and were represented in them. Moreover, the policy of the states was not merely national. Policy, *i.e.*, the principle of the politics of states, is complicated. It is affected by dynasties, governments, influential statesmen and politicians, journalists, parliaments, parties, and by intellectual and moral movements. To define scientifically exactly who conducted, and was responsible for, the policy of a given state—who, in a given instance, made the decision and why—who had greater and who less influence upon it—this is a task for genuine history and the philosophy of history. It is impossible to say that wars are nationalist, that is, nationalist only. England and America certainly did not take part in the war for reasons of nationalism, at any rate nationalism of the type common on the Continent, although they recognized the principle of nationality and especially the rights of small nations in Europe to be free and independent. It cannot, therefore, be said that the war was a contest between the Germans and Slavs, or between the Germans and the Romance peoples. It was a World War. The genesis and development of the war clearly demonstrate that nationality—at times national Chauvinism—was only one factor among others.

The war has sometimes been regarded as an ecclesiastical and religious quarrel between the Orthodoxy of Russians and Serbs and the Catholicism of Austria, the Protestantism of the Germans and the Catholicism of the French. These religious influences were also factors, but again only factors among others.

The character of this war can to a certain extent be realized by a comparison of the military aims of the contestants and their programs; that of the West, leading the enormous majority of mankind, and that of Germany, leading a minority composed of the Central Powers. This division had more than a temporary military significance; it expressed the whole situation. Ideas faced each other in a life and death struggle.

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In modern times, the independence of states and peoples has been substituted for the mediaeval theocracy which centered in the spiritual leadership of the Papacy as an international authority. The Reformation, humanism, science, art and philosophy laid down new spiritual and moral ideals as the foundation for the organization of a new society. A great revolution was prepared in England, France and America. In this revolution the enormous gain was that the state and the church (or rather the churches) became independent of one another. With the passage of time, state and church have become more and more separated in the West, that is, in Europe and America, not to the detriment of religion but on the contrary to its gain, as also to the gain of political life. And as the state gradually became emancipated from ecclesiastical influence all institutions and strata of society—science, together with philosophy, education and morality—became emancipated also.

In the state which after the Reformation took over the leadership of society and, following the example of the church, became absolutist, the French Revolution proclaimed the great watchword "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." The rights of man and of citizens were enunciated and codified, France and America became republics, England, and for a time France also, constitutional monarchies. Against the old aristocratic system—for monarchy is but a form of aristocracy—democracy developed in different forms and degrees. The revolutionary process was not exhausted by the French Revolution. A succession of revolutions followed, and we are still in the midst of them. It may even be that in the World War we not only overthrew the old régime but also the earlier stages of revolution.

The ideal of the whole revolution was humanity. Morally, this signified mutual sympathy and respect between individuals, and the recognition of the principle that one man must not be used by another as a tool. Politically and socially, it meant the equality of all citizens in the state, the alliance of nations and states, and through them the coming together of the whole of humanity. This idea of natural right was an old one which we had inherited from the Greeks and Romans, and in some respects it had been consecrated by the church and by the churches, though the social and political content of this natural right was only gradually formulated. Closely allied to this ideal of humanity was the conception of enlightenment, expressed in a

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striving for knowledge and education. From this grew, in the last century, the universal recognition of science and the attempts to develop a new philosophy with a scientific basis, as also the continual efforts to organize general education, to make attendance at schools obligatory, to popularize science, and to develop journalism, publicity and the press generally.

The revolution, and the great changes which it wrought in the outlook on life, fixed the idea and the ideal of progress in all branches of human effort, and spread the faith that nations as well as humanity in general would gradually, through their own efforts, reach a higher and higher degree of achievement and satisfaction.

These, it seems to me, are the dominating ideas of Western Europe. I say Western Europe, although I am chiefly thinking of France, since the West (France and the adjoining nations, England and America, and Italy and the other Romance nations) forms a cultural whole, as is clearly demonstrated by the history of the reciprocal influences exerted by the various nations mentioned.

During the Middle Ages, Germany also belonged to the cultural body of Europe. But in modern times she has steadily separated herself, more and more, in her culture. Prussia, an aggressive state from the very beginning, strengthened by the Reformation, came to dominate Germany. A noticeable *étatisme* also prevailed in the West, but there the state grew to be the organ of Parliament and of public opinion, while in Germany a monarchistic state was deified and its absolutism generally recognized. Not till the end of the World War did the Prussian King, as German Emperor, decide for the parliamentarization of the government. Prussia and Germany were really an organized Caesarism; certainly Frederick the Great, Bismarck and the Wilhelms in contrast to Napoleon were Caesars and Tsars. The soldier, the Prussian officer, was for the Germans the standard of social organization, in fact of the organization of the world. The soldier and war became institutions. In Germany the Reformation, humanism, science, art and philosophy did not expel theocracy as thoroughly as they did in the West; the German people accepted the Reformation only in part, and in its German form (Lutheranism) adapted it to Catholicism. A kind of Caesaro-Papism arose, although different from the Russian Caesaro-Papism. The humanitarian ideals of Lessing,

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Herder, Goethe, Kant, and Schiller, derived from observing and from collaborating in the development of the West and of the world in general, came to be replaced by a pan-Germanic imperialism. The Berlin-Bagdad scheme was characteristic of the effort to dominate Europe and Asia and Africa—an effort in which is to be seen the ideal of the ancient world! Germany maintains and develops the ideal of the Roman *imperium*.

In contrast with this, the ideal of the West is the organization of the whole of humanity,—the alliance (before everything) of Europe with America, and by this means the alliance of the other parts of the world. The World War furthered this unification.

Pan-Germanism did not recognize the rights of peoples to independence. It wished to be the sole leader and ruler of all. In its arrogance it announced that the ideal was a multi-national state. It rejected natural right and substituted for it historical right. Kant is certainly recognized as a leading philosopher; but his inclination towards natural right and Rousseau was rejected by Germany, as were humanitarian ideals in general. Historical right was strengthened with the aid of Darwinism, through the theory of mechanical evolution, guaranteeing success to the strongest. War and the making of war became divine institutions. Prussian militarism utilized the theory of the English naturalist to strengthen its military aristocracy, which proclaimed as its chief dogma the so-called *Realpolitik*, the notion that all right is born of might. Power and force were identified.[1] The German nation was described as a nation of born rulers.

The results of Prussianism can be seen not only in politics, but also in German philosophy, science, art and, of course, in theology. When in a nation the leading men and classes begin to rely upon power and force, eschewing sympathy, people cease to have any interest in finding out about the feelings and thoughts of those who are near to them, and finally of foreigners; for all contact with them is made through the state mechanism. They cease to think freely, and knowledge becomes devoid of living ideas.

[1] The proof of this Pan-German identification of right and might is given by Professor Schafer in "Staat und Gesellschaft," 1922 (*i.e.*, after the war). He shows that right is only an expression of conditions of power, particularly external right; but under his hands power becomes force. "The thing cannot be otherwise, force and power can create right" (p. 264).

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This is an interpretation of the great errors of German history and of German thought before and after the war. Bismarck, with his use of force in his relations with the people near to him, is the type of the domineering Prussian spirit. I should describe the development schematically as follows: Goethe, Kant, Frederick the Great, Hegel, Lagarde, Marx, Moltke, Bismarck, William II.

In Hegel we see the synthesis of both tendencies of German culture; he accepted the Prussian idea of the state, namely that it is the chief expression of nationality and the leader of all society. By his pantheism and his imaginative philosophy he constitutes a transition from Goethe, and in the practical domain a transition to Prussianism and its mechanism, materialism and force. Not for nothing was Hegel originally a theologian—even in this connection he formulated the principles of the Prussian theocracy. Bismarck and Wilhelm were always calling on God, of course the Prussian God; Hegel, with his "absolute idealism," served the "authoritism" of the Prussian state, abandoned humanity and the universal outlook of Goethe and Kant, and laid a foundation for the theoretical and practical employment of force. Bismarck and Bismarckism absorbed Goethe—the Prussian state became the infallible leader of the nation and the arbiter of its spiritual and cultural efforts.

Marx, having passed through the philosophy of Feuerbach ("a man is what he eats"), turned Hegel's pantheism and absolute idealism into materialism and accepted the mechanism of Prussian organization and *étatisme* (all-powerful centralization), although he made the state subject to economic laws. The fact that during the war the German Marxians, in spite of their socialism and revolutionary tendencies, accepted without criticism the Prussian policy and remained so long in alliance with the Pan-Germans, is due to their relationship with them in method and tactics. The undemocratic conception regarding the necessity of large economic units corresponds to the Prussian theory of super-humanity. Marx himself had the same view of the Slav peoples as Treitschke and Lagarde.

German thought, beginning with Kant, took a wrong road. Kant set opposite the one-sided English empiricism, and especially the skepticism of Hume, the one-sided intellectualism of so-called pure creative reason. He constructed a whole system of *a priori* eternal truths and thus began the reign of German

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subjectivism, leading inevitably to solipsistic isolation and egoism, to an aristocratic individualism and a super-humanity based on force. This metaphysical titanism necessarily led the German subjectivists to moral isolation. The phantasy of Fichte and Schelling gave birth to the nihilism and pessimism of Schopenhauer. The titans became wrathful, ironical—and anger and irony and titanism are a *contradictio in adjecto*—and finally desperate. Hegel and Feuerbach sought a refuge in the police state and in materialism, through which they avoided metaphysical imagination; they submitted to the régime of Prussian "corporalism," for which Kant had given strong justification by his categorical imperative. The German universities became the spiritual barracks of this philosophical absolutism, which reached its consummation in the idea of the Prussian state and kingdom, deified by Hegel. Hegel created absolutism for the state, and justified right by strength and force. Nietzsche, like Schopenhauer, rejects this development, but only in words; in reality Nietzsche became a philosophical prophet of the Hohenzollern parvenus and of Pan-German absolutism. Nietzsche is the type of the modern hair-splitting scholastic, intoxicating and satisfying himself with big words.

Hegel proclaimed not only the infallibility of the state, but the "self-saving" quality of war and militarism; Lagarde and his followers then conceived a philosophy and policy of pan-Germanism. This it was which was defeated in France. With the Prussian regiments there fell the philosophy which stood for the doctrines "exterminate the Poles" (von Hartmann); "break the thick skulls of the Czechs" (Mommsen); "destroy the decadent French and the haughty English." Prussian pan-Germanism was overthrown by the war.

In rejecting the one-sidedness of German thought which was initiated by Kant I do not say that German philosophy is entirely faulty, nor do I say that it is superficial or uninteresting. On the contrary, German philosophy is interesting and profound, but profound for the reason that it is not, and can not be, free. It is a scholasticism of the mediaeval type, ready-made, a predetermined official creed. Like the Prussian state and Prussianism generally, German philosophy, and also German idealism, is absolutist, violent, unjust to the greatness of free united humanity.

In my first work, "Suicide as a Collective Social Phenomenon

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in Modern Civilization" (1881), I attempted to interpret the surprising and terrible fact that in modern times, from the end of the eighteenth century, the number of suicides has increased everywhere in Europe and in America, and particularly amongst the most enlightened peoples, and this to such an extent that it is necessary to speak of suicide as a pathological condition of modern society. This tendency to suicide in the modern individual is allied to his increasing psychism. Through a detailed analysis of the causes and motives of isolated suicides I was forced to the recognition of the fact that the instigating, and often the deciding, factor in suicide is a weakening of character through the loss of religion. Seen in historical perspective, modern suicide and psychism appear as the result of the precocity or crudity of the new conception of the world and the inadequate organization of the society inhabiting it.

Mediaeval Catholic theocracy consolidated throughout Christendom a unified conception of the world and, corresponding to it, a moral and political régime; but the power of the Catholic theocracy in modern times (and this is what makes them modern!) decreased, and is still decreasing. Revolution—scientific, philosophical, artistic, religious, political and social—characterized the transition from the Middle Ages. Hume and Kant, skepticism and the attempt to overcome skepticism, are both characteristic of modern times. Against infallibility, absolutism and inquisition, mankind protested and revolted; there developed a revolutionary and excessive individualism and subjectivism, leading to spiritual and moral isolation, to general anarchy instead of the previous catholicity. Skepticism, criticism, irony and negation have forced faith into the background, man has become uneasy, inconstant, restless, nervous; through his very energy, often artificially increased, he has fallen into Utopianism; through his continual searching and enterprise he has been deceived again and again; the idealist has plunged himself into gluttony, but has not found satisfaction; pessimism, not only theoretical, but also practical, has become widespread—as also joylessness and anxiety, hate and despair, and from these exhaustion, nervousness, psychism and suicide. Modern society is pathologically irritated, torn, disintegrated—always in one transition after another. In the number of suicides we find a direct arithmetical measure of this psychic sickness, at once moral and psychological.

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The psychological opposite of suicide and the suicidal mania is murder. Suicide is violence done by the soul to itself and is intrinsically egocentric and subjective; murder is violence to the soul, turned outwards—it is abnormal objectivization. Subjectivistic individualism, reaching a higher stage in solipsism and titanic equality with God, is unendurable to man—finally he uses force, either on himself or on somebody near him: suicide and murder are degrees of the same violence.

Modern militarism, especially Prussian militarism, is a violent flight from morbid subjectivity and the suicidal mania. I repeat, modern militarism; for, psychologically and morally, the bellicosity of the savage, the barbarian, and even of the mediaeval knight and mercenary, are different from the scientifically calculated military system of the modern absolutist states. The savage and the barbarian fight from original savagery; but in the World War, there were to be found in the trenches disciples of Rousseau and Kant, Goethe and Herder, Byron and Musset! If Sombart praises German militarism in the spirit of Hegel, and is proud of the fact that Fausts and Zarathustras are fighting in the trenches, he does not realize that he is thus condemning the bloodthirstiness of German and European civilization.

The warfare of these modern civilized peoples is in actuality a violent flight from the narrow conditions imposed by the conception of the superhuman "I." For this reason the intelligentsia, as far as bellicosity went, were not eclipsed by countrymen and laborers, but on the contrary took a leading part in the war. In modern war the opponents do not stand opposite to one another, eye to eye; it is not a battle, as it used to be; they destroy one another at a distance, abstractly, one man not seeing the other, killing one another through ideas and in ideas—German idealism turned into "Kruppism." The *natural* man knows nothing of suicide from modern reasons of exhaustion, nervousness and boredom; only in isolated instances does he commit suicide from anger at the lack of recognition or from general failure of his energy. The *modern* man, through exhaustion and narrow conditions due to spiritual and moral isolation, from a fruitless desire for greatness, and from "superhumanism," suffers from a morbid desire for suicide. Militarism is the attempt of this superman to flee from his malady, but it only constitutes an aggravation of it. It is a nation of thinkers and philosophers which has had the greatest number of suicides,

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which has produced the most perfected militarism, and which was responsible for the World War.

I am of the opinion that this connection between the modern suicidal mania and Prussian militarism is very real. The World War was a war of peoples. Not the old, permanent armies were opposed to one another, but new armies created through a universal obligation to military service, armies consisting chiefly of reserves. Not many of the soldiers engaged on opposing sides were soldiers by profession, though, of course, the Kaiser and the military leaders, as well as a portion of the *personnel*, were soldiers of the old type. The fact, however, that the World War was conducted on a huge scale gave it a peculiar stamp—the characteristics of the combatant peoples themselves were made manifest. The character of the war depends on the character of the soldiers. If the war, as the pacifists assure us, let loose all the evil forces such as hate, ill-will, and bellicosity, then these qualities did not arise only in the war, but were characteristic of the people before the war; the devils of the year 1914 were not the angels of 1913. The World War had, as has been said, an abstract, scientific quality. It was the preeminence of scientific military industry and the mathematical employment of great masses which finally brought victory.

I am of the opinion that the moral significance of the World War as an attempt at objectivization after excessive subjectivism is plain enough; the war and the method of making war arose from this moral and spiritual condition of the modern man and of his whole culture, as I have briefly set it forth. The modern contest between objectivization and subjectivization, expressed in literature and philosophy, and therefore in life, is a protracted historical process and expressed itself in the war also and particularly in its long duration. The war demonstrated what the modern man is capable of and what he would be capable of if he were to rid himself of his desire for domination and did not suppress in himself that love for his neighbor which is innate in every man.

The German historian, Lamprecht, in endeavoring so enthusiastically and energetically to justify the Germans in the war, supports my analysis in spite of himself. In his history of modern Germany, written before the war,[2] he rightly characterizes the time as an epoch of nervous irritation (he coined the

[2] "Zur jungsten deutschen Vergangenheit," 1904.

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word "Reizsamkeit"), and quotes not only Wilhelm but also Bismarck as types of this neurosis. In fact, the German superman, the titan, is nervous and seeks either for death or war as an acute excitement in the place of chronic excitement.

This applies to all nations, but before everything to the German nation. In their spiritual isolation the German philosophers and scientists, historians and politicians, declared German civilization and culture to constitute the zenith of human development, and in the name of this self-appointed eminence Prussian Pan-Germanism announced the right of conquest and the right generally to subdue by power and force. The Prussian state, its army and militarism, became a corrective to morbid subjectivism; Prussian Pan-Germanism is responsible for the World War, is the moral cause of it.

The crisis of the modern man is a general one; it is a crisis of the whole man in his whole spiritual existence. Modern life, our institutions, our views on the world, must be revised. The internal disintegration and disharmony of the modern man and his life, the disintegration and disharmony of society and the general spiritual anarchy, the contest between the present and the past, between fathers and children, the war between the churches and science, philosophy, art and the state, these penetrate the whole of modern culture. We are seeking for the peace of our own souls—how and where shall we find it? In our effort to attain spiritual freedom we fell into an excessive individualism and subjectivity, which were the source of this general spiritual and moral anarchy. Many of us gave ourselves up to materialism and mechanics. We have cultivated intellectualism one-sidedly and have forgotten the harmonious cultivation of all our spiritual and physical powers and qualities. In opposing the churches and religion, we have contented ourselves with doubt and denial, we have snatched at revolutionary politicism, although we have convinced ourselves that at least in the primary conceptions of life and of the world a permanent social organization is impossible without harmony. We have revolted against the discipline of the church, but we have become slaves to programs and to the principles of parties and factions. To talk about and to demand morality and moral discipline is considered to be an exhibition of old-world moralizing. Restlessness, anxiety, skepticism, exhaustion, pessimism, hate, despair, suicide, militarism, going to war—that is the end of the modern man, the modern super-man.

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The post-war situation led many to the conviction that Europe and the civilization of peoples were declining, declining definitely. Before the war, the Pan-Germans often announced the decline of the Romance peoples, especially of the French; now the German philosophers of history (Spengler) talk about the decline of the Germans and of the whole of the West. Some, on the other hand, hope for salvation from Russia or even from further east, although Russia fell in the war just as did Germany and Austria.

I do not believe in a general and definite degeneration and decadence. As a consequence of the war we are living through an acute and chronic crisis. Not we alone are responsible for this crisis, but our forefathers also. We could not refrain from altering what they left us; but the alterations we made were erroneous, and we continue to err. However, an honest recognition of a mistake is the beginning of improvement. The war and its horrors upset all of us—we stand helpless before a tremendous historical mystery, faced with an occurrence of a type which has never been known before in the history of humanity. But perturbation is not a program. We need a calm, direct analysis and criticism of our culture and its elements, and we must decide upon a concrete improvement in every sphere of thought and action. In all the enlightened nations there are enough thinking people to carry out this reform in concert.

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THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF MINERAL RESOURCES

By C. K. Leith

THE mineral geography of the future has been etched in the earth by recent industrial development. Minerals constitute only a part of what is termed "the natural resource problem," but they furnish a defined basis for an inductive approach to the broader problem. We are just learning to make use of our physical environment; the problem of our mineral resources offers a tempting challenge to our ability to foresee and take intelligent advantage of a new environmental factor, instead, as has been our habit, of allowing ourselves to be overrun by environmental conditions to which we remain passive and more or less oblivious.

The world has used more of its mineral resources in the last twenty years than in all preceding time, and there is nothing to indicate any slackening of the acceleration which has occurred during this period. The production of oil, for example, is now as great for one year as for any ten years preceding 1900; a single company in the United States now produces annually more than did the entire country in that year. The last twenty-five years has seen as much gold production as the four hundred years following the discovery of America. There are important mineral industries (as, for instance, the aluminum industry) which are not yet fifty years old. One of the most significant changes has been in the use of the so-called energy resources—coal, oil, gas and waterpower. If the power used in recent years from these sources be translated roughly into man power it appears that every man, woman, and child in the United States has potential control of the equivalent of from ten to twenty hard-working slaves. The world has just entered on a gigantic experiment in the use of earth materials. Energy is being released on a scale never before approximated, with consequences which cannot yet be appraised.

The Convergence of Demand on the Few Adequate Sources. Vastly increasing mineral requirements have resulted in the intensive exploitation of the comparatively few deposits capable of meeting these requirements. When the demand was small,

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it was often possible to secure the necessary supplies from a considerable number of scattered sources. As the mineral industries have grown, the units most favorably situated in regard to raw materials and markets have naturally outstripped the others, thereby deepening and widening the trade channels tributary to them. In each of the principal mineral industries there now stand out a few dominating centers of supply and manufacture, which usually cannot be duplicated in regard either to quantity or efficiency of production. Other possible centers are likely to be handicapped in some essential particular —in size or grade of reserves, in cost of transportation to markets, or in some other way.

Iron ores, for example, are widely scattered over the globe, being present in every continent and in almost every country; yet the principal supply is drawn from only a few sources—from the Lake Superior region of the United States, from northeastern France, from the Cleveland, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, and Cumberland districts of England, from the Kiruna district of Sweden, and from northern Spain. Together, these sources supply about three-fourths of the world's annual total; the remainder comes from scattered sources in many countries.

The steel industries using these iron ores are concentrated in large units, favorably situated where they may draw on the large reserves and where there are adequate supplies of coking coal, together with access to a consuming population. Of the world's steel-making capacity over 90 percent is confined to three regions: the United States, centering for the most part about the lower Great Lakes; northeastern England, using both local ore and coal; and the Ruhr and adjacent portions of northeastern France. All of these great units draw supplementary supplies from outside sources. As they have become larger and more firmly entrenched, they have been able to reach farther afield for the needed raw materials. In no other region now known would it be possible to duplicate these large units with equal efficiency. Even if some location could be found which would apparently satisfy all of the necessary conditions, the size and efficiency of the units already established, with their ramifications of allied industry, would make competition or duplication difficult for the new district.

Turning to coal, we find that the grade of bituminous coal adapted to coking and to efficient power uses is most extensively

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exploited in the eastern United States, in England, and in western Germany, these three regions producing about two-thirds of the world's supply. The remaining third comes from many sources, no one of which is in the class with the sources named. The United States has about half of the world's estimated reserves. All the countries of the southern hemisphere have together less than one-tenth of the estimated reserves. In China there are large reserves of proper grade for commercial utilization, but the difficulty there is in the lack of industrial development and initiative on the part of the Chinese.

The anthracite production of the world is still more concentrated, being confined practically to eastern Pennsylvania. Over 95 percent of the world's total comes from that region, the remainder coming mainly from Wales. The only large reserves in sight are the yet unexploited reserves of China.

In recent years the United States has produced about 65 percent more oil than all other countries combined. Southern Russia, Mexico, Dutch East Indies, Rumania, and Galicia have accounted for 30 percent, leaving only about 5 percent for the rest of the world. Productive fields will probably be developed in India, Persia, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, China, Formosa, and perhaps also in South America and Africa, but the location of the great oil reserves of the future is not nearly so well known as is the case with other mineral commodities, and important shifts in the geography of the industry are to be expected. Making large allowance for such shifts, however, it seems clear that in the future, as in the past, the oil industry will be dominated by a very few districts.

The United States produces nearly 60 percent of the world's copper, and of this nearly 90 percent comes from a few mines in Utah, Arizona, Montana, Michigan, and Alaska. Another 14 percent of the world's production comes from Chile (which probably contains greater reserves than any other country except the United States). The companies controlling the major production of the world are even fewer in number than the principal mines. Two companies in the United States control over 30 percent of the world's output.

The minerals known as the ferro-alloys, necessary in the making of iron and steel, are derived from a very few principal sources. Manganese ore comes mainly from limited districts in India, Georgia (Southern Russia), and Brazil; chromite comes

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from Rhodesia, India, and New Caledonia; nickel for the most part comes from a single district in Canada; tungsten comes from China (60 percent of the total); and about half of the world's vanadium comes from Peru.

The Malay Straits, Bolivia, and Dutch East Indies account for over three-quarters of the world's tin production. The Union of South Africa produces over half of the world's gold (principally from the Transvaal district) and over two-thirds of the total comes from the British Empire. Mexico and the United States account for two-thirds of the world's silver production, mainly from half a dozen districts. The United States is the greatest lead-producing country, yielding 42 percent of the world's output in 1923; Mexico, Australia, and Spain yield 35 percent. As for zinc, the United States in 1923 produced about one-half of the world's output, and 83 percent of it came from three districts.

If we consider potash we find that the deposits of the Stassfurt district of Germany and, secondarily, those in Alsace, dominate the world's fertilizer markets. Natural nitrates, used in peace times for fertilizers, come almost solely from Chile. The sulphur markets of the world draw predominantly on three deposits in Louisiana and Texas, and present indications are that these are likely to be reduced to two.

This sketchy and necessarily disjointed outline of the distribution of the most essential mineral resources is perhaps sufficient to establish the fact that the dominating centers are few. About thirty of the principal mineral districts account for over three-fourths of the world's mineral production. In any picture of the world mineral situation, then, there stand out a few nodal points, pretty well fixed for the future, with ramifications usually extending far beyond national boundaries and crossing one another in the most intricate fashion. Even though new elements come into the picture, its main outlines will doubtless remain the same. Consolidation and coördination are proceeding rapidly in the interest of more efficient operation. Competition has not been eliminated, but it is now mainly among a few commercial giants.

The International Movement of Minerals Consequent on Centralization of Production. It is clear from the foregoing that the principal mineral trade routes must necessarily be few in number and more or less independent of national boundaries. A sub-

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stantial portion of the minerals produced is consumed outside the countries of origin. In fact, nearly a third of the world's mineral tonnage moves across international boundaries (of this third coal and iron constitute nearly 90 percent).

The necessity of world-wide movements of minerals puts a premium on freedom of the seas in peace and control of the seas in war. The key to the problem is to be found mainly in the mineral strategy of the north Atlantic Ocean, and secondarily in that of the north Pacific Ocean. The interruption of any one of the main channels of movement between nations is followed by confusion or disaster, because of the difficulty, usually the impossibility, of making up the supply of minerals from other sources. This was strikingly manifested in the Great War. Failure to comprehend this simple fact underlies many futile attempts to close or change these routes by political action. Certain schedules of our own recent tariff law—for illustration the one relating to manganese—were designed to foster domestic mineral industries and limit importations. But it happens that nature omitted to put adequate supplies of the minerals in question in this country when it was created. The actual result, therefore, is only to lay an additional charge on the consumer, without materially changing the volume of movement from foreign sources. As a revenue producer such tariffs may be useful; but this was not their primary purpose. There are other minerals which really warrant tariff protection.

The Exploration and Development Required to Maintain Available Mineral Supplies. Heavy drafts on mineral resources of the kind made in recent years make necessary constant exploration and development if a sufficient "cushion" of available reserves is to be maintained. This is not only because of the high rate of exhaustion, but because it is necessary now to look farther ahead for the raw materials as a matter of insurance on the large operations and the immense capital outlays involved. In proportion as there are world or regional shortages of available reserves—and there are acute ones—the rush for new supplies becomes more strenuous. The fear of a shortage varies with different minerals, with fluctuations in commercial demand, and with conditions of war and peace, but underlying it all is the outstanding fact that the general increase of the world's requirements during the last two decades makes even the largest resources look less adequate than they formerly did.

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The effort to maintain adequate reserves has made itself felt in several ways:

Better transportation facilities and enhanced commercial competence have made it possible to go farther afield for raw materials; in fact, there are now few parts of the world which are too remote to be affected by the demands of the mineral industries.

The geographic range of entirely unexpected major discoveries has been much narrowed. Geologically the earth has become well enough known to indicate in large measure what primary sources will remain fixed, the probable directions of geographic shifts of others, and some of the regions or countries of potential discoveries.

As the richer mineral deposits are exhausted the demand must be satisfied by the exploitation of minerals of lower grade. New beneficiation processes are making possible the use of mineral reserves which were not marketable a few years ago. A good illustration is found in the copper industry: the main supply formerly came from ore containing upwards of 5 percent of copper, but now it is won largely as a result of large-scale beneficiation of ores containing 2 percent or less of copper. Lower grade mineral deposits are on the whole much more extensive than high grade deposits, affording a better opportunity for large-scale operations, with correspondingly cheaper costs. The resulting postponement of the time of exhaustion of the richer ores is distinctly conservational in its effect.

Mineral supply and demand, both present and future, are much more carefully measured than formerly. Geologists and engineers are for the first time giving a comprehensive idea of the world's stocks of minerals and of the probable life of each.

Finally, there are important political consequences, to be discussed under a separate heading.

Political Consequences of the Geographic and Commercial Concentration of the Mineral Industry. An examination of the distribution of mineral industries, nation by nation, discloses the fact that about 85 percent of the world's output of minerals originates in countries bordering the North Atlantic basin. The United States far outranks all others. No country, however, not even the United States, has enough of all the essential minerals, and many countries are devoid of nearly all of them. A few decades ago the mineral commodities necessary for the welfare of a

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nation were not so large in volume but that they could be easily supplied from various sources by the natural processes of trade; if they could not be obtained in one place, they might in another. With the present vastly greater requirements the securing of a steady and adequate supply is a much more serious matter. The sources capable of supplying these larger demands are relatively few and limited; the failure of a regular supply has disastrous consequences; the international competition for them is keen. Hence it is that governments are giving closer attention to questions of supply, not only by aiding their nationals in various ways to secure supplies outside, but by the formulation of measures tending to conserve supplies within their own national boundaries.

A fact of far-reaching significance, made obvious by the war but still often disregarded in discussion, is the overlapping of political and commercial spheres of influence.[1] Commercial interests of one country own minerals in other countries, or international commercial interests control minerals in more than one country. British and American capital play an especially prominent rôle in controlling commercially supplies of minerals in other countries. Extra-national commercial control often carries with it important political influence, and the extension of political control is more and more tending to conform to the commercial spheres determined by the occurrence of raw materials. Such facts are seldom indicated in making up classifications of mineral production by countries.

An illustration of the kind of problem created by the overlapping of the spheres of political and commercial influence is the Ruhr controversy.[2] The iron and steel industry of western Europe centers about the Ruhr district of western Germany, and overlaps into Belgium, Luxemburg, and northeastern France. France has the iron ore, Germany most of the coking coal. The iron and steel plants have complementary relationships—France produces more raw steel than it can finish, Germany has most of the finishing plants. The industry cannot be successfully divided geographically into self-sustaining parts. Outside competition requires the efficient operation of this industry, which in turn requires coördination, consolidation,

[1] See "Political and Commercial Geology," edited by J. E. Spurr: McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1920.

[2] See "The World Iron and Steel Situation in Its Bearing on the French Occupation of the Ruhr," by C. K. Leith: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 136–151.

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and singleness of direction. The very size of the industry puts a premium on the firm possession of all the parts necessary to its operation. The history of this industry shows the growth of powerful economic unity, spreading over national boundaries, which since 1870 has been reflected in stirring political and military events. With the still further consolidation of commercial power, which seems to be inherent in the natural growth of this industry, it is quite possible that there will be further shifts of national boundaries in the effort to unify political and military control; even the creation of a new state is not impossible.

National barriers—such as certain tariffs, embargoes, prohibitions against extra-national ownership or exploitation of minerals, and lack of coöperative enterprise or capital—are likely to be swept aside by the world's necessity for developing new resources and for preserving freedom of movement. The need for the "open door" often comes squarely into conflict with the principle of self-determination of nations. When it happens that one of the few large potential sources of some needed mineral is situated in a country lacking the local capital and initiative necessary for its development, or where there is political opposition to such development, pressure is exerted by the outside mineral industries, and often by their governments, to compel exploitation in one way or another. Cases of this kind are rapidly multiplying. The pressure is constant, insidious, powerful, and is really backed up by world-wide forces. It is idle to argue whether this should or should not be, or whether or not it could be stopped by political action. A world which is rapidly developing habits in the use of the products based on mineral resources will not easily change these habits for the sake of an academic principle. If, for instance, it should be decided that it was unethical to force the development of much-needed supplies of oil in a country where such development would not take place without compulsion, the only practical way of giving effect to this decision would be to find means for lessening the demand for oil. The very man who argues on behalf of national self-determination on ethical and historic grounds is likely to be a user of materials which can be had only by breaking down this principle. Neither the mineral industries nor their agents should be blamed for acting on the demands which they feel pressing behind them. Instead of criticising this tendency it would seem wiser for us to devote our attention

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to examining and regulating the manner in which it is being translated into action.

An extreme result of the demand for raw materials is seen in one country's actual establishment of political control over all or part of another country. In several recent cases of national expansion the acquisition of mineral resources has been a frankly recognized motive. Less spectacular, but equally real, are the influences of mineral exploitation in determining the political complexion of many a regional settlement, as, for instance, in our own west, or in the case of the Mississippi Valley zinc and lead districts. Historians and geographers have pointed out many interesting instances of this.

Although students of mineral resources see these tendencies and note the steady pressure which is exerted, it is only when some actual political change results that public attention is attracted, and perhaps not then. There is a lag in the emergence of political results, often for many years, after the causative exploitation has started, and this is one reason why the influence described is not more generally recognized. In the case of some of the changes which have occurred since the war the economic spade work was done years ago, just as the exploitation now under way will make itself felt politically some years hence. A wider recognition of the influence of this new environmental factor should go far to clarify international political procedure. The public might well know more generally, both for reasons of self-interest and for the sake of international accord, just what minerals our country has in excess, what must be secured from foreign sources, where they can be secured, what are the vital needs of other nations, and what important explorations are now under way in various parts of the world. With this information available, it should be possible to discriminate between exploitation forced by real national needs and that which is irresponsible or needless, and to graduate political aid, protection, or opposition accordingly. The public might well know, also, the few great channels of international mineral movement fixed by nature, and the futility of attempts to interrupt or divert them by tariffs and embargoes.

Our experience during the war demonstrated clearly that the United States was not acquainted with these facts, and today there is little to show that our tariffs, our diplomatic notes relating to competition for mineral supplies, or our international

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trade agreements, are constructed on any broad policy reflecting an understanding of the problem as a whole. Too often such measures are enacted with regard only to some special interest which happens to be urging its claims at the moment. In this lack of perspective and comprehensive national policy the United States already is far behind many other nations whom necessity has taught to study these problems and take full stock of factors both of national surplus and deficiency. The information is now available.

It is, of course, not to be overlooked that the exploitation of mineral resources is only one of the many factors, environmental and human, that determine political action. The net political result of the interaction of several factors may be quite different from the effect of any single factor operating independently. But no one factor must be ignored.

The Nationalization of Mineral Resources. Public control of mineral resources takes many forms, among them direct government ownership and operation—control through leases and royalties—many forms of licenses, concessions, taxes, and tariffs —various measures of inspection and regulation of operations—regulations for the improvement of labor conditions—coöperation and even control in marketing—price-fixing—prohibition of monopoly—political, commercial, and military aid given to private interests exploiting foreign reserves—restrictions on the exploration of lands within governmental jurisdiction, particularly for extra-nationals—and a variety of measures for the control of transportation, both rail and water. At one extreme is outright governmental ownership, at the other a fairly full measure of private control, varying in the case of different countries, different mineral commodities, and with conditions of peace and war.

In recent years there has been a pronounced stiffening of public control, particularly over minerals of which there is a regional or world shortage. During the war most nations assumed charge of their own raw materials, in one way or another, for military reasons, and some of the measures then adopted have been carried along in peace times for purposes of commercial defense or offense. But aside from war measures, the tendency toward public control has grown so steadily and so widely, and under so many different conditions, that one seems fairly safe in inferring that it will persist. Noteworthy steps

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have been the withdrawal of mineral lands from public entry, the participation of governments in commercial operation, exploration, and selling arrangements, measures for the restriction of exploration by extra-nationals, and levies of special taxes. In the United States the movement has as yet been slight, but to show that it exists one need only cite the withdrawal of public lands from mineral entry, new leasing laws, the occupational tax on the iron ores of Minnesota, the special anthracite coal tax of Pennsylvania, the severance tax on minerals of Louisiana, the tax on oil and sulphur in Texas, and the appointment of coal and oil commissions.

This tightening of public control may be broadly designated as *nationalization* of mineral resources. Nationalization is popularly understood to imply government ownership and operation, but an examination of the discussions on this subject in countries where the problem has become politically acute shows that the term also covers various forms of more or less indirect control, and that it is difficult to draw any distinct line. Perhaps the best picture of the problem of nationalization in the narrower sense can be found in British political discussions of the coal mining industry during the last few years. Recently these discussions have been well summarized in non-technical language by Mr. Lloyd George.

It is not necessary in this article to do more than indicate the actual existence of nationalization, in one form or another, in many parts of the world, and to note its rapidly widening incidence. These are facts, whatever we may think of their desirability. Probably most people familiar with the mineral industry are agreed that it would not have reached its present high state of development under bureaucratic direction, because the problems involved—metallurgical, geological, commercial—are varied and intricate, and seem peculiarly to require the free play of individual initiative. They believe that the government could accomplish little more—probably less—than is already being done in the normal course of private trade. Naturally they view the progress of nationalization with alarm. On the other hand, the world is coming to realize the basic connection between mineral resources and national prosperity, the political advantages accruing to the country possessing mineral resources, and how limited are the reserves of some of these resources in comparison with the life of a nation. "Conservation," so little

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understood in its practical workings, is popularly assumed to require more direct government control, though the correctness of this assumption is open to argument.[3] The thought is growing that mineral deposits, so slowly accumulated by nature, are the heritage of all the people and are not to be exploited exclusively for private gain,—or that if the exploitation is left in private hands it must be done in trust for the public.

It is not our purpose here to argue this question, but merely to state it. The problem cannot be solved by ignoring it, as is the disposition in some sections of the mineral industry. To arrive at an intelligent solution will require broad objective study, as free as possible from self-interest, and an understanding of the variety and inter-relation of the various aspects which the problem assumes. The salient facts are not too many and intricate but that they can become fairly generally understood. A special responsibility rests on the leaders of the mineral industry to contribute their knowledge and ideas toward the formulation of a wise national policy. Otherwise nationalization is likely to take forms determined by surges of political sentiment, probably ill-adjusted to the facts of the situation.

The Internationalization of Mineral Resources. One begins to hear the phrase "internationalization of mineral resources." It comes up in connection with the League of Nations, with the peace settlements, and with various projects for world peace. The phrase means different things to different people; the manner of its use often suggests that there is no well-considered plan in mind, that it is more or less of an academic abstraction. Yet the idea behind it is reasonably clear—that some arrangement should be made to protect nations weak in resources against nations better favored by nature; to prevent monopoly by any one nation or group of nations; to minimize the strenuous competition among nations, which sometimes leads to war; to prevent abuses in the exploitation of the resources of backward countries; to insure freedom of search and of international movement. The phrase implies a belief in the possibility of distributing the advantages of local environmental factors in accordance with some sort of political arrangement. It equally implies the belief that the desired results are not being properly accomplished by uncontrolled private trade, or the fear that

[3] See "Economic Aspects of Geology," by C. K. Leith: Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1921.

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they will not be so accomplished in the future, and that therefore governments must collectively assume control.

During the Great War the Allies went far in the direction of internationalization of their mineral resources by many measures of pooling and allocation. Before the armistice British and American officials gave consideration to a plan that after the war the exportable surplus of key raw materials controlled by the Allies (mainly by the United States and Great Britain) should continue to be distributed as mutually agreed, as a means of controlling the commercial rehabilitation of the enemy countries during the reparation period. With this in mind the exportable surpluses and deficits of key materials were listed and totaled for the several nations most concerned. One of President Wilson's fourteen points—"the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance"—was interpreted in some quarters as requiring internationalization of key resources. These ideas received no expression in the Versailles Treaty. But since then the question has reappeared from time to time in connection with various international economic difficulties which were not solved by the Versailles Conference, and it has been given some attention by the Economic Committee of the League of Nations, following a resolution by the International Miners' Congress in 1920, "that there be constituted within a brief period an international office for the distribution of fuel, ores, and other raw materials indispensable for the revival of normal economic life." Recent attempts by France, Germany, and Belgium to make satisfactory working and financial arrangements for the iron and steel industry of western Europe, already cited, are essentially attempts to secure some of the advantages which would follow the internationalization of the coal and iron ore supplies necessary to that industry.

Another significant step toward internationalization, by agreement between private interests and governments, is exemplified in the recent organization of an international company (the Turkish Petroleum Company) to explore and exploit the potential oil fields of Iraq, in Turkey. Four groups are equal partners —The Anglo-Persian, the Royal Dutch-Shell, the Standard Oil and six other American companies, and sixty-five French companies. The British Government is a direct owner of shares in

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the first two companies named and also is governing Iraq under a mandate. The American and other governments concerned also took more or less of a direct part in formulating this arrangement. Our State Department interceded with England, for example, to allow participation by American companies, and, permission having been granted, was instrumental in seeing that the opportunity was open to more than one American oil company. The purpose of the plan is to insure equal opportunity among the nations represented and to prevent monopoly or exclusion by any one. Of course it does not necessarily insure equal opportunities for other nations.

It seems inevitable that the tendency toward internationalization will continue, in the sense that governments will take a larger hand in the formulation of agreements relating to exploration in foreign countries and to the maintenance of open channels for necessary supplies. The conditions to be met are so varied that probably it is impossible now to devise any comprehensive, precise, and workable plan of internationalization for the future. At best, any general scheme of control now worked out would lack the elasticity and effectiveness of the present procedure based primarily on private initiative. In time such a plan may be evolved, empirically, from the sum total of international experience in this field. Perhaps about as much as could be done now in this direction would be to give international affirmation to the general principle of the open door policy, which is after all the core of the problem, leaving the specific procedure to be worked out as circumstances require. The Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague furnishes opportunities for the settlement of international controversies relating to resources, and in fact it is now being used in this manner, for instance, in the settlement of the recent suit on power concessions brought by the Greek Government against the British Government. The League of Nations, or a World Court, might also come to exercise a certain measure of supervision over such arrangements.

Internationalization of the tentative and partial kind so far tried accrues to the advantage of the nations possessing most of the supplies to trade with, and does not help less favored nations to the extent of making them equal partners in the control of resources. Certainly the world has not reached the Utopian condition where any nation can be expected voluntarily to yield

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up to any super-national body the ownership of a part of its resources. A few strong combinations dominate the world's resources. England and the United States alone, by agreeing on the disposition of the mineral supplies they control, are in a position to determine the general course of the mineral industry of the world. It is a question whether such a combination, or any other strong one, would ever really subordinate its own advantage to any broader political or judicial control. It may only be hoped that, with the emergence of larger units of commercial and political control, there may be a fixing of responsibility and a broadening of self-interest which will help insure administration for the good of all.

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TEN YEARS OF SOCIALISM IN EUROPE

By Emile Vandervelde

"SOCIALISM is that policy or theory which aims at securing by the action of the central democratic authority a better distribution, and in due subordination thereunto a better production, of wealth than now prevails."

This definition of socialism, taken from the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, is open to the double criticism of being at once too narrow and too vague. It excludes from socialist ranks anarchists like Elysée Reclus or Kropotkin, who, though they always claimed to be socialists, were actually centralists. On the other hand, it also leaves out the Bolsheviks, whose dictatorship of the minority is the negation, pure and simple, of democracy. Moreover, the definition seems rather vague when we compare it with the statements of principles made by all the social-democratic parties, who, according to a formula derived from Karl Marx, pursue the conquest of political power by the workers and the socialization of the means of production and exchange.

The *Encyclopedia Britannica's* definition, however, does possess the advantage of applying accurately to all the parties and labor organizations which before the World War were organized in what has since come to be called the Second International. At that time, indeed, the Russian Bolsheviks still called themselves social-democrats and formed part of that particular International, where they rubbed shoulders with English trade unionists, men of very moderate views, who were not socialists at all in the Marxian sense of the word, but who admitted the necessity of political action by the workers as a class and whose social tendencies corresponded fairly accurately to the definition given above.

As I write these lines I have before my eyes the commemorative album prepared by the Austrian socialists for the Tenth Congress of the International, which, as every one knows, was to have been held at Vienna during the month of August, 1914. Several copies were already off the presses of the *Arbeiter Zeitung* when the war broke out, and ten years later these were presented to the members of the *Bureau Socialiste International* (*B. S. I.*) when it met in the former Hapsburg capital in June, 1924. Of special interest among the other contents of this album is the

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collection of portraits of the sixty-six members of the *B. S. I.* which sat before the war in the Maison du Peuple at Brussels. Lenin is not among them, although he had for years been a member of the *B. S. I.*; but one can find the faces of Rosa Luxembourg and Rakovski, today the Soviet Ambassador to London, side by side with Daniel de Leon, the American delegate, Jaurès, Ebert, the future President of the German Reich, Stauning, Branting, and MacDonald, who have since been the Prime Ministers of Denmark, Sweden, and Great Britain, respectively. One sees here, too, delegates from the trade unions, though not very many of them.

At that time labor and socialist unity in Europe, from an international standpoint, was apparently complete. The war was to change all that. From 1914 to 1918 the overwhelming majority of socialists in France, England, and Belgium ranged themselves for national defense. The Italians, except for the group led by Mussolini, who at that time was a Socialist of the Left Wing, declared themselves neutral. The Russians, after the fall of Tsarism, became either "social patriots" with Kerenski or defeatists with Lenin. In Austria, and above all in Germany, the social-democrats at first voted for the war credits, but before long the radical elements fell away. While the "majority element" were vainly trying to regain contact with the French and Belgian socialists, the "Independent Socialists" resorted to Kienthal and Zimmerwald in Switzerland, where they met with various extremist groups from the Entente countries who, like themselves, were exponents of an immediate peace "without annexations or indemnities." In short, the international unity of 1914, which after all had been rather superficial, practically went to pieces under the shock of events. After the armistice, with rumblings of revolution over half Europe and with socialist *coups* taking place everywhere, the dislocation of the International was an accomplished fact.

The Bolsheviks, believing themselves already masters of the world, declared the Second International dead and proceeded to found the Third International, which soon came to be known as the Communist International. At Amsterdam in 1919 other labor organizations from various countries founded the International Federation of Trade Unions, which at one time possessed 23,000,000 members, of whom 16,000,000 still remain, and in which the American Federation of Labor under Samuel Gompers

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joined forces with the French *Confédération Générale de Travail* and with the German *Freie Gewerkschaften*. Politically, therefore, the International found itself divided into three branches: the Third International at Moscow; the Second International,—in which the German "majority element" and the British Labor Party provided the big battalions,—at London; and betwixt the two, at Vienna, the International Working Union of Socialist Parties, which was dubbed the "Two-and-a-half International" and which aimed to knit up once more the pre-war International, though with somewhat more vitality and efficiency.

An attempt at reconciliation by a joint conference of the three executive committees, made at Berlin in April, 1922, ended in complete failure; and since then the Communist International has never ceased to accentuate the violence of its opposition to social-democracy. Between Vienna and London, however, the points of difference tended to diminish. As early as 1921 and 1922 the socialists of France, England, Germany, Italy, and Belgium, some of whom adhered to the Vienna International and others to the Second International, were holding meetings, first at Paris, then at Frankfort; and with one accord adopted the resolutions which have since become famous as the Frankfort resolutions. Anticipating the Dawes Plan, they demanded the reduction of the German debt to a reasonable amount, but, on the other hand, insisted that an end should be put to military occupations and that inter-Allied debts should be annulled.

After December of that year it was understood that the International Socialist Congress would be convoked at Hamburg, where the International was actually reconstituted (May 27, 1923). It was necessary at that time to lay down the conditions on which parties or parliamentary groups might be admitted to the International. Agreement was easily reached in a Franco-German text which, borrowing its somewhat heavy terminology from the Marxian vocabulary, appealed to "those who see in the replacement of the capitalist method of production by the socialist method of production, the goal, and in the class conflict (*lutte des classes*), manifesting itself in political action, the means, of the emancipation of the working class." But when it came to translating this document into English the delegates from Great Britain made difficulties. They objected that the words *lutte des classes*—on the Continent the touchstone of socialism—were not in current use in England; that the extremists, who alone em-

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ployed the expression, did not say "class struggle" but "class war"; and that under these conditions it would be better to render the idea by periphrasis, as, for example, by the phrase "independent political and industrial action of the workers' organization." And thus it was. The Franco-German text was retained, as was inevitable, since it would otherwise have been emasculated, but a free translation was permitted—for English consumption.

I report this trivial incident because it is still highly instructive, showing as it does that in spite of their common purposes and tactical unity, English labor and Continental socialism do not speak at all the same language. Such differences in terminology are the external expression of differences that strike deeper and are due to the various social environments in which contemporary socialism has been formed and developed.

Re-read, for example, such pre-war books as Jean Jaurès's "Etudes socialistes," Ramsay MacDonald's "Socialism and Society," or Karl Kautsky's "Das Erfurter Programm," and you will see how different is the socialism of Jaurès, steeped in the spirit of the French Revolution, and still more the socialism of MacDonald, which seeks its inspiration in the pacific and fraternal ideals of Christianity, from the more "materialistic" and "economic" socialism of the Marxians.

Since the war, however, these differences, even in their theoretical aspects, have been reduced. A kind of doctrinal amalgamation has gone on among the several national parties. German socialism has become less doctrinaire, French socialism, under the influence of the Guesdists, has come closer to Marxism, the socialism of the Independent Labor Party has almost completely conquered the world of British labor. No longer is there merely international unity of organization among the parties which advocate social-democracy; there is also a growing measure of unity in their programs.

In short, the twenty odd million men and women who have been voting socialist during the year 1924 in France, Italy, Germany, England, and the Scandinavian countries have all been more or less conscious supporters of a common doctrine which finds its most striking expression in the Communist Manifesto and the other works of Karl Marx.

Even in 1878 Frederick Engels was attributing to his *fidus Achates*, Karl Marx, the chief credit for the two "great dis-

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coveries" which in his view had made socialism into a science: historic materialism, or, if you prefer, the "economic interpretation of history"; and the doctrine of surplus value, that is, the amount which labor earns but does not receive, and which the capitalist appropriates when he puts his wage-earners to work.

These ideas, which when first enunciated were treated by some as discoveries and by others as mere paradoxes or sophistries, have within a few years become the commonplaces of socialist activities and of socialist propaganda. Whether they have read a line of Marx or not, there is not a coal-miner in Yorkshire, or a socialist metal-worker in the Creusot mills, or a laborer in the Sicilian sulphur mines, or a Polish weaver, or a worker in the salt-mines of the Salzkammergut or the tobacco factories of Philippopolis, who does not join with the social-democrats of the Ruhr and the Saar in agreeing to a series of formulae, Marxian in origin, which constitute the common groundwork of all the parties affiliated with the International. These formulae are as follows: Political struggles are due, in the last analysis, to class struggles; these struggles increase in scope and seriousness as capital becomes concentrated and as, in consequence, the exploitation of the workers progresses; to end this exploitation, capitalistic property—that is, property which has nothing to do with work—must be socialized; and to this purpose the socialist or labor parties pursue a common end, namely, the conquest of political power and the collective appropriation of the means of production and exchange.

It is true that those social reformers who wish to improve capitalism in order the more easily to preserve it oppose to this formidable diffusion of Marx's thought among the masses a pretended error in Marxism, which men like Menger, Böhm von Bawerk and other "socializers" of the days before the war could definitely have attacked. It is in vain to reply to them that Marx's ideas as to the decisive importance of economic factors, as well as capitalistic concentration, the downfall of the middle classes, and the growing opposition between bourgeois and labor or proletarian parties have all found startling confirmation in the conditions existing in post-war Europe. They assert that the science of economics has definitely condemned the Marxian theory of value; that consequently the rest of the edifice crumbles with it; in short, that if socialism wishes to survive it must seek other foundations.

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Of the anti-Marxian literature that has appeared since the war, Nicholson's "Revival of Marxism" and Aftalion's "Les fondements du Socialisme" deserve special mention. Among many others they are distinguished by genuine and thorough knowledge of the doctrines which they essay to criticize. Perhaps Nicholson's little book is the best in which English and American readers can inform themselves, both as to what form modern Marxian socialism has assumed, and what the arguments are that people think they can oppose to it. But it is in Aftalion that we shall find the most concise and convincing criticism of Marxism and especially of that theory of surplus value which, implicitly or explicity, lies at the base of all socialist demands.

M. Aftalion says: "However undeniable the revolutionary force of the theory of surplus value, today its insufficiency as a doctrine seems certain. It cannot meet the simple observed fact that in every private enterprise the profit tends to be proportional to the amount of capital engaged and not to the number of hands employed, and, in consequence, not to the amount of the surplus labor, as the Marxian theory would imply. Marx's desperate effort in the second volume of 'Das Kapital' to reconcile the doctrine with the facts, when he asserts that it holds true only for production as a whole—for the total capitalist income of a country—is much the same thing as saying that he abandons the essential elements."

An expository article such as this is not the place in which to open an extended discussion on this subject. As a matter of fact, Marx did not delay until his third volume was published to show the difference between value and price, surplus value and profit. Rodbertus, however, among others, had done it before him in this characteristic passage: "As a result of competition profits ought to be equal. . . . The principle that the value of the product is equivalent to the amount of labor it costs is made questionable by the law of uniformity of profits. . . . In my opinion it is enough that the production of a society, taken as a whole, should have a value which is measured solely by the work required for its production, in order to supply all our present income, both that derived from land and that derived from invested capital."

In the same spirit Marx compares modern society to a gigantic stock company, a trust, the sum of whose profits—that is, the surplus value produced by the workers as a group—are divided

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among the various stockholders in the form of dividends, interest, and profits. Thus understood, surplus value—which Rodbertus calls stock dividends (*rentes*) and Menger unearned income (*revenu sans travail*)—does not seem to me to be essentially different from what M. Aftalion, in the latter part of his study, calls the social surplus (*surplus social*). This, however, is the terminology in which he formulates his "theory of social surplus or exploitation by exclusion": "Modern views show that capitalistic income is not an exploitation, but that in the profits, taken as a whole, a part of the value that has been created is really due to the land or the capital. Such a view, to which the theory of distribution leads us, amounts to saying that, besides labor, that which nature has given us or that which has been accumulated through the centuries also shares in the value that has been created. Here is a surplus value. Here is wealth whose value is added to that created by the present labor of man. But why should the benefit of it be reserved for certain privileged individuals, since it was not they who originally produced it? That which nature gives us, and that which centuries of effort have created, ought to belong to all."

M. Aftalion, it is true, qualifies his recognition of this fact with many a reserve and limitation, and these reserves and limitations are worth closer examination. They may furnish arguments for continuing certain proprietors in possession and the indemnification of others, but they do not seem likely to impress the growing number of workers who feel the grip of capitalism. It is possible to justify ownership combined with labor. There is no way to justify those who happen to monopolize nature's gifts or the products of past labor in taking a portion of what present labor has produced. At the bottom of all socialist doctrine lies the idea of simple justice which we find as early as St. Paul, and which the Soviets have inscribed at the head of their Constitution: "If any would not work, neither should he eat." To bring this state of affairs about in societies so complex as ours, it is indispensable to socialize the fundamental branches of activity and to substitute the sovereignty of the workers over capital for the sovereignty of capital over labor.

It remains to discover what results labor parties and workingmen's organizations have secured in their duel purposes during the last ten years. From the socialist standpoint, such "wild expropriations" as were attempted in Bavaria, Hungary and

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other countries where proletarian insurrections took place have led merely to bloody reaction. The Russian Revolution, on the other hand, not only had the result—an essential for future purposes—of stamping out Tsarism to its last root and transferring the lands of Crown, nobility, and clergy to peasant ownership, but it also brought the collective ownership of industries and urban real estate into the hands of the Soviet State.

"In this way," writes Professor Varga, a communist writer, "Russia has today reached a condition which the Social-Democrats are pleased to style in their program as a point of departure for social transformation. The proletarian state remains in possession of those departments of economic life which are 'ripe' for socialization: the mines, heavy industry, large enterprises in general, transportation, finance, and foreign trade."

What will result from this collective control, whose revolutionary acquisition seems as a whole to have been more onerous than it would have been if the capitalists had been indemnified? What are the social transformations which will eventually be produced in this way? To these questions it is still too early to attempt reply. Experiment is still going on. It is desirable, however, to attempt an objective examination of the question, without preconceived ideas, eschewing alike the systematic optimism of the English trade unionists who have just passed a few days in Russia and the blind prejudice of those who seek arguments against socialism in the misadventures of the state capitalism instituted by Lenin.

If, now, we pass to those countries that have not been shaken by revolutionary convulsions, it becomes obvious that there has been since the war a reaction from, rather than progress toward, state centralization—that is to say, the direct exploitation by the state and government of certain industries or services. Mussolini has "unstated" the Italian railways. In France a majority of the Bloc National had decided upon the abandonment of the monopoly in matches, prior to the election of May, 1924. Everywhere complaints arise against the defective organization of the "bureaucratic régimes." To many of these complaints one can apply what Delemere says in his book, "le Bilan de l'Étatisme," about the French administration of posts, telegraphs, and telephones: "The P. T. T. emerged from the war in a condition of the most profound technical and financial disorder. Their organization was too fragile to stand the test, and the general

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crisis affects simultaneously the posts and telegraphic service, reaching its climax in the telephone service."

But though state centralization may be declining, socialization, under new aspects, is developing. A system of autonomous controls is being substituted for bureaucratic control. As in Germany, compulsory trusts under state control are being formed in the chief branches of heavy industry, with representation of the workers in the factory councils and in the "parliaments" of steel, coal, and potash, where owners, workers, and consumers are all represented. Most of all, combined enterprises (*économies mixtes*) are being set up in which public and private capital participate jointly, though in varying proportions. At this very moment, for example, all the hydraulic enterprises of Bavaria are being centrally operated in this way. Similarly, we have seen in Belgium within recent years an outburst of combined enterprises—the so-called *sociétés nationales*—whose control is retained by the state as the majority stockholder, but in which private individuals and municipalities participate on equal terms. This is especially true of narrow-gauge railways, inter-community water service, low-cost housing, the distribution of electric energy, the industrialized control of navigation on the Congo, and, in a general way, of the opening up of Belgian colonial mines, which are being developed by companies in which the state invariably possesses half the stock.

It is scarcely necessary to add that in these national companies the capitalist spirit still predominates; that their methods of exploitation differ little if at all from those of private industry; and that the workers have little or no share in the management of the industry. To transform all this, to accomplish something beyond the creation of a few new controls, to eliminate bureaucracy from those already in existence, and to give the people as a whole their due share in private enterprises, one condition is essential: the workers must wrest political power from the state.

In short, the ultimate progress of socialization depends largely on the political progress of the working class, and such progress is itself a function of industrial development, of the growth of the proletariat, and of the consciousness and organization of the working class. From this standpoint there can be no doubt that the war has given a definite impulse to previously existing tendencies and has laid the way wide open to the socialist conquest of power.

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A few months before the catastrophe of 1914, Jaurès, who had the prophetic instinct highly developed, said in an appeal to the German socialists: "A European war may produce a revolution, and the ruling classes will do well to consider that fact; but it may also produce, during long periods, counter-revolutionary crises, furious reaction, nationalism, strangling dictatorship, monstrous militarism, a long series of retrogressive violences and unworthy hatreds, reprisals, and slaveries." Since 1914 Europe has passed through the crises of counter-revolution which Jaurès foresaw. Yet who, on the other hand, can gainsay the correctness of President Masaryk of Czechoslovakia when he says in his recent book that revolution is on the way? Before the war three great autocracies overshadowed Europe. In democratic countries, the bourgeoisie were everywhere in power; the socialists were merely an opposition party—and often the weakest one. Today the remaining monarchies, scattered here and there, are either constitutionally limited or else subordinate to military dictatorships which are already staggering. In almost every country socialism is already either in power, on the verge of power, or else has become *the* opposition, the only opposition that can some day replace the conservative parties that now constitute the governments. Such is the case, for example, in Belgium, in Austria, and in Finland, where the socialists form more than two-fifths of the parliamentary representatives. We see them, moreover, assuming power in Denmark and Sweden, or sharing it with the agrarians in Czechoslovakia. They were far and away the most numerous party in Italy until Mussolini's *coup d'état*. They had the majority in the Russian Constituent Assembly prior to the Bolshevik dictatorship. In France the hundred Socialist deputies form the most active wing of the Radical-Socialist majority. In the English elections of last October they obtained 34 percent of the votes as against 30 percent in 1923—5,551,000 Labor votes as against 2,949,000 Liberal votes and 7,866,000 Conservative votes. In Germany, despite their loss of ground since the revolution, the Social-Democrats have 131 deputies (without counting 45 Communists) as against 137 deputies of the Centre parties and the 176 deputies of the right wing. In short, throughout Eastern Europe the Social-Democratic Party now constitutes one-third of the electorate, and its accession to power, which in 1914 was, if not chimerical at least very distant, today seems one of the

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possibilities—or rather, probabilities—of the immediate future.

To sum up, during the last ten years social-democracy in Europe has been able to establish anew its international unity. It has found a confirmation of its doctrines in the conditions of the post-war world. It has forced the bourgeois parties either to reach an agreement with it and submit to reforms, or else unite to block its path. It has met with great success. It has met, too, with serious reverses. In a word, the advance of labor to power is, to borrow a phrase from Goethe, a spiral, but an ascending spiral.

Yet even in admitting the importance and significance of these results it is necessary to guard against excessive optimism. In the first place, the fact that socialism has not struck root very deeply in the United States, the very heart of the capitalist world, and that the workers there have not yet succeeded in organizing an independent political party on the English model is not to be neglected. In the second place, representation in parliament is nothing but a "bit of Constitution." It would be a naïve illusion to imagine that for the political and economic expropriation of the capitalist class it is sufficient to gain a majority of the votes, little by little, in one country and another. The problem of the present hour is not the victory of a political party but the accession of a class to sovereignty—that is to say, a revolution, and the most profound revolution that the world has ever known. Will this revolution take place—in certain countries, at least—by peaceful and legal means? Or shall we, on the contrary, see it marked by those violent convulsions which have attended its beginnings in the greater part of Europe? It is to be hoped that the first will prove true, but it is unhappily impossible entirely to disregard the second possibility. In any case, however, the impatient, the enlightened, those who still believe in the complete power of either legislator or dictator to bring about revolutions before the appointed time, cannot meditate too often the words of Marx: "The workers have no utopias ready to produce by popular decree. They know very well that to bring about their own emancipation, and at the same time the most noble form of that organization toward which modern society is moving by its own economic forces, they will have to pass through a long struggle and a course of historical progress which will transform men and conditions."

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THE OPIUM CONFERENCES

By Raymond Leslie Buell

IN THE United States there are at least 110,000 drug addicts, slaves to "dope" manufactured out of the product of poppy and coca leaves. Once in the grip of the drug habit, an addict not only becomes worthless to society; he becomes a positive danger, willing to commit any crime to obtain the drugs necessary to satisfy his craving.

In the Orient the opium problem has been of a different nature.[1] In China, and among the Chinese laborers of Siam, British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and other Far Eastern colonies, *chandu*, or prepared opium is smoked. Despite the fact that official British commissions in the past reported that smoking in moderation is not attended with bad results, the Hague Convention of 1912 by implication condemned this practice by providing for the gradual suppression of smoking. It is significant, perhaps, that a majority of the Chinese smokers in the Far Eastern colonies acquire the habit after taking up their residence there.[2] Still another use of opium is found in India where the raw product is eaten—a practice which is widespread, raw opium being consumed as a prophylactic against malaria and as a sedative. The question whether this use is harmful has been hotly debated. The Indian Government still answers this question in the negative on the basis of the findings of an Official Commission, appointed in 1893, to the effect that the "common use of opium in India is a moderate use leading to no evident ill-effects." When it was originally made this report's impartiality was challenged by a minority minute. Further misgivings as to its present value were aroused by an inquiry conducted last year by the National Christian Council of India and by the resolutions of different Indian organizations, all of whom have expressed the desire that the Indian Government should bring about the restriction of opium to purely medical requirements. Moreover, such a distinguished tropical physician as Sir David J. Galloway has declared that eating opium is more harmful than smoking.

[1] However, the use of morphia in China has increased in recent years.

[2] Documented authority for the statements made in this article will be found in my pamphlet, "The International Opium Conferences": World Peace Foundation, Boston.

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While the Indian Government has regarded the production and export of opium from India to the outside world as of international concern, it has consistently taken the position that the internal uses of opium in India are a "domestic question" with which the outside world can have no legitimate concern, any more than it may demand that the United States enforce prohibition in the Philippines—an argument for which a good deal may be said, especially in view of America's insistence that tariff and immigration questions are "domestic," although they affect international relations to a much greater extent than the eating of opium. Some basis for protest might exist from the humanitarian standpoint if the Indian people were at the complete mercy of the British authorities. But as a result of the Government of India Act of 1919 the provincial legislatures (with the exception of Assam) have control over the production and uses of opium for internal purposes. And if the Indian representatives at any time believe that eating of opium is harmful, they may forbid it. In India today opium provides only 2.8 percent of the revenue, and in bringing to an end the opium trade with China in the agreements of 1907 and 1913 Great Britain gave up an annual income of $35,000,000. It is by no means true, therefore, that British policy is solely controlled by financial considerations. On the other hand, by unnecessarily frequent and even vindictive defense of the uses of opium in India before different international bodies, Britain has inevitably led to an awakening throughout the world of suspicions as to her motives. If the India Office would appoint a commission of experts, non-official in character, to investigate the situation in India, it would immediately remedy whatever injustice has been done to both the British and Indian authorities.

For the most part, the suppression of any kind of vice is regarded as a domestic problem, to be handled by one state without interference from its neighbors. But even leaving aside all moral considerations, it is true that so integrated has the world become that now-a-days one nation soon finds it impossible to prohibit the entrance of undesirable articles or persons into its own country without the coöperation of other countries. We have seen this in the case of liquor, drugs and immigrants. For these reasons the drug problem has become international.

While we know that the growth of the poppy from which

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opium is derived is limited largely to four or five countries in Asia and the Balkans, nobody exactly knows how much opium is annually produced. Estimates range from 2,500 to 15,000 tons, depending mainly upon China's output, which has been put as high as 15,000 tons. Whatever the true figure may be, China produces considerably over half of the world's opium. Although the 1906 edict of the Imperial Government suppressing poppy-cultivation was for a time enforced, revolutionary generals today have brought about a recrudescence of the poppy throughout the whole of China, except in the province of Shansi. Despite the repeated requests of the League Advisory Committee, the Chinese Government so far has failed to make an investigation of the opium situation. Meanwhile, according to abundant documentary evidence, Chinese opium is being smuggled wholesale into the territories of the Far East.

The second largest producer of opium is India, which produces about 2,000,000 pounds annually, some half of which is for export and half for internal consumption. However, the production and export of opium are alike severely controlled by the Government, which annually fixes the areas to be sown and which licenses producers. Through a government monopoly, the selling price of opium has been raised, with the result that consumption has declined from 8,334 chests in 1911–12 to 7,480 in 1919–20, despite the fact that during this period the population increased by some three million. The world would have cause to be indignant if the Indian Government allowed the unlimited export of opium. And in fact there was a time when the Government did sell opium to foreigners at auction in Calcutta, with no questions asked. This naturally encouraged smuggling into countries having an anti-opium policy. But that time came to an end in 1915. Two years previously all exports of opium to China had been stopped, while the Government now adopted the policy of making agreements with importing countries for the direct supply which they desired. If a government did not wish to import any opium, the Indian Government refused to permit any exportations. More than three-fourths of the opium is exported under these agreements. However, the auction system still applies to France, Japan, and Portugal, inasmuch as these countries have failed to make individual agreements. But since 1923 no national of whatever country can take any opium out of India without a certificate

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from the importing government (the import certificate recommended by the League) certifying that the consignment is for legitimate purposes. Since virtually all the Far Eastern territories where smoking continues import their opium from India, it has been proposed, notably by Sir John Jordan, former British Minister to China, that regardless of the wishes of the governments in these territories, India should prohibit all exports, thus bringing smoking to an end. This suggestion the Indian Government has declined to consider, on the ground that it would be a form of coercion and that the Indian Government does not intend to be "the moral mentor of the world," especially when Indian opium would merely be replaced by opium from China. If governments wish to buy opium from India, India is willing to sell. Otherwise, she will keep her opium at home.

In any consideration of the situation in India and in China, it should be pointed out that the morphia content of the opium produced in both of these countries is too low to be profitably manufactured into the drugs which afflict the western world. Opium with a high morphia content is produced chiefly in Turkey, Persia, and Jugoslavia. In each of these countries a large number of peasants depend upon the poppy crop as a sure means of livelihood. In Persia nearly 9 percent of the revenue comes from opium, which also constitutes from 20 to 25 percent of the export trade, exclusive of oil. As Persia already has an adverse balance of trade, the cessation of opium exports would seriously affect the exchange. Moreover, the Governments of Persia and Turkey, as well as of China, have within recent years been too unstable to carry out promises.

Some of the problems connected with the international drug traffic were attacked at a conference at the Hague in 1912. The Convention framed at that time provided that each party should enact "efficacious laws or regulations for the control of the production and distribution of raw opium"; "take measures for the gradual and effective suppression" of opium smoking; and limit the manufacture and use of drugs "exclusively to medical and legitimate purposes." Of equal importance, each government undertook to prevent exports of opium to countries which prohibited their entry—an anti-smuggling provision.

While the 1912 Convention embodied general principles envisaging the eventual suppression of smoking and the suppres-

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sion of the manufacture of "dope," each state remained free to decide for itself what measures it should take to carry these principles into effect. Obviously this principle of "national control" breaks down when it is to the interest of certain states to interpret their obligations narrowly. To make effective the principles accepted in the Hague Convention of 1912, further supplementary agreements providing for some form of international control became necessary.

In view of the vagueness of its provisions, the Hague Convention of 1912—which by the way did not go into effect until January, 1920—has had very little effect upon the opium policies of the powers in their Far Eastern colonies, where smoking is prevalent. As far back as 1905 the United States prohibited the use of opium in the Philippines, except for medical purposes, while in 1897 Japan adopted in Formosa an equally effective policy of licensing addicts. Since 1909 licenses to new smokers have not been issued, with the result that the smoking habit is being gradually ended as old smokers die off. So successful has this system been that the number of licensed smokers in Formosa has declined from 215,474 in 1908 to 38,966 in 1924. The British apply the same system to Burma, while Siam also adopted it in 1921, but postponed its application, presumably because of the need of revenue. In the other Far Eastern territories the powers have merely increased prices, hoping by this means to decrease smoking. But in no case does it appear that this maximum price-minimum consumption policy has appreciably reduced the consumption of opium over a long period of time. In fact, the policy of increasing prices may have a positively harmful effect in driving smokers to more cheap as well as more dangerous forms of drugs, such as dross. Also, since smoking is a habit which can be thrown off only with the greatest difficulty, higher prices merely increase the poverty of the smoker, willing to sacrifice his other needs for the vice. Moreover, when government opium is maintained at an artificially high price, the incentive to smuggling is heightened.

Further steps in the suppression of smoking were not taken before the conference of November 3, 1924, because of the demand for the drug on the part of the Chinese laborers in the Far Eastern colonies. Government officials virtually said that if the use of opium was prohibited, laborers would not stay in their colonies. Moreover, opium furnishes 40 percent of the

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total revenue of Siam and Macao, about 27.3 percent of the revenue of French Indo-China, 28.3 percent of that of British Malaya and 22.4 percent of that of Hongkong. Finally, the ease with which Chinese opium could be smuggled into these territories made a policy of suppression almost impossible to enforce, as committees appointed by the Governments of Singapore and Hongkong reported in 1924. It was estimated that as much opium was smuggled into Hongkong as entered legally. In Burma the reduction of legal sales had led to such an increase in illicit traffic that the total estimated consumption was greater than before. Consequently, it was argued that smoking in these territories could only be stopped when opium production in China was put under control.

Moreover, the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1912 were too vague to prevent the smuggling of manufactured drugs, such as morphine, heroin and cocaine, from one country to another. Despite the most rigorous legislation, drugs manufactured in Europe entered the United States and Canada. Likewise, the smuggling of narcotics into China was alarming. According to the labels on drugs seized in China during 1924, the source of this traffic was Germany, Japan and Switzerland. None of the drugs came from Great Britain or the United States.[3] While this smuggling was due in part to ineffective legislation and administration on the part of foreign governments, it was aided in some cases by corrupt Chinese officials—a fact brought out in the Canton Road Smuggling Case, decided in Shanghai in March, 1925.

After studying the question for several years, during which time it worked out the import certificate, an important means of stopping smuggling, the Advisory Committee on Opium established by the League of Nations came to the conclusion that supplementary agreements were necessary if the ends of the Convention of 1912 were to be realized. In resolutions passed in 1921–22 both the Council and the Assembly of the League intimated that the drug traffic could best be controlled at its source, while in its resolution of March 2, 1923, the American Congress stated that "the effective control of drugs can be obtained only by limiting production" to quantities required "for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes." According to

[3] Cf. "Morphia and Narcotic Drugs in China": International Anti-Opium Association, Peking, Bulletin Vol. V., No. 1, February, 1925.

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the estimates of the Health Committee of the League of Nations, the world's annual requirements for these purposes is about 720 tons, which means that at least five times too much opium is now being produced.

At the fifth session of the Advisory Committee, which met in June, 1923, Congressman Porter presented in behalf of an American Delegation propositions to the effect that if the purpose of the Hague Convention was to be achieved, the use of opium products for other than medicinal and scientific purposes must be recognized as an abuse, and that to prevent such abuse the production of raw opium should be controlled so that there would be no surplus for non-medicinal and non-scientific purposes. Mr. Porter argued that since the parties had agreed in the 1912 Convention to "control" production of raw opium, and since that Convention had implied that smoking and the use of drugs except for medical purposes was illegitimate, opium production should under the Convention be "controlled" so that there would be no surplus for illegitimate purposes. This interpretation of the 1912 Convention was wholly untenable, because it would have prevented production for smoking, which was temporarily authorized in the Convention, and for eating, in regard to which the Convention was silent. However, in order to placate American feeling, the Advisory Committee finally accepted these proposals as "general principles," but the governments concerned made reservations as to production for smoking and eating purposes. In order to give effect to these principles, the Committee proposed a conference in regard to the limitation of drug manufacture and of the production of raw opium and the coca leaf "for export"—words which exempted production for the internal uses of India. The Committee also proposed a conference of the powers responsible for the suppression of smoking in the Far East, as well as of China, to consider the adoption of a number of measures looking toward the suppression of smoking, and of steps which China should take to bring about the suppression of illegal production.

These conferences being authorized by the Fourth Assembly, the Council on November 3, 1924, convened the anti-smoking, or first conference, which was attended by eight governments, and on November 17 the second and more general conference, attended by forty-one governments. It was apparently the understanding of the American delegation that the second con-

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ference could review the work of the first. But this possibility was guarded against in the resolution adopted by the Fourth Assembly which provided that the first conference should be composed of plenipotentiaries and should report to the Council of the League. Apparently the so-called "Opium Bloc" did not wish to submit its actions to the scrutiny of the governments of the world.

At the first conference all of the governments, with the exception of Japan and China, insisted that it was impossible totally to suppress smoking in their Far Eastern territories until China had put an end to smuggling. Portugal made a disgusting defense of the situation in Macao, stating that it was going to devote the whole of the opium revenue to social welfare, and that its occupation of Macao was justified by "services rendered to humanity and particularly to the Chinese people, whom we have helped to free from the state of piracy of which they were the victims." When Dr. Sze, the Chinese delegate, proposed a loan to assist Macao in getting rid of the opium monopoly, the Portuguese delegate declared that the country which he had the honor to represent "had no need of advice from anyone. . . . The part which Portugal had played in history was well-known and showed sufficiently that his country had always worked for the good of humanity." In reply, Dr. Sze said that he, too, was content to leave the judgment to history.

While the policy of the European powers was to place the onus for the continuance of smoking upon China, the policy of China was to throw the onus back to Europe. China frankly admitted that "due to temporary disturbed political conditions within her territories" there had been a revival of poppy-growing. But the Chinese delegation did not believe that smuggling was serious or that it should be used as an excuse to justify the continuance of smoking. A humorous repartee took place over the proposal to carry on anti-opium propaganda in the Orient. Mr. Campbell, the Indian representative, opposed the idea on the ground that in the Orient propaganda did more harm than good. Dr. Sze, however, objected to the inclusion of China in this statement and suggested that propaganda should be obligatory in all countries "except in India." He then asked if China could send anti-opium propaganda to Chinese smokers in Burma. Mr. Campbell said this wouldn't do except upon a basis of reciprocity. To which Dr. Sze replied

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that China would like nothing better than to receive missionaries from India to preach the evils of opium! As a result of India's attitude, the convention provides that the governments should carry on anti-opium propaganda unless they "consider it to be undesirable under conditions existing in their territories."

A more serious controversy arose over the transit of opium across third states, which the Japanese Government proposed should be allowed, if accompanied by an official certificate from the government of the importing country that the opium was for legitimate purposes. The British opposed this proposal for the reason that it would oblige them to allow the transit of opium through Hongkong and other ports, when they had reason to believe it would be smuggled into China. This reflection upon the Japanese Government was immediately objected to by Mr. Sugimura. Whether or not the British had wished to pick a row with Japan, there was much to be said for their position, which had been recognized in the Barcelona Freedom of Transit Convention of 1921 and by the United States, which does not allow the transit of opium or of liquor.[4] After negotiations between the British and Japanese delegations, the British contention was in part recognized; the Convention finally provided for the recognition of certificates only if they can be accepted "as affording sufficient guaranties against the possibility of illegitimate use."

By the middle of November a deadlock had arisen over the main question of the suppression of smoking. All that the first conference had succeeded in accomplishing was to draft a convention which provided for such minor reforms as the abolition of opium farms (a provision affecting only Macao) for the prohibition of opium sales to minors, and for a further conference by 1929. Meanwhile, the second conference for the limitation of production had convened. On December 11, the American delegation, disturbed at the failure of the first conference to accomplish further results, moved that the second conference consider Chapter II of its draft convention to the effect that smoking in the Far East should be entirely suppressed within ten years. This motion was at once opposed by the "Opium Bloc" on the ground of "competence." The second conference could not review the work of another conference of plenipotentiaries, especially since it was still in session. As this was a

[4] Cf. *Grogan v. Walker* (1921), 259 U. S. 79.

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crucial question, and also because of the approaching holidays, the conference was adjourned and did not reconvene until January 19, 1925. Before this adjournment, the chairman of the second conference, M. Zahle, had frantically telegraphed to the League Council, then meeting in Rome; while Bishop Brent, one of the American delegates, issued a protest against the work of the first conference, which he vigorously repeated to the British and French Governments on his way home in December. As a result of this pressure, the delegates of England and France at the first conference were instructed not to sign the Convention, while Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands sent new heads of their delegations to the second conference when it reconvened.

At the first plenary meeting after the holidays, Viscount Cecil, the new head of the British delegation, made a lengthy speech in regard to the American proposals. While he also took the position that the second conference was incompetent to discuss them, he read a declaration of British policy, based on a suggestion previously made by Bishop Brent in a document called "An Appeal to My Colleagues." Viscount Cecil stated that the British Government was willing to abolish smoking within fifteen years from the time when China should have reduced the growth of the poppy in such measure as to eliminate the danger of smuggling. The question whether or not this reduction had taken place should be decided by a League Commission. Moreover, if any government questioned the good faith of Great Britain in making this offer, the British Government proposed that League commissioners go into these territories and make recommendations, which it was prepared to accept.

Despite the fact that the Cecil declaration was originated by a distinguished American delegate who had presided over the meetings of the Opium Commission in Shanghai in 1909 and of the Hague Conference of 1912, Mr. Porter vigorously opposed it, stating that the United States, which had already fulfilled its obligations under the Convention of 1912, had the right to insist that the other governments should fulfil theirs. The Cecil proposal, he said, would convert an absolute into a conditional obligation. Viscount Cecil replied that some account must be taken of practical considerations; that instead of answering the arguments made in regard to smuggling, the representa-

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tive of the United States had merely charged the powers with disregarding their obligations and with being prompted by financial considerations. Such a charge was "very wounding indeed," and England "was deeply hurt." The conference had degenerated into a kind of recriminatory rivalry; no power was prepared to submit to dictation; the "Geneva atmosphere" was lacking.

By this time the air had become so tense that another adjournment was taken. Meanwhile a plan was worked out by which the American proposals could be considered without admitting the contention that the second conference was competent. This took the form of a committee of sixteen, eight representatives of the first and eight from the second conference, which was instructed jointly to examine the anti-smoking proposals of the United States. This committee reported two protocols, the first of which, signed by the states at the first conference, obligated the parties to put an end to smoking within fifteen years after such progress had been made in the suppression of smuggling that the latter no longer formed an obstruction to such measures. The second, signed by the states at the second conference, provided that the powers should control the production of raw opium, by laws to be enacted within five years, so as to prevent opium smuggling. It was laid down that whether this legislation was to be considered effective or not was to be determined by a League Commission. Partly as a result of this conditional settlement the American and Chinese delegations now withdrew from the second conference.

To cover up her own sins China followed the policy at these conferences of charging European powers and Japan with an attempt to exploit Chinese laborers throughout their Far Eastern territories and to drug China with narcotics. But whatever truth may have been in these accusations, the Chinese delegation clearly over-played its hand. Here was a nation producing much more than half of the world's opium, which was being smuggled throughout the Far East, and some of whose officials were living on the narcotics trade at home, playing the part of Injured Virtue; but who vigorously protested against any suggestion of foreign interference and who refused to accept any obligations to coöperate with the powers in the suppression of smuggling. Opinions may differ as to whether the powers, disregarding the question of smuggling, should proceed to the

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immediate suppression of smoking. To make this reform dependent upon a house-cleaning in China is probably to postpone it indefinitely. Immediate action, on the other hand, might stimulate public opinion in China to demand reforms, since the attention of the world would now be transferred from the smoking to the smuggling evil. At the same time, it is bad policy to enact laws which cannot be enforced. The example of our Eighteenth Amendment has not yet commended itself to many Europeans. Until we demonstrate the possibility of enforcing prohibition here they are not likely to attempt it in the Orient, where the coolies' demand for drugs is apparently more intense and widespread than is the demand for alcohol in America. It is not a question of tolerating an evil simply because it is the source of lucrative revenue. The European powers feel that should this revenue be given up by making smoking illegal, the vice would none the less flourish on account of smuggling; and in fact would become more flagrant because it would be uncontrolled.

The United States had already precipitated a crisis at the second conference by moving, on November 24, the consideration of its proposal to limit the production of raw opium so that there would be no surplus available for purposes not strictly medical or scientific. Here again the representative of India raised the question of competence, saying that the agenda was limited to the consideration of measures controlling production for "export," but that the American proposal would also stop production for the internal uses of India. The Indian Government could not discuss any proposals lying outside of the agenda. Despite his statement that "the United States did not have the slightest intention of . . . interfering in any manner, shape or form with the internal affairs of any country," Mr. Porter did not attempt to re-word the American proposal which, if adopted as it stood, would have prevented production for eating in India. In taking the position that the agenda of the conference could be enlarged only with its consent, the Indian Government could have invoked a ruling of Secretary Hughes to this effect in the Central American Conference at Washington in 1922–1923.[5]

[5] "It is always usual, when a conference is called, to interchange some views as to what is to be discussed, because no power desires—and I am not speaking of the Central American powers especially, but all powers—no power wishes to be put in a position where it will be compelled to discuss something that it does not want to discuss . . ." *Conference on Central American Affairs*, Washington, 1922–1923, Government Printing Office, p. 80.

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But despite the legal basis of India's position, the conference voted to refer the American proposal to a committee, thus admitting its competence, by 26 votes to 1 (India). Nine states, including the opium-producing countries, abstained.

Meanwhile, in the sub-committee dealing with the limitation of production, small progress was being made. Although Chinese promises were of little value, the situation in China did not directly affect the Western world since Chinese opium is entirely consumed in the Orient. Production in India was already so severely controlled that Indian opium did not enter any country not wishing to receive it. The problem, therefore, reduced itself to production in Persia, Turkey, and Jugoslavia. The first of these countries declared that it could not restrict production without a loan of ten million tomans, customs autonomy, and a financial moratorium. The other two said that until other means of livelihood had been found for their peasant populations, production could not be limited. Things having been thrown into a general mess in sub-committee "B," the Indian representative moved that the parties should agree merely to prevent any export of raw opium not specifically authorized by the 1912 Convention. The United States declared, however, that it could not accept any amendments. She withdrew from the conference on February 6, 1925.

The memorandum setting forth the reasons for this withdrawal is a curious document. The conference had failed to limit production; therefore, according to the American point of view, the drug evil could not be controlled. On the other hand, the Americans criticised the first conference because of its position that smoking could not be abolished until production in China was controlled. Now this argument cannot work both ways—if, because of smuggling, the limitation of production is necessary to suppress "dope", it is also necessary to suppress smoking. After stating that the powers had refused to reduce smoking on account of China's production, the American memorandum says, "no restriction of the production of raw opium under such conditions can be expected"—a statement which is, of course, a *non sequitur*. In view of the fact that the conference had not adopted the American principles, "the delegation of the United States, in pursuance of instructions received from its Government, has no alternative, under the terms of the Joint Resolution authorizing participation in the conference,

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other than to withdraw . . ." This badly-worded sentence confuses the instructions of the delegation with the Joint Resolution—two entirely separate things. The instructions have never been published; and until they are we have no way of knowing whether Mr. Porter was acting under orders given before the conference by the State Department, or whether he used the Joint Resolution as a ladder to crawl out of a bad hole. At any rate, there was nothing in this Resolution to prevent the American Delegation from staying until the end of the conference and the final drafting of an agreement.

Temporarily shocked by the American exit, the conference now adopted the American principle of limiting production to medicinal and scientific needs, subject to the provision that any party could make a declaration stating the limitations subject to which it accepted the principle. But on February 12, the French delegate, M. Kircher, declared that the adoption of the American proposal, subject to this declaration, was a travesty, and that it would be better for the conference merely to reiterate the provisions of the 1912 Convention that production should be "controlled" as each state saw fit. With the adoption of his amendment the last attempt to limit production failed.

This did not prevent, however, the signature of a new drug Convention which contains some important provisions. It now covers preparations of Indian hemp, a drug with which Egypt is particularly afflicted; while the League Health Committee may inform the Council that the convention should be extended to include other drugs not now affected by the Convention. On the other hand, the attempt to prohibit the manufacture of heroin and to place codein under the Convention failed. The only new provision in regard to production is a resolution asking the League Council to examine the suggestion that commissions visit opium-producing countries to study the difficulties connected with the limitation of production.

As far as the international control of the traffic in drugs is concerned, the Convention has made some progress. The export certificate (a separate authorization from the importing government being required for each shipment of drugs) is embodied in an international agreement. What is of even more importance, this traffic is to be watched by a Permanent Central Board of eight qualified persons, appointed by the Council of the League. The United States (as well as Germany) is to be

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invited to nominate a "person to participate in these appointments"— an important provision envisaging a future method of coöperation in other directions between the United States and the League. Once a year the parties agree to send to this board statistics relative to production and consumption of drugs, while every three months they will submit import and export statistics. If the board believes that there is danger of a country becoming the center of illicit traffic, it may ask for explanations, through the Secretary-General of the League. If no satisfactory explanation is made, it may recommend that no further exports be sent to such a country until the situation becomes satisfactory. The only power of the board, therefore, is the power of advice and its only sanction is that of public opinion. Its powers are considerably weaker than of the board contemplated by either the Advisory Committee or by the United States.

While the American proposals for the limitation of production may have been theoretically sound, the United States ignored the practical obstacles in the way of their achievement. In one sense these proposals were unfair, since they transferred the responsibility for suppressing the international drug traffic from the strong countries to lamentably weak governments such as those of China, Persia and Turkey. Financially, the United States stood to lose nothing and to gain everything by the acceptance of its proposals. The producing countries, as well as the governments of territories where smoking prevails, would on the other hand be obliged to give up revenues amounting to millions of dollars a year. In other words, the United States asked from the remainder of the world sacrifices which entailed no hardships for herself. A better balance would have been struck if the American delegation had been in a position to offer loans to countries wishing to do away with the opium trade. But no such proposition was made.

The American delegation made a still greater mistake in taking the attention of the conference away from its main problem, that of the traffic in drugs, and fastening it upon the smoking and eating practises of the Orient. The welfare of the people of the United States, which its delegation was supposed to protect, did not depend upon the uses of opium by coolies in the Far East, but upon the manufacture of drugs, which was a totally different problem. While from the humanitarian stand-

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point, and as a party to the Convention of 1912, the United States was entitled to discuss the situation in the Orient, it was the height of folly to quit the conference on issues which affected only indirectly the welfare of the American people. In considering the wisdom of our attitude toward the final anti-smoking protocols, one may overlook the fact that Mr. Porter opposed a suggestion which came originally from Bishop Brent; but one cannot overlook the fundamental inconsistency in Mr. Porter's position that while the limitation of production was necessary to rid the world of the "dope" habit it was not necessary when it came to the abolition of the smoking evil. As far as "dope" is concerned, the control of drug manufacture is probably more important than the control of poppy cultivation. At the most there are not more than thirty drug factories in the world; they are located in countries possessing strong governments; drug manufacturing is a complicated process which it is difficult to conceal. Consequently, the control of drug manufacture was more practical than the control of poppy cultivation. If the American delegation had not been side-tracked on other issues, and if it had worked out a plan, it is possible that the Opium Convention would have embodied provisions for this type of control which could have really been enforced.

It is more disturbing still to review the attitude and the methods adopted by the United States throughout these negotiations. When the Advisory Committee asked Mr. Porter to discuss the American proposals which he had presented at the fifth session, Mr. Porter declined. "The American delegation was not disposed to enter into any discussion." When Viscount Cecil at the second conference casually said that he had seen figures that the per capita consumption of opium in the United States was greater than in India, Mr. Porter did not politely tell him he had been misinformed but denounced the statement as a "vile slander upon the people of the United States."[6]

We also made the initial mistake of advancing a strained interpretation of the 1912 Convention which would *obligate* the

[6] Apparently the figures to which Viscount Cecil referred were taken from a report made to the United States Treasury in 1919, but which were later proved erroneous. Mr. Porter declared that these figures had been publicly disavowed, and that British officials should have known of this disavowal. The writer, however, has failed so far to find any direct disavowal of this report. In fact, Mr. Porter quotes from it in a speech printed in a document published in French and English, presumably for foreign consumption, called "The Traffic in Habit-Forming Narcotic Drugs" (House Document 380, 68th Cong., 1st session, p. 35). This speech was made February 26, 1923, while the document was published on February 21, 1924.

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parties to take steps of which only the United States was in favor. Instead of arguing our program upon its merits, we accused every state opposing it of violating its obligations under the Convention of 1912. Now disputes over the interpretation of treaties cannot be settled in diplomatic conferences, especially by interested politicians who know very little international law. They should be settled by judicial process, which indeed the Government of India suggested, but to which the American delegation was apparently opposed. Neither was there any justification for the anti-British bent of the American delegation. The fight over opium eating in India could have been avoided—and without giving an international sanction to the practice—if the American delegation had been as capable of drafting diplomatic documents as was, for example, Viscount Cecil. Opium eating may or may not be legitimate; but this question had nothing to do with the control of the drug traffic, which was our chief concern.

Apparently the American delegation went before the Opium Conference determined to win a "national" victory. It presented its proposals and demanded their integral acceptance. It refused to consider any important amendments. This "hell and high-water" attitude may at times be effective in domestic politics. But applied to foreign affairs it becomes a type of coercion. Compromise is essential to international coöperation. In a conference of equals who have divergent interests there is no single point of view, and no single power can hope or should want to dictate a settlement. For the intransigence of the American delegation the instructions of Congress were partly to blame. A bolder man than Mr. Porter would have violated his instructions as did John Jay in negotiating treaties in 1782 and 1794—in the hope that Congress would see the futility of this method of doing international business. But Mr. Porter was not interested in compromises. He invoked the shades of John Brown at Harpers Ferry and the fear of Bolshevism, and he quoted from several writers on contracts and on international law. He denounced the conference and withdrew. But he did not answer the fundamental objections to his own proposals.

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THE SECURITY PROBLEM

By Hans Luther

THE question of a European security pact between Germany and the other states with Rhenish interests is of primary importance and unquestionably deserves the greatest attention. It is significant for Europe that it should be dealt with in the great American review, FOREIGN AFFAIRS. It seems to me, however, that at the present stage of the discussion the most important task is to give a consistent view of the whole situation, for the eventual solution of which new formulas are now being sought. Obviously the thing chiefly to be desired, no less in Europe's own interest than in the interests of America, is that everything humanly possible shall be done to prevent Europe having recourse to arms in the process of reaching a decision. Such a wish is not solely or even primarily the expression of a visionary striving toward peace among the nations; rather is it the necessary preliminary to a prosperous economic life for mankind.

When one considers the whole question in its fundamental aspects a vast difference is apparent between the situation of the United States of America and the situation of Europe (I refer to the portion of the Continent which has reached the same stage of economic evolution as the United States). When future generations come to write the history of the last half century they will discern in the immense transformation wrought by the advance of technical science the inner origin of all that has happened. The progress that we see going on in transportation is practically abolishing the distances which separate various sections of mankind. As a result of the exploitation of its natural and economic resources, each particular portion of the earth's surface is undergoing ceaseless alteration; the development of transportation is constantly creating new conditions. Incidentally, the numerous other technical discoveries often produce revolutions in themselves, and no one can foresee the end of the process. All these vast technical and economic changes, then, are hurrying social life on into ever new transformations. Security of livelihood for the great mass of mankind is no longer conditioned by the permanence and irreplaceability of some particular industry at some particular place.

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Even in agriculture the old-established relations are being relaxed, due to the advance of technical science. The security of the bread-winner seems more thoroughly guaranteed where economic progress results perpetually in the introduction of new processes, and hence requires many and active hands.

In the United States of America all these prodigious happenings have now taken place. They have taken place within a large and unified economic area and, what is more important, in many cases upon still virgin soil. So far, the United States knows nothing of the difficulties of over-population; and historic realities of a nature to hamper the free play of economic forces exist only in a very limited degree.

Quite the reverse is true in Europe. Here, as in America, the final outcome is dependent on the vast technical development, with all its attendant phenomena; but this technical development everywhere clashes with hard and fast historic realities. The vital problem for Europe is to effect a compromise between the heritage of history and the new framework decreed by economic evolution.

The difficulty of solving this problem, we now realize, has been extraordinarily magnified by the World War. To be sure, even without the war it would not have been possible off-hand to transform Europe into a single unified economic field or even into a higher political unit. I imagine citizens of the United States are far from appreciating the full measure of existing difficulties. To the traveling American the sensation of the very quantity of obstacles to be got over probably leads in many cases to the idea that by this means or that it must be possible to bring about a speedy improvement. As the traveler continues his journey, only to be perpetually encountering new tariff barriers and after a few hours' journey to be hearing new languages, again and again, the whole thing must appear—when viewed in contrast with the American scene—completely unendurable and destined to imperative change.

But for us, who are accustomed to working amid European conditions, it is clear that not even the greatest development of technology and transportation will ever create in Europe anything comparable to conditions in the United States. In this respect, so far as human foresight can tell, America will always retain her wonderful advantage. And in any case the economic and political gulf between Europe and America will not readily

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disappear. Of course it is absolutely impossible at the present moment to say just how all this is working out in detail or to prophesy how it will work out. America, with her vast expanse of territory, will have economic characteristics different from those of Europe, which as a consequence of the whole course of her political development remains divided into small territorial units. Even should time fulfill the expectations of those who believe that the national life of each individual European state will gradually be restricted to cultural fields, that first its economic and later its larger political interests will become broadly European, people do not seem to realize the effect which any tendency toward nationalism, even if only cultural, must nevertheless have on the development of economic life, on social conditions, on the working methods of the individual nations, and on their requirements as consumers.

But in general I want to keep what I have to say closer to present realities and to bring out particularly how Europe, far from following any tendency toward unified development, is deepening the lines of division between states because of the World War, and because of the manner in which the heritage of the World War has hitherto been liquidated. Our quest for new formulas, of which I spoke in my opening paragraph, has got into the field of post-war economic settlements. Here we find that Europe has received particular aid from the great plan for economic reconstruction which originated under the direction of the present American Vice-President, General Dawes. I am allowing myself the definite hope that on the basis of the Dawes Plan there will be developed, as a matter of pure economics, the possibility that Germany and later the whole of Europe may again take part in the life of the world. I shall not endeavor to explain here in detail what immense burdens the German people must shoulder as a result. I simply wish to register my firm opinion that the artificial reduction of the purchasing power of Germany's population, which has been brought about as the outcome of the war, is to be regarded as a handicap to the economic reconstruction of the world. Nevertheless, if affairs take a relatively favorable course, we shall now arrive—though doubtless amid many further vicissitudes—at a basis on which not only the special damage wrought by the World War will be repaired, but a way for the future economic collaboration of all the nations will also be devised.

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One may perhaps venture to hope, then, that in the economic field the new European formulas have already assumed at least a preliminary form. We may look for similar new formulas in political life as well. Assuredly the Treaty of Versailles contains some very considerable attempts in this direction—specifically, the first definite effort that up to that time had been made to give definite form to the idea of a League of Nations. I regard as an especially valuable part of the League organization the World Court at the Hague, which may be destined one day to bring to universal realization the fine ideal of a peaceful settlement of the conflicts of states.

The conception of general disarmament is likewise formulated in the Treaty of Versailles. Here one can clearly see, however, how far removed certain of the new formulas are from reality. For the compulsory and one-sided disarmament of Germany is obviously not a realization of the formula of general disarmament outlined in the Treaty of Versailles. Conversely, this one-sided disarmament (which has been carried to the point of producing complete impotency) has wholly upset the old arrangement on which the common life of nations used to be conducted in time of peace—that is, the balance of power. Thus the practical upshot of this one-sided disarmament is that the armaments of other powers seem actually to feed on the German lack of armament, because they can advance into an empty space. This is clearly to be seen in the fact that Germany, having been rendered powerless, is refused the evacuation of the first zone in the Rhineland which is specifically prescribed in the Treaty of Versailles itself. Similarly, the advance into the Ruhr, which in spite of the fact that it undoubtedly is illegal has hitherto been only in small part rectified, is an expression of the state of mind that results from having no opponent. The frame of mind which still exists in many heads in France, and which in practise leads not to the limitation of armament but rather to its increase, is linked, moreover, with notions of alleged dangers threatening from Germany. Objectively considered, these notions are incomprehensible. In this state of affairs it must unfortunately be pointed out that the new formula of the Versailles Treaty, that is, the formula of general disarmament, has led not to the pacification of Europe but rather in the opposite direction.

Such an admission is obviously a very grave matter, since

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the economic improvement of which I have spoken above cannot be maintained in the long run unless politically also there is evidence of a fundamental desire for peace. It therefore is not a matter of purely European internal policy, but a matter inseparably connected with the great ideas of world economics in which the London Agreement based on the Dawes Plan plays such a large part, that there should now be a further effort to find new formulas to establish political tranquillity in Europe. Viewed in this light the negotiations for a security pact seem like fumbling and uncertain strides toward that great goal which I described in opening. Thus regarded, the question of a security pact likewise is seen to be not an isolated question but rather a part of the general problem of creating such a foundation for European life that eventually the rattle of arms without and within may cease and that, working together in mutual confidence, the European nations may, under the new conditions of technical progress, make their contribution also toward the welfare of the world.

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TURKISH FACTS AND FANTASIES

By F.

I

IN THE past decade Turkey has passed through three periods of swift transformation. So bewildering have been the changes brought about by them that the atmosphere of the country is still that of the fairy tale. Look at the modern Turkish Republic, purged of Sultan and Khalif and foreign domination—where are the traces of the old Ottoman Empire? Or of the beaten Turk who was to be driven from Europe? Or of the Defender of Islam to whom the Moslem world, from Morocco to India, was supposed to rally four years ago? Gone, vanished, dissolved in the whirl of a fantasy as unreal as is the Turkish conception of it all. This decade is a kaleidoscopic picture of changing forms in front of which has been suspended one screen after another of camouflage. And back of all the shifting scenes the phlegmatic old Turk has remained, one of the most unchanged and unchangeable types in Europe.

The war period stripped the Empire of its non-Turkish possessions, disrupted the country by massacres and deportations and brought about the most abject surrender of any of the Central Powers. But the Turkish armies did not happen to be defeated in lands racially Turkish. Palestine and Syria meant little to the Turkish people: Allenby's campaign still less. And in the end Turkey, alone among the Central Powers, avoided the consequences of her defeat and the punishment she deserved. So when the Turk looks back on the war the camouflage screen falls, the realities disappear and he sees only his great victories of Gallipoli and Kut-el-Amara.

In the period following the war, the period between the armistices of Mudros and Mudania (1918–1922), the puppets moved with accelerated tempo. The Allies had meant to deal with Turkey as they liked. Above all they had meant to internationalize the Straits and to sweep the Turkish power from Europe—little matters of good housekeeping long overdue. They began by bringing upon the scene the most fantastic of their puppets, the Greek, with his Ionian and Byzantine traditions and his modern incompetency. A Turkish soldier appeared in the deserts of Anatolia and gathered about him a hardy lot

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of that one type which his race can always produce, the fighting man. In his palace at Constantinople the sanctity of the Sultan, the Khalif of Islam, rose like a ghost to haunt the Allied statesmen. And between the very tangible military power of Mustapha Kemal and the imponderable Mohammedan appeal of the Khalif the distraught Allies broke and blundered. Where unity alone was needed, self-seeking intrigues and fear proved to be poor substitutes.

Such was that extraordinary period which ended in the débâcle of the Greek army. What could have been more fantastic than the Allied declarations of neutrality in the war then being waged between their puppets, the Greeks, and their enemies, the Nationalist Turks? What could have been more of a sham than the relations then existing between the Sultan Khalif at Constantinople and the Nationalists at Angora—the Sultan denouncing the Nationalists as impious rebels while the Nationalists proclaimed to the Mohammedan world that they fought to liberate their Khalif? The height of Gilbertian absurdity was reached in the summer of 1922 when the Allies prevented the Greeks from entering Constantinople by threat of war, only to have the Turks themselves enter a year later.

Of course all this period of blunders is lost on the Turks. They see it as the glorious "War of Independence"; to them the issue was the rejuvenation of the Turkish nation, the rebirth of Turkish patriotism, the heroic struggle with Europe which they won by virtue of their own strength and sacrifice. The battles of In-Eunu and the Sakaria are very real and very glorious victories in their eyes. They did it all—it was not that the Allies held back from further fighting after four long years of war, not that the Allies quailed before the intangible power of the Khalif and blundered into turning their hands against each other, but that Turkey faced the West and won.

Recently a distinguished foreign general visited Constantinople. He was interviewed by the newspapers, and among other absurdities he was made to say in print that he considered "the battle of the Sakaria more glorious and of more consequence to the world than that of the Marne." Now this was not merely a case of Oriental lying. It would be fairer to call it the expression of an opinion which the ordinary Turk thinks a distinguished soldier should hold. A general who had never heard of the Sakaria would be inconceivable.

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I have emphasized the fantastic side of the foundations of the present Turkish state, not in order to make light of the great suffering and sacrifice of the Turks during the war and the armistice, but because the unrealities of the present republican régime cannot be grasped unless one realizes the artificial atmosphere of the preceding periods. When the editor of Constantinople's leading newspaper—a journal of European reputation—solemnly asks "all who are interested in politics if Turkey has ever been a menace to her neighbors," what is one to make of it? Is one to say, simply, "This man is a fool"? Not at all—in point of fact he is a highly cultivated and intelligent person. But he is understandable only in the light of the fantastic fairy tale in which he has lived.

When the armistice was signed at Mudania between the Turks and the "neutral" powers of Western Europe, Constantinople and the Straits were held by Allied troops, including a brigade of British Guards, backed by the most powerful battleships of Europe and a considerable air force. Yet within six weeks Allied power had become a camouflage. The great ships still lay in the harbor; British guardsmen and French poilus still walked the streets of Constantinople. But control had in reality passed to a little Turkish general, astute, unscrupulous and amazingly active. He was on his way to Thrace to command some eight thousand "gendarmes" allowed that province by the agreement of Mudania. But for one reason or another he tarried in Constantinople, and as he tarried he drew power into his hands. Before Mudania was two months past he had seen the Sultan-Khalif spirited out of Yildiz in a cold dawn and sent to Malta on a British battleship (this Khalif of Islam who had been the spiritual banner of the Turkish Nationalists and the bugaboo of the Allies), and he had driven to Top Capou and the Mosque of the Conqueror with a new Khalif (one carefully selected by Mustapha Kemal and his Angora Assembly) and had had him invested with the Mantle of the Prophet. A clever little Pasha, this; one who did his master's bidding most expeditiously and who realized, as did Kemal, that for a time at least the Khalifal camouflage would be most useful.

To be sure, "The Commander of the Faithful," in theory at least, should have temporal as well as spiritual powers. And, whatever may be said of the vagaries of Khalifal succession in the past, the election of such a dignitary by a laic and self-

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appointed Assembly was an innovation somewhat difficult to justify. But one must not examine too closely the props behind stage scenery. The eye should focus on the new Khalif; and it must be said that, for his part, he was ably chosen. He was a mild old gentleman who loved a quiet country life and who dabbled in art. Every Friday after he became Khalif he went to Mosque in state—such state as Angora allowed—and at other times he occupied himself in growing the beard which tradition prescribes. For he had no other duties whatsoever. The Sword of Othman which had girded the Sultans had not been produced at his investiture. Mustapha Kemal had his own idea about swords.

Meanwhile the Conference assembled at Lausanne. The powers of Europe faced Turkey across the peace table. At Turkey's side sat Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks had been the avowed friends of the Nationalist Turks, a treaty of alliance had been signed between them, and the Turks had profited by Russian aid in gold and munitions. To a lesser extent and through a more secret treaty they had profited by French sympathy. But at times it may be well to strip off the old camouflage and set up the new. Those nebulous friendships with the Bolsheviks and the French, for instance: were they not rather out of date at Lausanne? The Turks seemed to think so, at any rate. They preferred to come out boldly as the citizens of a great power lately revived by victorious battle, wholly independent, the masters of their own fate. And since no one was inclined to gainsay then at the risk of war, that pose proved to be as good as, if not better than, any. By dint of saying "no" most generally and "yes" but rarely, Ismet Pasha at last prevailed. It was diplomacy which called for some patience, but patience was born in Asia.

So at last the Capitulations were surrendered, the question of the payment of the interest on the Turkish pre-war debt was postponed to a more auspicious occasion, and the Treaty was signed. The old policies of internationalized Straits and a Turk-less Europe were admitted to be as unreal as had been Allied unity in the Near East. Considering that the Turk at Lausanne held practically all the cards in his hands, it is to his credit that the Treaty left the Straits open to commerce and contained sufficient give-and-take to make it a possible basis for international relations. The demilitarized zones of the Straits and the Thracian

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frontier, proposed by the Allies, look very well on the map. The little matter of seeing that they remain demilitarized, however, has been overlooked.

In due course of time the Allies withdrew their last troops from Constantinople. A small Turkish force marched in, very shabby and rather dispirited. It was difficult for the Constantinopolitans to see in them the "ever victorious army" which had won that startling victory over the Greeks and so greatly impressed Europe the preceding year. But appearances are deceptive; and in any event Turkish military power, real or unreal, had accomplished its purpose. The Second Conquest of Constantinople had passed into history.

The New Turkey then squared away on its course. It called itself the "Turkish State," and declared that it was governed solely by its "Grand National Assembly." But the President of that Assembly, Mustapha Kemal Pasha, had come to be called "Ghazi," the Victorious. He had lately toured the country and organized a political group which he called the "People's Party." He had also found time to marry a young lady endowed with wealth, modern ideas and ambition. Latefé Hanoum has somewhat shocked the old Turks. They are still not quite used to seeing her, in Europeanized clothes and veilless, accompanying her husband on his trips about the country. But the movement towards feminine emancipation among the upper classes in Turkey is a reality, limited to a small number of people, if you like, but nevertheless growing.

Mustapha Kemal, with his bride and his People's Party and his Lausanne Treaty all in his hand, prepared another shift of scene. At the end of October, 1923, the opportunity came. It was a minor political crisis, the fall of a cabinet on personal issues and a deadlock in the Assembly on the formation of a new one. But the occasion served. Mustapha Kemal stepped into the breech, stated the terms under which he would form a cabinet, and within two hours he found himself the duly elected President of the newly proclaimed Turkish Republic. Here indeed was a man of action. And in imposing his will on the amazed Assembly he also cut short the hesitations of a committee which had for a month been trying to draft a constitution. For the terms he had imposed on the Assembly were in fact the basic articles of such a constitution: the establishment of the Republic, the election of the President by the Assembly,

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the right of the President to preside at need over the Assembly and the Cabinet and to choose the Prime Minister. But the stroke of Kemal's sword had not been too apparent. The fiction was still carefully maintained that the Assembly, and not the President, ruled the country. The Assembly, however, was composed exclusively of members of the People's Party. Every other day that Party met its chiefs in closed caucus. Every alternate day it solemnly and openly functioned as the Grand National Assembly.

Mustapha Kemal chose as Premier the faithful Ismet, a man whose military career had shown him to be an excellent chief of staff, a matchless transmitter of orders received. The President was also happy in the fate which established the recompense for his labors. He found himself granted a salary somewhat higher than that of the President of the United States, while the Deputies of the Assembly contented themselves with the equivalent of about $2,000 a year.

The scene was then prepared for the dramatic exposure of a sham which it was no longer necessary to maintain. The Khalif of Islam, the spiritual link with the Mohammedans of all the world, the imponderable force which had so impressed Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, was to be revealed as a man of straw and summarily kicked out by his own people. Mustapha Kemal had found a more useful camouflage in the Assembly. He no longer needed the figure-head which he had set up at Dolma Bagtche. As a precautionary step a revolutionary court, called the "Tribunal of Independence," was instituted in Constantinople, where some journalists had printed an open letter from prominent Indian Moslems in which the Khalif set up by the Angora Government was urged not to resign his post. Even the Tribunal of Independence could not find much that was heinous in that, but it caught in its net a prominent lawyer and a hodja, charged with similar offenses, and sentenced them both to some years of imprisonment. Constantinople was duly impressed with the necessity of caution in dealing with the Khalifate.

Mustapha Kemal then went off for a rest at Smyrna. He invited the chastened journalists of Constantinople to visit him in his retreat. Also he arranged a "strategic war game" which would bring the army chiefs within conferring distance of Smyrna. To journalists and generals he had certain things to say, and from his contact with them he saw that all was well.

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Immediately he returned to Angora and made a famous speech to the Assembly (March 1, 1924). "The Moslem religion," he said, "must be freed from its rôle as a political instrument which it has been made to play for centuries." Two days later the abolition of the Khalifate was proclaimed by the all-powerful Assembly, and on the night of March 4th–5th the ex-Kahlif, with his family and some scanty personal belongings, was hustled out of his palace by the police and driven by motor thirty miles outside Constantinople. There they were put in a train and sent across the frontier. No doubt Lloyd George and Poincaré wondered why they, in their day, had never thought of so simple a move.

But that was not all. The abolition of the Khalifate and the exile of the entire Osmanli Family was promptly followed by the suppression of the religious courts and schools and the assumption of governmental control over the very considerable properties of the Mohammedan Church. "To the victor belong the spoils." Laicism was decreed as the policy of the Government. Hereafter there was to be but one power in Turkey, the Grand National Assembly. The astute soldier in his modest presidential residence at Angora could not be bothered with other masks.

Furthermore, there was a constitution to be drawn up and adopted. Modern republics must have constitutions, and Kemal and his entourage are nothing if not modern. One day a week was set aside for the discussion of that important document. Some fifty of its articles were discussed and adopted in this way during March and the first half of April, 1924. But the program was running behind and certain snags had been encountered. The Assembly was at times inclined to forget its true rôle in the play. It actually objected to writing into the constitution presidential authority to dissolve the Assembly, or presidential command of the army and navy in time of war, or a longer presidential term of office than the life of an Assembly. Even with a full day a week devoted to it, the constitution did not seem to be getting itself done, at least not as it should be done. Accordingly, on the 20th of April, the Assembly was persuaded to consider for a few hours the remaining fifty odd articles, including all those on juridical powers and on the personal rights of citizens, and to adopt them. It then proceeded to put the whole constitution to a final vote by the raising of hands.

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A two-thirds majority was secured, and the matter was considered settled by acclamation.

The Assembly, having performed two such notable feats, took a rest for a half a year. In the early summer an Anglo-Turkish conference met to settle, if possible, the Mosul Question. The Turks claimed practically the whole province, and based their claim largely on the Kurdish population of Mosul. They pointed out that there are thousands of Kurds within the borders of Turkey, and that the Turk and the Kurd are really one: give Turkey, therefore, the whole of Kurdistan. It was not a happy plea, for nine months later the Kurds in Turkey rose in revolt, but for better or worse it broke up the conference on the Golden Horn.

It was not until the fall of 1924, after the Assembly had met again at Angora, that the smooth working of Mustapha Kemal's machine became slightly deranged. Trouble with the British on the Mosul frontier, due to a Turkish raid into disputed territory, postponed for a few weeks the rift in Turkish political unity. But in November an opposition party was at last formed. It adopted the name of "Progressive Republican" (whereupon the People's Party, regretting that they had not thought of that before, tacked "Republican" onto their own name). There naturally ensued a political flurry at Angora. The old system had been so simple. One party, one assembly, one government—what could be more *en famille?* And the worst of it was that the army, Kemal's stronghold, contributed to the Progressives two of its best generals and that clever little Pasha who had shared with the Allies the honor of occupying Constantinople.

The new party was, of course, a distinct minority. But it was not long in being before the Government trimmed its sails, and a much less intransigent cabinet, under Fethi Bey, came into power. The Progressives had justified their existence by making the radical government more conservative. For it is natural in a land of camouflage that the title of "Progressive" should mean just what it does not seem to mean—conservative. The Progressives were, and are, the group opposed to violent changes, to over-hurried Westernization and to the immediate destruction of the old traditions that cling to Islam. Their platform advocates free trade (with certain exceptions), national referendum as the sole means of modifying the constitution, the direct election of deputies, and the election instead of the appointment of city mayors. This sounds innocuous enough, but platforms

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amount to little in Turkey. They are but part of the scenery. The real issues always hinge on personalities.

There soon appeared a startling personality — General Nurreddin Pasha, son-in-law of the most prominent Dervish in Turkey, a reactionary, a devout Moslem and an avowed personal enemy of Mustapha Kemal. His election to the Assembly from Brusa in the month of December, 1924, was a grievous blow to the Government, for up to that time all electorates had been notably amenable to governmental wishes. Nor was his election much more welcome to the Progressives than to the Kemalists. He is a reactionary of a decidedly unassimilable type. The Government promptly refused to allow him to take his seat in the Assembly on the ground that he had not fulfilled a certain condition required by the constitution of a candidate at a general election. As a matter of fact it was a by-election that had been held in Brusa, but Angora interpreted it otherwise. Two months later Brusa returned Nurreddin Pasha on a second election, and the Government, busy with the Kurdish revolt and alive to the danger of raising the religious issue, allowed him to take his seat.

For the Kurdish revolt thoroughly alarmed Angora. The disaffected region was small and the number of armed rebels relatively few, but the standard raised by the revolt was the Koran itself. Religious conviction may not be deep in Turkey, but there is a strong Moslem sentiment. The danger was that all the dissatisfied elements in the country would rally to the old traditions. So they might have done had there been at the helm of government a lesser man than Mustapha Kemal. His counter measures were both thorough and deliberate. Twelve provinces were put under martial law. A partial mobilization was decreed to increase by half the strength of the army. Elaborate military plans were put in operation by which—though contact with the rebels was delayed six weeks—in the end, overwhelming forces were brought to bear in encircling movements.

The political measures were even more far reaching. The arbitrary Tribunals of Independence were reëstablished. The relatively moderate cabinet of Fethi Bey, which called itself "a government of calm and stability," was replaced by one under the ever-useful Ismet. The Opposition was thoroughly subdued. wavering adherents (and they were many in the Assembly)

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hastened to reaffirm their devotion to the People's Party, spurred on by three laws which the Government hastily put through. These laws made treasonable any form of religious appeal which could be construed as of a political bias, gave the Government the arbitrary power of suppressing any newspaper it chose, and permitted generals commanding army corps to execute death sentences on any persons, military or civil, condemned by military courts in any territory that might be placed under martial law. These extraordinary measures were delicately called "tranquillity laws." One is reminded of that old English phrase about objectionable people being "quieted with swords."

II

These are the high lights of the short story of the New Turkey. But they are so obscured by the mists of unreality that one must look beneath them in any attempt to estimate the value of the Turkish State as a political entity.

Consider first with what manner of man we are dealing. The Turk has some estimable personal traits. It is neither by chance nor by intrigue that he has won the devotion of so many fine men and women of the West. As an individual his simplicity, honesty, loyalty and kindliness make a very strong appeal—the stronger because of the contrast with those about him. But he is singularly lacking in creative ability. Broadly speaking, he has created nothing in all the seven centuries of his distinct history. Races subject to him have worked in his name and have created some splendid things—the mosques of Stambul, for instance. He has borrowed copiously from the Persian, the Arab, the Byzantine, the Armenian, the Syrian, and the European. But neither art nor science nor philosophy owe him any appreciable debt.

Two occupations have absorbed him since he came into Europe nearly six hundred years ago—administration and war. Few peoples have had more varied experience in either. Yet every land he has administered, from the Persian Gulf to the Middle Danube, has known either stagnation or ruin under his hand. In war he has always fought with stolid courage and sometime with fanatical *élan*. But his best troops have usually come from subject races, and in all his wars he has not produced a single general or admiral of the first rank, nor a single tactic or military invention of value.

This extraordinary lack of creative ability, even in his own

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chosen fields, bears directly on his present problem. For, essentially, the task which he has set himself is the creation of a nation. So far as his present purpose is concerned, the Turkey that existed before the war cannot be used even for a foundation. The old Ottoman Empire was not a nation in the modern Western sense of the word, which is also the modern Turkish sense. It was rather an administrative machine for the collection of taxes. Those taxes went to a small oligarchy (save when the international receivers intervened after the state went bankrupt). And since church and state were one, the great mass of the people, who counted for nothing save as a source of revenue, uncomplainingly supported both.

Very different is this ultra-Western nation which the Turks are now trying to construct. Their Assembly may be a camouflage to cover autocratic power; their elections may generally be hollow forms. But the essence of the thing they are avowedly striving for is a nation in our sense of the word, and the spirit behind it is nationalism, though of the narrowest and most chauvinistic type. The result must necessarily hinge on Turkish ability to create, or at least to imitate.

What they propose to do, if we may accept the formula of their leading political philosopher, is to amalgamate Turkish culture, Moslem religion and Western civilization. Now Turkish culture, so far as it can be defined, is a resultant of certain ideas and traditions of other Eastern races impinging on the simplicity and virility of a tribe of Turkoman warriors. The Ottoman Turks have never absorbed into their body politic the various races they have ruled. But they have absorbed an immense amount of foreign blood, through their slave trade in women and their seizure of Christian boys for the corps of Janissaries. They have also assimilated much of the civilization and culture of the Eastern peoples, especially the Byzantines, with whom they have come into contact. Before they came under Western influence, for instance, they shaped their empire into the framework of Byzantine government so well that one could hardly be distinguished from the other. On their past performances in assimilating foreign culture the modern Turkish nationalists base their claim that Western civilization can also be absorbed.

But one wonders whether they take into account the essential difference between Western and Eastern civilization. Our Western life is built on experiences from which Eastern Europe and

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The Levant have been completely isolated—the revival of learning, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the discovery and conquest of the New World, the liberal-democratic movement, the industrial revolution and the growth of modern science. We Westerners have become realistic and individualistic to a degree beyond anything ever attained in the East. Quite aside from any handicaps that may arise through Turkish retention of the Moslem religion, the amalgamation of Turkish culture and Western civilization would appear to be, on the face of it, a considerable undertaking.

So far the Turks have to their credit little constructive work which would indicate future success along this line. The constitution is obviously not a stable foundation. The cavalier manner in which it was adopted is a true indication of the way in which the Turks regard it. It can, in practice, be amended by a simple vote of the Assembly, and interpreted by whatever government is in power. Before it was a year old the Assembly, at the instance of the Government, passed those "Tranquillity Laws" which have, potentially at least, restricted personal liberty to the vanishing point.

What is worse, from the point of view of nation-building, is the Turkish failure to consolidate the divergent elements within the state. The Kurdish problem is a case in point, and the Kurdish revolt is a measure of their failure. More serious still is the growing disaffection of Constantinople and the Marmara region. Basically this is a question of lowlands versus highlands, of the divergence of interests between a costal region, with its sea-borne trade, and a high and largely barren plateau. The highlands rule, and the erstwhile great city, the Seat of Empire for fifteen centuries, is consistently snubbed. Last summer, when Mustapha Kemal sailed up the Bosphorus on a warship, the Constantinopolitans enjoyed their nearest approach to a visit from their President. Presidential displeasure is hard to bear, no doubt, but the loss of trade is still worse. Anatolian administrators and Angoran legislation are pretty generally held responsible for the present serious slump in the commerce of Constantinople. The ships that once crowded her harbor now go (of all places!) to the Piraeus. Constantinople complains of the incompetence, if not the downright malevolence of Angora's rule, and Angora counters by charges of disloyalty and subversion. They are not a happy pair.

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Nor have the Turks, in their task of nation-building, shown ability in solving their economic problems. Their country is essentially agricultural, but on several occasions they have been compelled to import wheat. This may have been due to bad seasons or poor seed, but the Government laid it to faulty transportation within the country—and then proceeded (spring of 1925) to put through a new transportation tax of 10 percent ad valorem on all agricultural produce which moves forty miles from its place of origin! The necessity for the construction of roads and railroads is very obvious; but many grand projects, including that of the Chesters, have resulted only in an insignificant amount of governmental rail-laying from Angora towards Sivas. The Turkish pound slowly depreciates, the cost of living rises, land taxes are increased, new "consumption" taxes are imposed to raise the tariff barriers, and still the yearly budgets fail to balance and the interest on the public debts remains unpaid. Foreign capital is not encouraged when it remembers the Turkish Government's bankruptcy in 1875 and its partial repudiation of 1903, or examines the Government's attitude towards its present indebtedness.

To the credit of their economics it must be said that the Turks are trying to give some assistance to their farmers through the establishment of agricultural banks, that they have not so far resorted to the printing press to obtain money, and that they have recently done away with the pernicious "tithe" system under which 12 percent of farm produce was taken by the state. They are also blessed with a few money-making crops, such as tobacco, raisins and figs, which support Smyrna and Samsun and bring in some much-needed cash. But their deficit for the past fiscal year was large. How large it was no one knows, for they have not published their actual expenditures since 1921. We do know, however, that considerable deficits have been accumulating year by year, and the military expenses incident to the suppression of the Kurdish revolt will swell the total. Foreign financiers who know Turkey well cannot see how the country can continue to finance itself, much less meet its debts.

In jurisprudence there is not much sign of constructive effort. The Consular Courts on the one hand and the Sheriat (religious) Courts on the other, have been abolished. But the Turkish civil courts, which were supposed to expand and cover the whole

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field, are much the same as they always were. Paper reorganization will not do. What is needed is a well paid judiciary and reasonably sound methods of judicial procedure. And these are not forthcoming.

The fiction of a modern state exists, but little else. Nothing gets done. There are interminable discussions and negotiations, but little result. Interpellations are made in the Assembly, but the questions die. A few doctrinaires strive to ram Western ideas, including laicism, down the throats of a people essentially anti-Western and intensely reactionary. And there is little result from it all. The truth is that among Turkey's eight million people the number of intelligent, progressive and capable men are very few indeed. They are attempting to make the country pull itself up by its own boot-straps, and incompetence, inertia and a certain childish form of chauvinistic xenophobia meet them at every turn.

III

What is there, then, in this fantastic play of unrealities? Are all the shapes one sees on the stage just phantoms? No. There is in Turkey what there has often been in the past—a strong man. He at least is no sham. He knows exactly what he wants, and he gets it. That he is called Ghazi and President, that he rules behind the mask of an Assembly, does not make him essentially different from that Abdul Hamid II who was called Sultan and Khalif and who ruled by absolutism sanctified through ancient tradition. Radical Westernization and laicism are Kemal's tools, just as secrecy and intrigue were those of Abdul Hamid. The real issue is personal power, as it was in the days of the Sultans.

In the face of the reality of this struggle and of Turkish inefficiency in constructive directions, the few men who are unselfishly trying to build up a nation can do little or nothing. Turkey under the present régime must of necessity deteriorate. There is simply not enough untrammelled administrative ability in the country to keep it up. But that it will go to pieces, that it will break up under the weight of its own incompetency or fall the prey of some foreign power, does not at all follow. The Turk has stored up an immense resistance to misgovernment. His needs are extraordinarily simple. He can get along somehow under almost any conditions. He asks only to be left

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alone. The country, to Western eyes, may be going to the dogs —but does the Turk know it?

Furthermore, Turkey is today what she has been for a hundred years and more, a most useful weight in the European balance of power. Internationally she is supported by the jealousies and suspicions of rival powers, just as a keystone is held in place by the arches on either side. Great Britain finds her most useful in blocking the Russians from the Mediterranean and the route to India. Russia is content to see her hold the Straits until such time as the old Russian dream may come true. She enters as a factor in the Franco-Italian rivalry for supremacy in the Mediterranean. No European power would willingly see her replaced by a rival. The great Straits and the inter-continental land passage centering at Constantinople are too vital.

These, then, are the realities of the "New" Turkey—the old personal struggle for autocracy, the old mass inertia and incompetence, the old balance between the rival powers of Europe. Laicism, Westernism, democracy; these are but the passing fads of the present ruler, like the pan-Islamism of Abdul Hamid or the pan-Turanianism of Enver Pasha. Nationalism runs deeper, for the Turk has been severely shaken up in the past ten years. But nationalism leads nowhere unless it builds up a nation. The Turk's labors to construct a nation on ultra-Western lines are wholly foreign to his blood and to his traditions. Our Western foundations become in his hands mere camouflage for the things which are to him racially inborn—the personal struggle of the few, the political indifference of the many.

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THE FUTURE OF THE OECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE

By A. Rustem Bey

THE banishment from Turkish soil of Constantine VI, who was elected Oecumenical Patriarch in January, has brought to the front the question of the future of the institution of which this prelate became, as it were, the still-born representative. A deep-seated and long-standing antagonism exists between Turkey and the Patriarchate, of which this incident is only the latest manifestation and which, in the interest of both parties, calls for a prompt and radical solution.

Practically on the morrow of the capture of Constantinople in 1453, Mohammed II, "The Conqueror," issued a *Berat*, or Imperial Patent, by virtue of which the Greek community was allowed to retain its faith and practise it in almost complete freedom. Constantinople remained the seat of the Oecumenical Patriarchate, which continued to function in the magnificent premises assigned to it in the Phanar (as the Greek quarter of the city was called), surrounded by the same pomp and splendor as before. Not only this, but its spiritual jurisdiction was extended to the entire Orthodox population of the Empire—Bulgars, Rumanians and Serbs, as well as Greeks; and to this spiritual jurisdiction, which grouped under one religious sceptre ethnical elements outnumbering by far the dominant race, was added a very considerable administrative authority. The ecclesiastical organization of the Greeks became in this fashion the framework of a vast system of self-government applicable to all the members of the Eastern Church, irrespective of nationality, of which the Greeks had the control through their Patriarchate.

Here is how Prof. Philip Marshall Brown, of Princeton University, alludes to the subject in his book, "Foreigners in Turkey, Their Juridical Status," published in 1914: "His (the Conqueror's) idea was extremely simple. He aimed at leaving the Greeks in the enjoyment of their own customs and laws, in the fullest practical measure possible, under the responsible control of their Patriarch who was to serve as their intermediary or ambassador with the Sublime-Porte. . . . He also granted to the Patriarch and his successors an almost unlimited juris-

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diction over the members of the Greek nation. . . . The essential fact to note is that the Turks, in the midst of a great triumph, recognized generously and spontaneously to the conquered the right to govern themselves according to their own laws and customs in all affairs considered as sacred by the Mussulmans as well as those which were not vital to the State." Such statements should do much towards inducing the Western public to revise its opinion of Turkish imperial rule.

The fact is that the annals of imperialism do not record a single instance of a treatment of the conquered by the conquerors even remotely approaching in liberalism that meted out to the Greeks by the Turks. A veritable *imperium in imperio*—that is what the Greek community represented in the Ottoman Empire, and the Oecumenical Patriarchate had the absolute control of the machinery of this formidable organization.

So long as Turkey remained powerful, inspiring respect and fear at home and abroad, the Patriarchate observed, at least outwardly, a correct attitude towards the state. No sooner, however, were there signs of impaired authority than the Patriarchate (in which disloyalty had been smouldering from the very moment of the subjection of the Greek race to Turkish rule) reared its head in opposition. With Muscovite encouragement, it plunged into a policy of subversive intrigue aiming at the restoration of Greek independence and the reconstitution of the Empire of Byzance. The conclusion of the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774, by which defeated Turkey was made to recognize victorious Russia's claim to a right of protection over the Orthodox populations of the Empire, marks the beginning of the revolutionary enterprise of the Patriarchate.

No doubt it was in a way natural that, insensible to gratitude, the Patriarchate should take advantage of the opportunities which the Turks themselves, in their over-confident liberalism, had so abundantly provided, to work for liberation from Turkish rule. History teaches that no people conscious of its individuality will resign itself to the loss of its independence. Sooner or later, if not from the outset, it will grow restive under the foreign yoke, its reactions growing in violence and intensity as time goes by and occasion serves.

But it was no less natural that Turkey, taking her stand on the right of conquest, which to this day forms an essential part of the *conventional* public law of the civilized world, should

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have viewed the revolutionary movement among her Greek subjects in the light of a criminal enterprise to be resented and combated with all the greater force because, according to the *official* code of ethics in general use, its prosecution was, in the circumstances, a manifestation of gross ingratitude. And if the Patriarchate became the object of the special aversion of the Turkish people and Government, this is sufficiently explained by its rôle as initiator, organizer and leader of the aforesaid movement. To denounce the operation of these feelings as being a display of what is called Turkish fanaticism is a libel on the Turkish race. (The introduction of religious passion into Turkey's relations with the subject Christian peoples was due to the influence exercised in her midst, so long as she was an Empire, by such truly fanatical elements as the Arabs and the Islamized Slavs and Greeks. These elements having ceased to play a rôle in the new Turkey, the latter's action may be trusted to be entirely free from fanaticism in the future. Her renunciation of the Khalifate and the secularization of the state show that the new spirit is already fully in operation.)

In her struggle with the Patriarchate, Turkey was terribly handicapped, until the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, by the tyranny exercised over her by the great powers of Europe. Terrorized by naval demonstrations, military occupations, financial boycotting, etc., to which the great powers did not hesitate to resort on numerous occasions, Turkey, rather than enter into conflict with them on the subject of the Patriarchate —Russia being particularly dreaded in this connection—finally gave up all serious attempt at crushing this inveterate foe installed in her midst.

The defeat of Turkey in the Great War, followed as it was by the occupation of Constantinople by the Allies and Greece, gave the Patriarchate its long-awaited opportunity to throw off its allegiance to Turkey and transfer it to Greece. This was in the natural order of things, but the situation thus created, so long as it lasted, was marked on the Greek side by an inconceivable orgy of provocations and aggressions.

The decisive victory of the Nationalist troops over the Greek army of occupation in Anatolia, and the ensuing Peace of Lausanne, introduced a radical change in the relationship of Turkey to the Western world. The Patriarchate, too, felt the repercussion. Having recovered her sovereignty in full, Turkey

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found herself at last free to deal with this institution according to its deserts—short, however, of banishing it from the country, this for a reason to be explained presently.

Angora began by severing the organic connection existing between the Patriarchate and the state. Gone now are the administrative rights it possessed for centuries, gone the privileges and franchises, the pomp and splendor, on which rested its great situation in the country and to which it owed much of its prestige abroad. Except that its activities are watched and its hierarchical organization controlled, the Turkish Government refuses to take any notice of its existence. In the eyes of Angora the Patriarchate has ceased to be anything more than the head office of the native Greek community. Its oecumenical pretensions are absolutely ignored.

But though dealing a great blow at the authority of the Patriarchate, and reducing thereby in some measure its power to injure the country, the new restrictions did not go the full length of what was demanded by the security of the state. The fact is that the only means of preventing the Patriarchate from being a source of trouble and danger to Turkey is for the latter to withdraw its hospitality.

The entire orientation of Greek foreign policy demonstrates that Greek imperialism has not disarmed, at least in relation to Constantinople and the narrow stretch of territory which still separates it from the Kingdom of Hellas. And that the maintenance of Constantinople as the seat of the Patriarchate, in unwilling response by Turkey to the passionate insistence of Greece supported by the Allies and the United States at Lausanne, was intended to serve the cause of Hellenic expansion, is irresistibly suggested by the circumstances. Manifestly, the underlying motive of the effort to ensure the survival of the Patriarchate in Constantinople was the intention to use this institution, in the future as in the past, as a bulwark of Hellenic influence in the heart of the coveted place itself and as an agent of the policy pursued by the Greek Government at the expense of Turkey. Corroborative evidence of this interpretation is to be found in the exemption from the operation of the Convention for the Exchange of Populations of a certain category of the Turkish-born Greeks of Constantinople. What other explanation is there of this concern for an exception in favor of fifty or sixty thousand Constantinopolitan Greeks, when ready consent

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was given to the expatriation of the remaining two million Greeks throughout Turkey, except that the favored group was meant to keep alive Hellenic claims on the City of Constantine? And what more logical than to bracket this case with the case of the Patriarchate and to discern in each a confirmation of the interpretation given to the other?

Be that as it may, a positive fact is that the Patriarchate has not ceased to be a hot-bed of intrigue, in violation of the specific condition on which Turkey assented to its remaining in Constantinople. The latest instance of its impenitence was the election of Constantine, who had been formally declared liable to exchange by the competent mixed commission and concerning whom the electoral synod had received the warning of the government to strike him off the list of candidates as it had been decided to make no exception in his favor and to remove him forthwith from Turkey.

Manifestly, Turkey cannot rely on any assurances or pledges, however binding in appearance, that the Patriarchate will settle down to a loyal attitude towards the State. No other resource is left to her but to put the frontier between herself and this institution. Sooner or later this decision will have to be taken. That the Patriarchate claiming to represent the entire Orthodox world, composed of close upon two hundred million individuals belonging to fifteen or twenty different nationalities, should continue to have its residence in Mussulman Turkey, whose population does not include today more than 100,000 members of the Eastern Church—and these all Greeks—is an anachronism and paradox.

At the Conference of Lausanne the question having been raised of the location of the Patriarchate, a declaration was obtained from Turkey to the effect that this institution would be allowed to remain in Constantinople on condition that it would cease to deal in politics and intrigue. But this declaration does not figure in the text of the Treaty of Lausanne or any of its annexes. It is simply recorded in one of the *procès-verbaux* of the Conference, which deprives it of the force of an international stipulation. And the condition on which its validity, such as it was, was made to depend, has been repeatedly violated, as explained higher up, and thus in any case has ceased to be binding on Turkey. For the rest, not a single treaty or convention or other international agreement is in existence which im-

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poses on Turkey any obligation whatsoever as regards the Patriarchate. Juridically speaking, therefore, she is absolutely free to banish it from her soil.

The question now presents itself whether, though free from judicial restraints, Turkey is not morally called upon to stay her hand; whether, in other words, she is not obliged to take into consideration the sentiment of Christianity which, according to current statements, would be shocked if the Patriarchate were removed from its historical and traditional setting. The answer to this is that no considerations of international comity can be allowed to prevail over the *raison d'état*. Also, the offensive attitude systematically adopted towards Islamism by the Christian world has in any case relieved Turkey of all obligation to spare the religious sensibilities of the latter.

But, as a matter of fact, would the removal of the Patriarchate from Constantinople really produce a commotion in the Christian world in the sense and to the extent claimed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, for instance, who, moving for information in the House of Lords concerning the banishment of Constantine, declared that the "Oecumenical Patriarchate is one of the most venerable of institutions, with a range of authority and influence far outside the limits of Constantinople and whose continuity is fundamentally important to the whole Christian Church"? The question is worth inquiring into briefly.

The Patriarchate is certainly a venerable institution. For the rest, the Archbishop's statements are inaccurate. The oecumenical pretensions of the Patriarchate are contested by every Orthodox community, except the Greek. The Rumanian, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Russian communities (the latter the most important of all), proclaimed at different periods their independence of the Phanar. In the case of the three first-named communities, this was a revolt against the administrative as well as the spiritual jurisdiction of the Patriarchate and as such it was marked by feelings of deep hostility toward the latter's policy of Hellenization. In reality, the "Oecumenical" Patriarchate ceased to exist long ago. There can be no talk of its continuity, as such. Its removal from Constantinople, which does not mean in the least its suppression as a religious institution of the Greeks, can only have the effect of setting limits to its legitimate rôle. The Greek community may, and no doubt will, deplore the change—but not the rest of the Orthodox world.

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Again, the Roman Catholic Church has always been hostile to the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, in which it saw a rival to its own pretensions to universality, quite apart from considering it a heretic rebel against the "mother" institution. The removal of the Patriarchate from Constantinople will be pleasing to Catholic circles, as implying a lowering of its status.

Of the three great divisions of the Christian Church there remains the Protestant. And of this only one section, the Anglo-Saxon (British and American), has shown any concern in regard to the geographical future of the Patriarchate. As a matter of fact, in the Anglican world this concern is inspired much more by political than by religious considerations. The American Church is the only one, then, which can be credited with a sincere feeling of religious emotion in this connection. Much as Turkey would like to show regard for the sensibilities of the United States the possibility is denied her by the force of circumstances.

It is only a maudlin or medievally militant or politically contaminated Christianity than can oppose the idea of the transference of the Patriarchate from Constantinople to some congenial locality in Christian territory. (Greece is logically designated as the place best suited for harboring its future destinies.) From the point of view of the prestige of this institution, of the purification of its activities, of the regularity and efficiency of its functioning, the change can only redound to its advantage. Apart from the obscurity to which it is condemned in Turkey, it is exposed to all the misadventures and humiliations which its incorrigibility and the accumulations of Turkish resentment are bound to bring upon its head. Such incidents as the banishment of the holder of the patriarchal office, not to speak of the frequent police raids which have been made upon it lately, all tending to ruin what prestige it may still possess, must recur so long as it remains on Turkish soil.

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THE ARMIES OF EUROPE IN 1925

By Sir Frederick Maurice

FOR five years the League of Nations has been seeking for some way to give effect to the declaration contained in Article 8 of the Covenant: "The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety." In each of the treaties of peace—with Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria—a strict limitation of armaments was imposed upon those powers, and in each case the clauses defining those limitations were prefaced by the statement that: "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations Germany (Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria) undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow." Therefore for a number of years two pledges have been in existence, the first given by all the signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the second by all the signatories to the treaties of peace, that they would seek to bring about a general limitation of armaments.

During these five years the problem has been again and again investigated by commissions of the League of Nations, and a number of plans have been produced, but so far none of them has obtained a sufficient degree of support to bring any practical result. It is not my purpose in this article to discuss the merits or demerits of these plans but rather to give a description of the land and air armaments of Europe today and to indicate some of the difficulties which have hitherto stood in the way of reduction.

But before turning to the land and air armaments a word on the position of naval armaments is necessary. If no result has yet been obtained at Geneva, real progress in the solution of the problem of naval armaments was made at the Washington Conference. At that Conference in 1922 Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy agreed to accept a definite limitation of battleship tonnage, and to preserve as between themselves a certain ratio in that tonnage. Great Britain and the United States were to have a ratio of 5, Japan of 3, France and Italy of 1.5. That ratio was not, as has some-

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times been stated, to apply to naval armaments generally, for while a limit of 10,000 tons was accepted for the construction of new cruisers, no limitation was placed upon the number of cruisers, nor of naval personnel, nor of destroyers, while attempts to limit submarines failed. The Conference has resulted in the scrapping of a number of battleships and in the prevention of competition, but successful as it was there were limits to its success, and the reasons both for the success and the limits to it have a bearing upon the problems of land armaments.

First among the reasons for success must be placed the strong expression of popular opinion, particularly in the United States, in favor of the objects of the Conference. Second came the fact that the three principal naval powers, Great Britain, the United States and Japan, all felt themselves to be secure against any form of attack for which naval armaments could provide protection. It was this fact that allowed public opinion in favor of a limitation of armaments to become expressive and influential. There will never be similar enthusiasm in countries which feel themselves to be in danger, and no arguments that armaments are in themselves a cause of war will impress people whose history and experience show them that they are liable to attack, until some other form of protection in which they have confidence, other than their own armaments, has been provided for them.

A third reason for the success of the Washington Conference was due to the kind of armament which was chosen for limitation. A battleship takes a very long time to build and cannot be constructed in secret. Each of the parties to the treaty was therefore confident that any attempt to evade its provisions as regards battleship tonnage would be discovered, and that therefore the attempt would not be made. But since the treaties have been signed suggestions have not been infrequent from nationals in the countries of the signatories that one or other of those signatories was evading its secondary provisions, as for instance in the matter of gun elevation. This is an instance of the extreme difficulty of establishing any general confidence in these matters, and of how easily even the most friendly nations become suspicious of each other.

The negotiation for the limitation of submarines broke down because submarines are a very effective means of coast defense and because those nations with a long coastline, France and

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Italy for example, were unwilling to limit their supply of a comparatively cheap and effective weapon while other powers possessed the means of attacking their coasts, and because it is possible to build submarines comparatively easily and quietly and there is not the same assurance that their construction could be known as in the case of battleships. Similarly the agreement concluded at Washington on the use of asphyxiating gases has remained a dead letter, for the reason that such gases can be secretly prepared and no one has any confidence that an agreement prohibiting their use will be observed. Recently the very premises of Article 5 of the Washington treaty which runs "the use in war of asphyxiating poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials, and devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world," have been challenged with arguments which require respectful consideration. Proposals have been made for the extension of the terms of the Washington treaties to those states which were not parties to them, and also for a general extension of those terms. While the conditions for bringing this about are more difficult and complicated than confronted the delegates at Washington in 1922—for example, the requirements of the naval powers in cruisers and other light naval craft depend mainly on the length of their sea communications, which vary in almost every case—yet the prospects of obtaining further agreement are far from negligible. There is no logical reason why if all powers having navies are brought together the battleship ratio should not be still further reduced, and it is even possible that eventually what is now known as the battleship may disappear by general agreement, and its place be taken by the type of ship now called the cruiser, with a defined tonnage and armament. Such a possibility, which would at least result in great economies, would appear to depend mainly upon a general will to effect reductions, and upon the battleship maintaining its claim to be the one type of armored vessel capable of resisting attack by torpedo and air bomb.

Such being the general position as regards the navies, let us turn to the armies.

Statements that purport to give a comparative estimate of the military strength of various powers in terms of the number of men they maintain in arms in time of peace are, taken by themselves, very misleading. The systems by which armies are

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raised and maintained in various countries have a direct bearing upon their offensive and defensive power. Of three countries each with armies in time of peace of 200,000 men, one may have half its troops in garrisons in distant places abroad and small reserves for the expansion of those that remain at home; the second may have a system which makes its army effective for the defense of its frontiers but incapable of making a rapid attack upon an enemy's territory; while the third may have a system which enables it to expand at once its peace army three or four fold, and take the field with this increased body either in attack or in defense. Between these three there is obviously no common unit of comparison such as the battleship represents in the navies. The reduction of the three armies by a like number of men may be crippling in the one case and make comparatively little difference in the others.

The three systems indicated above cover, generally speaking, those in existence in Europe today. They are known as the voluntary system, the militia system, and the compulsory service system. The voluntary system has been imposed by treaty upon Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In each case the terms are similar though the number of soldiers permitted varies. Germany is allowed to maintain 100,000 men, Austria 30,000, Hungary 35,000, and Bulgaria 20,000. Enlistment must be voluntary and for at least 12 years, no reserves and no military aircraft are permitted, and the weapons of all kinds are strictly limited in number. I shall have something to say later as to the observance of these conditions by Germany.

The only power in Europe which maintains an army on a voluntary basis of its own initiative is Great Britain. In 1913 the strength of that army, including the air force which was then an integral part of the army, was 250,000. In 1925 the strength of the army and of the air force, which has become a separate organization, was approximately the same, the air force as compared with pre-war days having been largely increased and the number of soldiers having been correspondingly diminished. The terms of service are the same as they were before the war, being for most sections of the army seven years with the colors and five years in the reserve. Owing to the number of foreign garrisons maintained by Great Britain about one-half of the army is always abroad, the largest garrison being in India. The reserve which is available for the immediate expansion of the

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army in an emergency has a normal strength of 120,000 men, but as the British army had to be recreated in 1920, on the disbandment of the forces raised for the war, that figure has not yet been reached, and in 1925 the reserve numbers 99,000 men. A voluntary system of this nature is a convenient one for a country with large possessions outside its shores, for it is impossible to compel men to serve for long terms in strange countries and climates. A comparatively long term of service with the colors is necessary to avoid the expense of constantly bringing men home and sending others out to replace them, but this means that the reserve for expansion is necessarily small. In every other system (except where restrictions have been imposed, as in the case of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria) the reserve is much larger than the army serving in time of peace.

In order to overcome this difficulty Great Britain has adopted what may be termed a voluntary militia system. She maintains a Territorial Force, voluntarily recruited, the members of which do such training as their occupations in civil life permit. The strength of the Territorial Army provided for in 1925 is 148,750 men, its actual strength being somewhat lower. In the event of an extreme emergency, such as the outbreak of another Great War, the Territorial Army will be the means of expansion of the military forces of Great Britain.

The militia system, which is commonly known as the Swiss system, has since the war received a number of adherents. The basis of the system is that all male nationals of the country in question fit to bear arms are liable for military service between certain years, usually between the ages of 19 and 48. In practice a small permanent military staff of instructors is maintained, and the men called up for service do a fixed period of training in their first year, and reduced periods of training in subsequent years. In Switzerland where the system originated the maximum number of men under training at any one time is about 120,000 and this number is only maintained for a short period. But if the number serving in the army is small the number in reserve is large. Switzerland could, for example, produce in an emergency some 600,000 men between the ages of 20 and 48 who had been through a course of military training. The advantage of this system is that it is cheap, and it provides a considerable force capable of defending the country against invasion, but

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from its very nature it cannot rapidly produce a large army capable of invading hostile territory. It does not therefore arouse fears of possible aggression in neighboring states. These advantages have appealed to a number of other countries, and now Norway, Sweden, Holland, and Denmark have adopted the Swiss system, while Finland has chosen a variant of it. The period of first training varies in these countries. In Switzerland it is for infantry 65 days, in Sweden 150 days, in Holland 160 days, in Norway 48 days, and in Denmark 150 days. Finland, which has to face the responsibilities and anxieties of a newly won independence, and has Russia as a neighbor, has adopted a one-year period of preliminary training, but with this exception her system is analogous to that of Switzerland. It is worth noting that the basis of the system is the defense of the homeland against attack. The only one of the countries using it which has to provide any foreign garrison, Holland, makes special arrangements for that end, while all these countries possess, in the nature of their frontiers and of their territory generally, special facilities for defense, with the single exception of Denmark. That country has before it proposals to do away with armed forces altogether except as they are needed for police work.

The compulsory system which was general in Europe before the war is still preserved by France, Italy, Russia, Belgium, Rumania, Spain, Portugal, Jugoslavia, and Greece, and has been adopted by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Esthonia, and Latvia on their creation as independent states. It continues, therefore, to be much the most general of the military systems. Its basis is a legal obligation upon all males between certain ages to bear arms. Usually the young men in their twentieth year are called out for service, becoming an "annual contingent" or "class." They remain in the army for a period long enough to make them efficient soldiers and then pass into the reserve, where they remain until their obligation to serve has expired. The system requires the maintenance of a large number of professional officers and non-commissioned officers, who remain for the greater part of their lives with the active army, but the number of men with the army in time of peace is but a small portion of the military forces of the nation. The greater part of the army, having completed its period of training, is pursuing its trades or avocations, waiting to be called back if emergency arises. This

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system was brought to its highest development in the period preceding the outbreak of the Great War, in consequence of the rivalry between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. In 1914 the peace strength of the German army was 856,000 and at the beginning of the war she had about 4,300,000 trained men of whom she was able to put in the field about 1,800,000 within a fortnight of the declaration of war. France had at the same time a peace army, exclusive of native troops, of 766,000 men; she had some 3,500,000 trained men and was able to place about 1,000,000 in the field in the first fortnight of the war, while the greatest strength of her army in the field at any one time was 2,600,000. From this it will be seen that under the compulsory system the strength of the army in time of peace represents about one-half the strength of the army immediately available for war, while the maximum expansion possible of the army in the field is about three and a half times the peace strength, the remainder of the reserves and future contingents of recruits being required to replace losses. In the Great War France mobilized (between August 1, 1914, and November 11, 1918) 7,932,000 men, exclusive of natives—that is, about one-fifth of the total population, which may be taken as the maximum effort possible in a war of like duration and in a country with highly developed communications and manufacturing resources. In a war which lasted four years France was able to raise the maximum strength of her army to about 33 percent of her available man power.

In a war, then, in which national existence is at stake the measure of the military strength in men of any one country in comparison with any other is not to be found in a comparison of the strength of the armies maintained in time of peace, since every country—given the time and the means—will, if necessary, put in the field all its males capable of bearing arms, less the number required to maintain the essential services of the state, such as railways, industries, agriculture, etc. The military advantages of the compulsory system are that it allows of the rapid expansion of the peace army into a body ready either for offense or defense, since the men first called up on the outbreak of war are those who have most recently done their training in the army in peace time and, by hypothesis, that training is sufficient to make them efficient soldiers. It also allows of more rapid further expansion of the army than any other, since it makes

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available a large number of professional experts who can be used as organizers and instructors. While, as compared with a voluntary system in which high rates of pay have to be offered to attract recruits, it is per man far less costly, it is much more costly than the Swiss system, and, as was the case on the eve of the Great War, the possession of a highly organized and perfected military machine, together with the influence of a large professional class of officers who have for years acted as the instructors of the youth of the country, may become preponderating factors in a crisis.

In countries where compulsory service is rigorously enforced the strength of the army which can be rapidly mobilized on the outbreak of war depends to a great extent on the length of the terms of service in the army. If three annual contingents are serving in the army at the same time its strength and its power of absorbing classes from the reserve is clearly greater than when two are serving. It was this fact which induced the French before the war to adopt a term of three years' service as a reply to the expansion of the German army. But the term of service makes no difference to the ultimate power of expansion of the army, since this depends on the man power of the nation. A short term of service means a smaller army maintained in time of peace, but a larger reserve for expansion. Since the war the general tendency in Europe has been to reduce the terms of service, partly because experience has shown that it is possible to train a soldier in a shorter period than was thought necessary in 1913, and partly from the desire to lighten the burden of military service on the population. In France, for example, the term of service has been reduced from 3 years in 1913 to 1½ years in 1925, and proposals are actually before the French Chamber for bringing about a further reduction to one year. The number of Frenchmen serving in the army has fallen from 766,000 in 1913 to 435,000 in 1925. France has been able to reduce this call upon her white population by increasing her native troops, and the actual strength of her army today is 675,000 men, made up of 435,000 Frenchmen, 113,000 North Africans, 115,000 natives of other colonies, and 12,000 of the Foreign Legion.

From these data it is possible to make the following rough estimate of the man power of the principal European powers having compulsory service:

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	Terms of Service With Regular Army	*Peace Strength of Army*	*Strength on Mobilization*	*Maximum Man Power in Prolonged War*
France	1½ yrs.	657,000	1,200,000	8,000,000
Russia	2 yrs.	800,000	1,600,000	?
Italy	1½ yrs.	308,000	650,000	7,500,000
Poland	2 yrs.	276,000	550,000	5,500,000
Rumania	2 yrs.	140,000	300,000	2,250,000
Jugoslavia	2 yrs.	116,000	250,000	2,000,000
Czechoslovakia	14 mos.	150,000	300,000	2,200,000
Belgium	1 yr.	90,000	180,000	1,500,000
Spain	2 yrs.	180,000	350,000	3,800,000
Greece	2 yrs.	86,000	190,000	1,000,000

Man power is, of course, but one measure of military strength, though at present it remains one of the most important. It is probable that the continued development of mechanical means of warfare will make it less important, but even today the character of the people and the manufacturing and financial resources of the country continue to be factors in military strength at least as important as man power. The figures given above as the maximum man power of the various countries available for military purposes are calculated at one-fifth of the present population. Whether these numbers could be produced to maintain armies in the field, and whether the maximum strength of those armies at any one time could reach or exceed 33 percent of the maximum available number of men, would depend entirely upon whether the nation could endure long enough to make its greatest military strength available and had, or could obtain, the resources to equip such forces. Russia, for example, has at the present sime a population of about 131,000,000 but she could not possibly employ one-fifth of these—or 26,000,000 men—for military purposes. Such evidence as is available goes to show that the discipline and organization of the armies of the Soviet Republics have been materially improved during the last few years, but the railway communications, the poverty of which in 1914 severely hampered the Czar's armies, have deteriorated since then, while the manufacturing resources which were wholly inadequate in that year have become even more inadequate today. It is doubtful whether Russia could place quickly in the field more than one-third of the 1,600,000 men whom she could mobilize. The object of this paper is not,

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however, to attempt the difficult task of estimating the present military strength of the European powers, but to show how the military systems have developed since the war.

Obviously the changes have been great. New armies have been created by new states, others have either been compelled to change or have voluntarily changed their military systems. In 1913 there were seventeen European powers which maintained armies. Of these seventeen, one, Great Britain, had the voluntary system; one, Switzerland, had the militia system; and the remaining fifteen had the compulsory system in various forms. Today there are twenty-five European nations which maintain armies and of these twenty-five, five have the voluntary system, six have adopted the militia system, and fourteen have the compulsory system. Of the six new states created by the peace treaties[1] all except Finland have adopted the compulsory system, and four of the six (all of them neighbors of Russia) have the longest time of service in the regular army at present in existence in states with the compulsory system, namely two years. It is owing to this fact that, although the armies of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria have been drastically reduced and the military system in those countries radically altered, there has been no material diminution in the number of armed men maintained in Europe today as compared to 1913.

While this situation must appear gloomy to those who seek peace, a closer examination shows that there have been tendencies which give reason for hope. There has been a noteworthy development of the Swiss system, which, as I have explained, is defensive in character. It has, in the main, taken place in those countries which from their position and the nature of the country feel themselves to be less exposed to aggression than others. On the other hand, the compulsory system has been preserved or adopted by those states which from their history, the character of their frontiers and the nature of their neighbors feel themselves to be in danger. Security, then, as the Commissions of the League of Nations which have examined the problem of armaments have repeatedly stated, is at the root of the matter. But though up to the present the anxious search for some means of giving Europe generally a feeling of security has failed, there are not lacking definite signs of a desire on the part even of those

[1] Austria and Hungary have now separate governments and armies but can hardly be described as "new states."

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nations which are confronted with very difficult problems of defense, to reduce their military establishments as far as possible, As I have pointed out, France has reduced her terms of service from 3 years to 18 months, and is considering the possibility of further reduction. Italy, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia have all done the same; plans have been prepared for a reduction of the term of 1½ years in Italy; and Spain is examining proposals for reducing her terms of service. Any reduction below one year of service means practically the adoption of the militia system, and it would appear to be at least probable that given a greater feeling of security a gradual and general extension of the militia system will follow naturally. Financial pressure and the desire of the peoples to have the burden of military service reduced to a minimum are powerful factors working in that direction. This, then, would seem to be the most hopeful direction in which to seek for a policy of limitation of land armaments. It may be a policy which would be made futile by a development of aircraft, of poison gases, or of other scientific means of destruction, such as would make man power a minor consideration in war, but such a development has not come yet. The general adoption of the militia system, or of some system analogous to it, would remove the danger which experience has shown to be constituted by the possession in times of crisis and excitement of a powerful military weapon capable of instant use in attack, and would afford great financial relief.

No survey of the armies of Europe today would be complete without some reference to the position of Germany. In the absence of the delayed report upon German armaments, which has not appeared as I write, it is only possible to deal with the matter very generally. The German Reichswehr, or regular army, is, as I have said, limited by treaty to 100,000 men, and all measures for expanding that number are prohibited. Now, besides concealment of arms, of which there have been numerous instances, there has undoubtedly been a great deal of drilling of young men who belong to gymnastic societies and other organizations of peaceful *appearance*. Further, the custom has been adopted of nominating each of the companies of the Reichswehr as the inheritor of the traditions of one of the regiments of the Kaiser's army, a company having a strength of 200 men and a regiment of 3,000. The presumption is therefore natural that a system has been elaborated for the expansion of the Reichswehr

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by the incorporation of the youths drilled in the various societies, and of the men who were trained during the war. If this is so the Reichswehr has become in fact the training cadre for a considerable part at least of the youth of Germany, and Germany has in fact adopted a surreptitious form of the militia system. Such a proceeding is a definite breach of the Treaty of Versailles. This does not mean that Germany is today, or will be within the next few years, a serious menace to France. The destruction of German munitions and of the means of their manufacture has been so complete that the equipment of a large army must be for her a slow and costly business, while, as I have already said, the militia system does not lend itself to the rapid preparation of an army for attack. If Germany has prepared a scheme of expansion she has to begin from a basis of 100,000 men, with practically no fleet, while France would start from a basis of six times that number and with a vastly superior equipment in aircraft, tank and heavy artillery, and quite an efficient navy.

The further development of the German scheme might, however, mean that she would in a few years feel herself strong enough to refuse to comply further with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and defy France to come and attack her. Having done that she could proceed at her leisure to prepare a compulsory service army on the old basis, and with her population steadily increasing, while that of France is as steadily decreasing, her prospects of conducting a successful war of revenge would be very far from negligible. This is the situation which France fears. That her fears are for the future and not for the present is clearly shown by the reductions in the period of military service and the consequent reduction in her strength on first mobilization which I have described. In the report of the Army Commission of the French Chamber in 1921, in which the present organization of the French army was elaborated, occurs the following passage: "It is well to admit the total and absolute disarmament of Germany is impossible if we mean by that that she will have not a gun, not a rifle, nor a machine gun nor the possibility of manufacturing arms in secret and of hiding them away. The real inferiority in which Germany is placed consists in the loss to her of her strategic base on the left bank of the Rhine, of her machinery for mobilization, of her navy and of her Continental allies, and finally that the mobilization of German forces will continue to be, so long as we are on the Rhine, so long

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as the treaty is not openly broken (and we must make it our business to prevent that) a very slow and delicate operation."

History tells us that attempts to impose disarmament on other countries have always failed in the long run, and there is no reason to suppose that the attempt to limit German armament by treaty will succeed. If the present arrangement continues the one course open to France is to attack Germany before she is sufficiently prepared to resist. She cannot wait for the day when Germany with a preponderating population will be ready to fall upon her. The one real remedy is to make it a matter of interest to Germany to limit her own armaments. With that conclusion as to the position in one part of Europe it is possible to sum up the conditions which make a limitation of armaments possible and to suggest the general lines such a policy should follow.

1. The first essential condition is that a feeling of security should be established in Europe, particularly in France and in the countries bordering on Russia.

2. It will be gathered from what I have said above that the land and air armaments of Europe are to a preponderating degree due to fear of Russia and of Germany. It follows, then, that no scheme of limitations of these armaments which does not include those powers is likely to be successful. It is possible that the problems of eastern and western Europe can be treated separately, but this is doubtful since France is definitely committed to Poland.

3. It is impossible to limit either the man power or the manufacturing resources of any country and these are at present the backbone of its military strength.

4. It does not seem practicable to endeavor to limit the use of particular weapons such as poison gas, since there will be no confidence that such weapons will not be prepared in secret.

5. It is possible, given a feeling of security, to limit the power of a country to strike immediately an offensive blow.

6. The most hopeful method of seeking a limitation would therefore seem to be to encourage a general reduction of the terms of service in the standing armies, and an approximation to the militia system in those countries which have not already adopted either that system or the voluntary system.

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS IN SOUTH AMERICA

By William L. Schurz

THE republics of South America have looked outward to the sea rather than in the direction of their immediate neighbors. In the first place, they are essentially producers of raw materials whose principal markets are in the United States and Europe rather than in other South American countries. Thus, at least until recently, there has been no powerful economic motive for the development of intra-continental communications and South Americans have been more interested in steamship lines to New York and Liverpool than in railways into the neighboring countries. This is contrary to the situation in Europe where, with one or two exceptions like Greece, the best customers are other European nations.

Again, the South American countries, at least those which have a sea coast, are primarily concerned with the development of their own systems of internal communications. Brazil's effort to consolidate her vast national territory is a typical example in this respect. The building of the Northwestern Railway west across the huge state of Matto Grosso to the Paraguay River, and of the north and south line between São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul; the plan to connect Rio de Janeiro with Para by a long extension of the Central Railway; the subsidizing of coastwise shipping and of steam navigation on the Amazon; the Rondon telegraph line between São Paulo and the far-off Madeira River; the wireless stations in the Amazon Valley—all these are phases of Brazil's imperative problem of internal communications. And the same necessity dominates the policy of nearly all the South American countries.

Another factor aggravating the isolation of the South American republics one from another is that in almost every instance their centers of population and of industrial development are distant from their frontiers. Moreover, the border zones between the different countries are, with few exceptions, wildernesses of mountains, desert or jungle. The Andes Mountains not only present a natural barrier which stretches the length of the continent between the east and west coast countries, but

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they also act to keep apart Pacific coast nations such as Peru and Ecuador. Brazil is circled by a ring of wilderness that is only broken in the south, where railway lines cross the border into Uruguay and Argentina. Between Paraguay and Bolivia there lies the Gran Chaco, a *terra incognita* claimed by both nations. Even though a single line of railway may cross these wastes (as between Argentina and Chile) it does not represent any considerable movement of travel across the frontiers. The "international" trains generally run on a weekly or bi-weekly schedule and few of the natives ever visit the contiguous countries unless on urgent business.

The Argentinians are the only people who have shown any special tendency to travel for other reasons, though of late there has been an increasing current of travel between Uruguay and the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul. South Americans who have the means and inclination to travel generally go to Europe or the United States rather than to other Hispanic-American countries, where customs and cultural life approximate conditions in their own home lands. Paris above all, but London, Madrid and New York as well, exert a stronger lure to the South American traveler than do other capitals in South America. Those who visit Rio de Janeiro, for example, generally do so on their way to or from Europe or the United States. Also, the young men of Latin America in search of higher and specialized education go to American, British or Continental universities and not to the schools of other South American countries.

Strong forces are surely working, however, to break down this isolation of the South American nations, and a good beginning has been made in the establishment of international communications. A new and significant factor is the growth of intra-continental trade relations. Some nations with well-developed manufacturing industries are showing an interest in foreign markets for their surplus production, either actual or potential. Others need the coal and lumber or wheat and cattle produced by their neighbors. This is especially marked in the case of the so-called ABC nations. Argentina exports to Brazil very considerable quantities of wheat and fresh fruits, enjoying on the latter a tariff preferential. On the other hand, Brazil sends to the River Plate yerba mate, lumber, coffee and increasing amounts of manufactured goods. The inevitable expansion of Brazilian manufacturing industries to the point where there will be a con-

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

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siderable surplus for export promises a search for outide markets that will be a new feature in South American relations. Brazilian manufactures, for example, are already finding their way into the back-doors of Paraguay, Bolivia and Peru. Again, from the opposite side of the Andes, Chile exports flour, fruits and wines to other South American countries.

Intercourse like this will require improvements in the international system of rail communication. At present it is very inadequate. There is a railway connection all the way from Victoria, on the Brazilian coast, around by Buenos Aires, over the trans-Andine Railway, and thence by the Chilean "Longitudonal" line and the Antofagasta and Bolivia line to the Pacific Coast at Mollendo, in Peru,—the only break being at Lake Titicaca, where there is a night's journey by steamer between the termini of the Bolivian and Peruvian railway systems. However, a through journey from Victoria to Mollendo would require some fourteen changes of train and at least three weeks time. Under these circumstances it is not a practicable route for through traffic.

Let us now survey the different railway lines which cross the more important South American frontiers.

We shall begin with Brazil. That country has established connections with Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru. From São Paulo there are direct rail connections with the Uruguayan and Argentine lines. The western terminus of the Northwestern Railway, on the Paraguay River, is within a short distance of the Bolivian border, but a more interesting connection between Brazil and Bolivia is the famous Madeira-Mamore Railway. This road was constructed in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Petropolis (drawn up in 1903 between Brazil and Bolivia) to serve as an outlet for Bolivian rubber and as compensation for Bolivia's relinquishment of claims to the valuable Acre Territory. Originally it was provided that this railway, which runs close to Bolivia's northern frontier but keeps entirely within Brazilian territory, should be extended across the Mamore to Riberalta, the commercial center of that part of Bolivia. Considerable work was actually done on this extension before the undertaking was suspended, probably to the relief of the Bolivians, who were inclined to regard it as a possible means of military penetration by their powerful neighbors rather than as a potential benefit to themselves. Though, due to the decline of

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the rubber industry, international freight traffic over the Madeira-Mamore Railway is light, there is considerable travel over the line and there exists a friendly understanding between the two peoples along that sector of frontier. Brazil's only direct connection with Peru is by way of the Amazon and the river steamers that ply between Para and Iquitos. Brazilians may always be encountered in Iquitos, with which city Para and Manos have close commercial relations. And here again a general good feeling toward the neighbor people is observed on both sides of the frontier.

Argentina's best known link with a neighboring country is the trans-Andine Railway. It connects her transportation system with that of Chile and affords the only through trans-continental railroad in South America. Freight business is light over this route and passenger traffic is restricted to two trains a week. Moreover, its utility is limited by the fact that there are different gauges on the various sections that go to make up the coast-to-coast connection—a limitation, by the way, that is all too common a feature of South American railways. A very appreciable part of the passenger travel over this line consists of foreigners who are making the round trip tour of South America. Though its full possibilities are far from being realized, this road has done much to promote between the two nations the friendly feelings that are expressed by the fine symbolism of the statue of the "Christ of the Andes" in the Uspallata Pass. Farther to the south the Argentinians have pushed two railways from the Atlantic coast westward up into the low Andine ranges, quite close to the Chilean border. The scheme for a railway between Salta in northern Argentina and Antofagasta on the nitrate coast of northern Chile is still only projected, though plans for the connection are economically sound and very desirable from the standpoint of international relations.

The position of Chile is difficult. Isolated, as it were, on the edge of the world—facing the wide waste of the Pacific and with her back to the mountain wall of the Andes—Chile is one of the loneliest of nations. Her corridor to the Atlantic, which she desired should be across Patagonia, instead lies far to the south and she has had to content herself with the possession of the little-traveled Straits of Magellan. Chile's only rail connections with her west coast neighbors are the two lines that climb up into Bolivia, the one from Arica and the other from Antofagasta.

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The former, the Arica-La Paz Railway, is the property of the Chilean Government; the other, the Antofagasta and Bolivia Railway, belongs to British interests. The "Longitudonal," whose importance is strategic rather than economic, after intersecting the Antofagasta and Bolivia Railway at Baquedano continues north into Tarapaca and down to the coast at Pisagua.

Only mule trails lead across the desert waste that extends from Tacna north into the Peruvian Department of Moquegua.

No railroads lead from Peru directly into any of the adjacent countries, but the Southern Railway runs up from Mollendo to Lake Titicaca, across which easy access is had to the Bolivian system. Between Peru and Ecuador there is a desolate moun-

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tain wilderness that offers as effectual a barrier in that direction as does the desert between Peru and Chile. The only communications are by the lonely trails which lead across the mountain moors of the border zone and which do nothing for the international relations of the two peoples, who share in the unhealthy suspicions chronic among the west coast neighbors.

Peru and Ecuador are more immediately concerned with the task of establishing connections with their ultra-montane territories, known as the *montana*, than with linking up their railway systems with lines in neighboring states. At present there only exist rough trails over into the *montana*—in fact, the most convenient route between Lima and Iquitos, on the upper Amazon, is by way of New York and Para. There actually is a steamship line in operation between Callao and Iquitos by way of the Panama Canal. To remedy this condition, Peru is considering several railway projects for binding her Amazonian lands more closely to her. Ecuador already has under construction a branch of the Guayaquil and Quito Railway, the objective of which is a navigable point on the Napo River, a tributary of the Amazon; in view of Peruvian initiative in that region it would seem that Ecuador must complete this railway if she is to maintain her hold on her tropical lands to the east of the Andes.

The two inland countries of South America, Bolivia and Paraguay, demonstrate strikingly the importance of communications on that continent. It is not too much to say that their economic independence and territorial integrity may depend on the solution of their problem of external outlets.

Bolivia has three rail connections with the Pacific coast. The northernmost route, from Guaqui by steamer across Lake Titicaca and thence by rail to Mollendo, has already been mentioned. The shift of Bolivian interest away from Chile and towards Peru which followed the overturn of the Montes régime in 1920 gave new political importance to this route. The central and shortest of the three routes is by way of the Arica-La Paz Railway, the property of the Chilean Government. Though treaties between the two countries provide for Bolivia's acquisition of the section within her own frontiers the problem of financing the transfer is most difficult. For this reason the very cornerstone of Bolivia's foreign policy during the past few decades has been the acquisition of a territorial corridor to the Pacific at Arica. Her more ambitious hopes are for the entire

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Tacna-Arica area, but failing the realization of these extreme aspirations she will have to content herself with the possession of a narrow zone bordering the railway, or, as a minimum concession, with the conversion of Arica into a free port. The southernmost of the three routes—and the longest—is from La Paz via Oruro to the Chilean coast at Antofagasta. Antofagasta was formerly a Bolivian town and a certain anti-Chilean element in Bolivia has persisted in making an *irridenta* of the conquered province of Atacama and in advocating its reincorporation into Bolivian territory. However, the idea has never gained the support of the nation at large, which looks to Arica as the logical outlet to the sea.

Due to Chile's superior military strength and preparedness, the Arica and Antofagasta lines are of much greater strategic value to her than to Bolivia, as the rapid Chilean mobilization demonstrated in 1920. For a few years it appeared that a real Chilean sphere of influence was to develop over much of the Bolivian plateau and that in case of hostilities Bolivia would fall under the political hegemony of the far-seeing realists in Santiago. Chilean economic penetration manifested itself not only in the export of Chilean products, such as flour, to Bolivia, but in the investment of a large amount of Chilean capital in Bolivian tin mines. However, this process has declined in recent years and Chile's position in Bolivia is not so strong as it was in 1919. Meanwhile, too, the Argentine Republic has been directing more attention in this direction. The railway that climbs up from Tucuman to the little frontier town of La Quiaca has been waiting impatiently for the addition of the link across the border into Bolivia that would enable trains to run from the Argentine plains into La Paz. The 125-mile gap between the border and the end of a branch of the Bolivia Railway out of Uyuni is now being filled in by a line under construction by American engineers. Its completion will place Argentina in a better position to counter-balance any possible designs of Chile against the none-too-secure Andine state, and should lead to a considerable development of Argentine trade in Bolivia.

In the direction of the Atlantic, too, Bolivia finds herself faced with a serious communications problem. The development of the agricultural and mineral resources of the vast eastern plains country centering in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, where are located the Bolivian oil fields, must await the completion of

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railway or other connections with the outside world. There are four alternative routes for such a connection. Three of them would drain off the trade of the region into other countries, two into Brazil and one into Argentina. The fourth alternative would be the extension of the Oruro-Cochabamba branch of the Bolivia Railway eastward into Santa Cruz. But this route lies at right angles across a succession of north-and-south mountain ranges that would make the construction of a railway so costly as to strain very heavily the resources and credit of the nation. The much easier route, skirting the mountains in the north, seems to have found little favor with Bolivians. Yet the building of such a line is probably the price that Bolivia must pay to hold the country to the east of the Andes. If the Argentine Central Northern Railway paralleling the Andes should be extended up from the south, or if (as appears more improbable) the Brazilians should build a line from the Paraguay River west into Santa Cruz, a very effective means of peaceful penetration would be created. This would inevitably weaken the already fragile hold of Bolivia on that region in favor of the country that provided its products with an outlet to the outside world.

Paraguay is dependent, for her external communications, on the Paraguay River and on the British-owned railroad between Asuncion and Buenos Aires. Due to this circumstance, all but an unimportant share of her trade gravitates toward Buenos Aires, with an inevitable effect on the economic and political independence of the weaker and ill-organized country. Paraguayan currency is only quoted abroad in terms of Argentine money, and the Argentine peso circulates freely in Asuncion. Mutual tariff preferentials favor the interchange of products between the two countries. Moreover, there are very considerable investments of Argentine capital in Paraguay, especially in cattle and quebracho properties in the Gran Chaco. This is an extensive territory lying west of the Paraguay River, little known back of a narrow river-front zone, and separated from Argentina by the Pilcomayo. Bolivia has been gradually pushing her military outposts down the Pilcomayo in order to assert more effectively her territorial claims. The railway now building northwest across the Argentine Territory of the Chaco, from Formosa towards Embarcacion, closely parallels this frontier; and the line up the west side of the Parana-Paraguay gives Argentina an additional approach to Paraguay from the south.

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Finally, an Argentine railway is projected to run the length of the Misiones region to the Brazilian frontier on the Iguassu. Thus the process of walling in Paraguay with iron promises to be complete.

The domination over Paraguay made possible by these lines of communication from the side of the Argentine has roused in Brazil the desire to open a counter-balancing system of connections, a desire which, needless to say, has the ardent sympathy of those elements in Paraguay who fear the gradual establishment of an Argentine hegemony over their country. The line of the Northwestern Railway that connects São Paulo with the Paraguay River is too far to the north to serve this purpose effectively. Several schemes for a direct rail connection have been talked about. One of these is the old project for a line from the fine Bay of São Francisco on the Brazilian coast into Paraguay via the Valley of the Iguassu. Another has been the building of a branch from the Northwestern Railway down into Paraguay. A third has contemplated the construction of a more direct road from São Paulo, which would open a new market to the manufacturing industries of that city and create a considerable commercial movement between the two countries, as well as make more secure the international position of Paraguay.

The preceding paragraphs may have given some idea of the stage that railway communication has reached in South America. It has been shown that political factors have entered into the situation, in addition to topographical factors. These political factors are also found to be present when we come to consider the other forms of communications existing today between the South American republics, or planned for the future.

Among these other forms of communications, coastwise navigation has an importance fully as great as have railways. All three coasts are well supplied in this respect. Most of this business is in the hands of foreign steamship companies, the outstanding exceptions being the Lloyd Brasileiro service between Brazilian ports and Montevideo, and the Chilean and Peruvian lines on the west coast. American, British, Dutch, French, Italian and German lines offer frequent and rapid service between the River Plate and Brazilian ports as far north as Pernambuco, and American and British steamers afford similar facilities between the countries on the west coast.

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The Amazon and Plata fluvial systems are also, of course, of great importance as international arteries. The Amazon is open to the ships of the world, but the fact that for most of its course that river flows through Brazilian territory gives Brazil an unusual position in the event of there arising international complications involving its navigation. Steamer navigation between the different countries of the Amazon basin is also entirely under the Brazilian flag. Eastern Peru is dependent on this outlet, as are also the rubber country of Bolivia and the little developed *montana* regions of Ecuador and southeastern Colombia. Colombia has persistently asserted her pretensions to a place on the navigable tributaries of the Amazon, but she so far has done little towards occupying the vast territories to which she lays claim under the title "Amazonia Colombiana."

On the Plata river system Argentina holds a place analogous to that of Brazil in the Amazon Valley. She controls both sides of the Parana from its mouth to its confluence with the Paraguay, and the left bank thence to the Brazilian border at the mouth of the Iguassu. Moreover, the west bank of the Paraguay is Argentine territory as far as the mouth of the Pilcomayo. Her occupancy of the strategic island of Martin Garcia—long coveted by Brazil—situated where the Parana debouches into the estuary, gives to Argentina a formidable position from the military point of view. Navigation on both the Parana and the Paraguay is largely in the hands of Argentine companies, though a Brazilian company connected with the Lloyd Brasileiro operates an intermittent service between Montevideo and Corumbá. Argentine steamers not only ply regularly up the Paraguay to Asuncion and on to Corumbá, but they also provide the Parana with its only transportation facilities as far as the limit of navigation at the Guayra Falls. Though the principal shipping firm which has taken over the fleet of the famous Mihanovich interests is an international joint stock company, Argentina still holds a predominant position in the matter of communications in the Plata basin. She is thereby in a position to exercise in that area a hegemony which might become more than economic.

Turning to the Orinoco, we find that the only problem of international communications in that river basin concerns the rights of Colombia to an outlet for the vast tropical wilderness that lies between the Meta and the confluents of the Rio Negro.

Both the east and west coasts of South America are well

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supplied with submarine cable facilities. All such cable connections, it should be noted, are controlled by foreign interests. The most important are the All America Cables, Inc., an American concern, and the Western Telegraph Co., Ltd., which is British. The former serves the east coast as far north as Rio de Janeiro and has eleven stations on the west coast, as also a land line running to La Paz (Bolivia) from Arica. The British cables serve the east coast as far north as Para and duplicate much of the American service on the west coast.

The land telegraph lines operated by the different governments play a very minor part in the general scheme of international communications in South America. In many instances they reach out to remote places on the frontiers (as in the case of the remarkable Rondon line that links São Paulo via Cuyaba with the Madeira River), but it seldom is possible to relay messages over the lines of neighboring countries. Wireless, however, is rapidly growing in importance as a means of communication. There has been a strong tendency in recent years to bring outlying strategic points in the different countries into connection with the capital by this means. Radio has excellent prospects in South America and broadcasting has already been initiated on an up-to-date scale in Buenos Aires. South American papers are also giving more attention to events in the neighboring countries, thanks to gradually improving telegraphic facilities and better service by the regular news agencies.

To sum up briefly, it may be said that while ocean communications between the different South American states are very satisfactory, much yet remains to be done in the way of rail connections. The east and west coasts still are connected only by the single line of the trans-Andine Railway, and, if the lines from the Pacific coast into Bolivia are excepted, there are no direct land connections between any of the west or north coast countries. Many plans for improvement, however, are under discussion. The best known of these is for a "Pan-American Railway." This scheme has been repeatedly brought up at international conferences and endorsed by the delegates, but no agreement has been reached as to the route to be followed. On this point international rivalries come actively into play. If the trunk line should follow the line of the Andes and utilize existing links it would ignore Brazil and the other countries to the east; on the other hand, if it should skirt the eastern edge of

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the *cordillera* it would avoid the most populous parts of the Andine countries. Although there is general sentimental accord as to the advantages of realizing this project, the problem of financing has not been solved. Local traffic would doubtless support certain stretches, but for a considerable time returns from through or long haul business would probably be small. However, the eventual consummation of this grandiose conception of Pan-American idealists is sincerely to be desired; for separation must inevitably breed distrust, even among peoples who are kindred and whose fundamental community of interests is so strong. In South America, the usual non-commercial motives for travel are lacking. The stimulus for a closer understanding between the various states must therefore be sought in the development of intra-American trade and in the interchange of ideas that will accompany it. With a better acquaintance will come far closer bonds of sympathy than can be fostered by such international conferences as that held at Santiago, in 1923, or by the nebulous ideas of those who ignore the dangerous antagonisms at present bred by the isolation of the different South American nations.

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FRANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By Louis F. Aubert

THE purely idealistic reasons for joining the League of Nations have been dwelt upon in abundance of detail; and, with arguments of equal loftiness, certain very great nations have declared that if they did not join it was solely in order that they might preserve their liberty and thus render still more service to humanity. These assertions have their value. But as the League of Nations has been at work for five years is it not pretty nearly time to come down to earth and ask each country—whether it is a member of the League or not—to give a frank answer to one of these questions: Do you think it is worth your while belonging to the League? Or, on the other hand, why are you glad that you do not belong? If as the outcome of these heart-searchings it should be shown that the League of Nations has stirred deep feeling, satisfying some while disappointing others, would not this be the best proof that it is a reality, not a utopia, and that much may be expected from it? So far as France is concerned, I shall now try to reply to the question. I hope that the Editors of FOREIGN AFFAIRS will put the same question to representatives of other countries.

I

By taking up or refusing to take up certain matters the League has disappointed or disturbed a good many nations. For example, it has disappointed some because it thought its powers did not justify it in taking up the question of racial equality, because it has not exerted itself to communize the consumption of raw materials, or again because it has paused in the face of the exclusive competence of nations in their own domestic concerns. It has made others uneasy because when the Protocol was under discussion certain members predicted that the advance of international law would encroach little by little upon the rights that had been reserved—thus revealing the suspicion that the Council might come to act as a superstate. The League has likewise caused uneasiness because one member has presumed, in defining its relations with the government of the empire of which it forms a part, to make use of the specific statute under which it becomes a member of the League, talking

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about complete legal equality, registration by the League of its treaties with the government already mentioned, and eventual submission to the Council of the League of Nations of any conflict that may arise in the interpretation of these treaties.

Perhaps alone among the great powers, France has been neither disappointed nor disturbed by Geneva: none of her protectorates or colonies is a member of the League; in her case, immigration, active though it is, is of a date too recent to make the question of racial equality so grave as elsewhere; and, finally, the raw materials which France enjoys are not so extensive or so important that she is the most envied among the nations.

But these negative reasons why France has been neither disappointed nor disturbed do not explain why French confidence in the League has actually grown during the last five years.

It is true that in the beginning this confidence was rather fragile. Save for M. Léon Bourgeois and the little group of lawyers and politicians who ever since the Hague Conferences have been interested in the development of international law and the organization of peace, no one put any genuine faith in it. Labor unions, intellectuals, and fighting men, to be sure, demanded the creation of an institution which should make an end of war; but shaken by the skepticism of the realists they were slow to recognize the idealized features of that institution in the face of the League which arose on the basis of the universally derided peace treaties.

At first it was supposed in France that the whole business was stage-managed by the Anglo-Saxons and that they would continue to control it. It was thought that President Wilson paid no heed to European realities in his enthusiasm for a plan which, in its entirety, had sprung into being in his brain, over there in the United States. Then it was learned that there had been adjustments of the plan by General Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil, and that suggestions and amendments from other quarters were being launched against the united and obstinate Anglo-Saxon front. Later it appeared that the Englishmen appointed to the Secretariat were many and important. And, finally, it was learnt that the British Empire had been granted six votes in the Assembly. France thought she would be isolated at Geneva.

As soon as the first Assembly met that fear was banished. Since then it has almost entirely disappeared, together with the legend that President Wilson—said to be an incorrigible dreamer

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—had during the course of the negotiations often hampered bipartisan agreements which France and England were ready to put through on a basis of solid reality. Five years of Anglo-French *tête à têtes* have brought matters back into perspective. How much better adapted to European conditions and how much more disinterested does the Wilsonian principle of the rights of peoples to dispose of themselves now appear than the cleverness of Mr. Lloyd George in hindering the unduly rapid recovery of France and the growth of the newly emancipated nations, in order to get back as soon as possible to that European equilibrium which is so nicely calculated to favor England's desire to recover her old rôle of the isolated arbiter!

Moreover, the refusal of the United States to join the League of Nations has naturally diminished the French fears of Anglo-Saxon preponderance in the Council, the Assembly, and the Secretariat. Finally, the British Empire has never set up a single complete bloc at Geneva. The dominions retain their right of free speech where there is any question of assessment quotas, technical organizations, the interpretation of Article X, or exclusive competence. Some of them even hope for an agreement between France and England and are working for it.

In the early days of the League, France was less inclined than today to place confidence in the general promises of the pact, believing rather in special alliances and in one special alliance above all the rest. The importance that the idea of security assumes in a country that has been thrice invaded within a century so impressed Wilson that of his own accord he offered himself, and persuaded Mr. Lloyd George to offer—besides the guarantees of security which the treaty assured—a promise of military aid in case German troops entered the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. This treaty was to continue in force until the League of Nations should be strong enough to offer France an equivalent guarantee of security. When this treaty was not ratified by her old allies and associates France felt that she had been cast off. Not only was no substitute offered her, but when the German resistance, thus encouraged, paralyzed any execution of the treaty, the French reaction was represented in England and the United States as a manifestation of aggressive imperialism. This bitter experience induced France to seek in the League of Nations a remedy for her unsupported status. The result was that, having once entered the League, where she

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had feared to find herself isolated, she discovered that she was far less isolated than she had anticipated.

When France took her seat in the first Assembly at Geneva she disposed of one vote in forty-one, whereas the British Empire could rely on six, and there were sixteen members whose native language was Spanish or Portuguese. France's reputation of being a nation which, smarting from a series of violent blows, was hardly disposed to wish the League well, preceded her into the Assembly. Her own newspapers represented her as skeptical with regard to this "debating club." The stir raised by the international press over the admission of Germany placed France in the unpleasant position of the member who votes "No." The fall of Venizelos, the extermination of the Armenians, the Wrangel débâcle, all conspired to make the position of France difficult in the Assembly.

But what does she see there today? Her language employed in two-thirds of the speeches delivered at the plenary sessions and in four-fifths of the discussions held by the commissions; and warm sympathy on every side, especially among the Latin Americans and the Slavs—this, of course, without mentioning her neighbors in Spain and Belgium and her allies in the Great War. She finds, moreover, her opinion sought and followed in most of the important votes and notices a desire that in affairs of major importance France shall say what she wishes and even assume the task of expressing the wishes of others—in recognition of the fact that often in the course of her history her rules of action have been adopted as almost universal rules of conduct. Thus quite naturally, though not without surprise, France finds herself on a level of equality in this international assembly by sheer virtue of her historic position—her centuries of culture, her hundred and thirty years of democratic tradition, her chivalry toward weak nations and her humanity toward the non-white races. All that French patrimony which our chancellery had been finding it hard to make use of suddenly regained its prestige, with forty-one nations as audience. Such was the revelation at Geneva, which has been renewed at each Assembly for five years. A further fact is significant. Save for M. Léon Bourgeois—who from the beginning had been a firm believer in the League and who had been one of its creators—not a single French statesman who has returned from representing his country at a session of the Assembly has failed to confess publicly

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that he had learned things which surprised him. This reputedly utopian Covenant proved in practice to be a treasure-house of formulas admirably adapted to European realities. Geneva, whose silent pressure France had feared, became an incomparable tribune in the eyes of France's own representatives. The Assembly, where it had been feared France would be swallowed up, proved to be solid ground on which she might base her policies.

At Geneva France found herself already on familiar terms with part of Europe. Her bonds with Czechoslovakia and Poland fell into line quite naturally with the requirements of the League, being defensive alliances, designed to reduce armaments and quite capable of being registered and published. To her allies were added Rumania and Jugoslavia. At the same time she drew closer to the Baltic countries. There was a whole ramification of new and agreeable relationships. There in the Hall of the Reformation the words "Little Entente" took on concrete meaning, signifying a force that counts for something and with which one has to count, since room has been made for it on the Council. As for Central and South America, France has found support which is particularly welcome because it is voluntary and free from all material considerations, reminding her of a fact which too often, in her chagrin, she has been inclined to forget—namely, that the place among the nations which her civilization guarantees her implies an obligation upon her not to live apart.

When the history of the post-war relations of Great Britain and France comes to be written it will be recorded that it was at Geneva that the two countries, though often in disagreement, always reached an accord the most easily. This was not only because they had the fortune to be represented there during the early years by two distinguished men who brought to their conversations a serenity, philosophy, and experience which are rare in chancelleries; but also because at Geneva, England, which ordinarily looks at Europe through a haze of traditional ideas, is compelled to fall back on her deep-seated sense of reality and to see Europe, assembled before her eyes, directly and as it really is. Last year the moment Mr. Ramsay MacDonald sensed the feeling of the Assembly he knew that his project of eliminating all idea of security and of special agreements from his plan of reducing armaments was impracticable. At Geneva, too, England comes to realize France's true position in Europe

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and the support given her by the nations born or reborn in the war in her determined opposition to German ambitions for a restoration by violence. Every year for five years the support lent by British diplomacy and British public opinion to a Germany which, they say, asks nothing better than to take her place in line if France will only grant her the right to live, has gained England nothing but disappointment, for Germany has always evaded the issue when it has been proposed to apply the ordinary rules to her candidacy.

The white light of Geneva, which shows up so clearly every gap between special and general interests, is swiftly rendering untenable certain theses to which the secrecy of diplomatic notes and conversations have formerly been only too favorable. At Geneva, France was able to substitute for the English thesis the idea that in dividing Upper Silesia under the plebiscite the national wishes expressed by the voters ought alone to be taken into consideration in tracing the frontier—all arguments founded on the necessity of not disturbing the economic unity of the industrial basin being of no avail, once the frontier had been defined, for fixing permanently a transitory economic régime. It was at Geneva that Austria and Hungary, remnants from the territorial readjustments wrought by the Treaties of Saint-Germain and The Trianon, whose early demise so many English voices had predicted, received the financial aid which has enabled them to maintain their independence, thanks to a balanced budget and a stabilized currency. It was at Geneva, during the discussions of the Pact of Mutual Guaranty and the Protocol, that France was able to show that the obligation to arbitrate before entering on a war would not suffice to permit reduction of armaments unless the security of the more exposed states was guaranteed. Finally, it was at Geneva that the idea of aid given by Great Britain to France in case of attack—the idea which had been given up because of America's failure to ratify the tri-partite agreement—was raised anew, first in the Pact of Mutual Guaranty and again in the Protocol.

No doubt Great Britain's disinclination to subscribe to any European compact save when she herself is immediately and definitely menaced—a tendency strengthened by America's isolation—has hitherto, upon three occasions, prevented the English Government from signing or ratifying agreements of assistance whose necessity it had nevertheless recognized. Two

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points have been gained, however. On the one hand, if England is some day to subscribe to European engagements, it will be through the League of Nations; on the other, each year for five Assemblies, England has been made to feel that more than fifty nations hope a Franco-British agreement will be reached. In their eyes it seems a necessity—more, a duty. Should it come into being, the Assembly would breathe more freely; were the idea given up, the Assembly would be paralyzed. A permanent entente between France and England, under the Covenant, is what Geneva needs. What are we to think, in view of this, of the predictions of those realists who averred that too close an adhesion by France to the League would cost her an English alliance?

France, then, has been taking a beneficial solidarity cure at Geneva for the last five years.

It must not be thought, however, that French faith in the League of Nations is of recent date. As a matter of fact, since the Treaty was signed no member of the League has submitted weightier matters to its management, decision or oversight than France has submitted.

First of all, the Saar. Here France is in control of the mines. In ten years the territory of the Saar will decide by plebiscite whether it wishes to become French or German, or to stay as it is. If France had not placed full confidence in the competence and fairness of the League, she would not have allowed it to take over a government which day by day might hinder the exploitation of the mines and which might by its policy now, or ten years from now, influence the inhabitants of the Saar in their choice between the three possible solutions. This was the first experiment in government by an international commission. In spite of Germany's incessant propaganda designed to increase the difficulties inevitable in a highly industrialized and thickly populated region which had been placed provisionally mid-way between two great countries, two tariff systems and two currencies, in a time of great financial and economic crisis, the life of the Saar basin has been calmer than the life of neighboring Germany; and this territory, which threatened to be one of the most critical spots on the map of Europe, will pass through a period of fifteen years and decide its own fate in such conditions of light, publicity and fairness that no matter what solution is chosen by the inhabitants it will impose itself, without appeal, on all interested parties.

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Second, the military control of Germany. It is vital, and for years to come it will be vital, for France to know where German armaments stand and whether they are in conformity with Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Under Article 213 of the Treaty, Germany promises to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary. It is provided that as soon as the Interallied Commission of Control shall have decided that Germany has provisionally completed all demands, the task of continued surveillance will fall upon the League. The whole mechanism of investigation was placed on a basis satisfactory to France at the last meeting of the Council in Rome.

In the third place, the independence of Austria. It would be a serious matter for France—which already feels the weight of a Germany with more than sixty million inhabitants upon her frontier—if Austria should give up her independence and unite with Germany. Under Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany agrees that the independence of Austria "shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations." And by Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, Austria assumes the same engagement. In undertaking to bring order into Austrian finances, the Council of the League has established her political independence—not because it has tried in this way to influence the choice of the Austrians, but because by relieving them from the despair which they felt in August, 1922, it has tried to give them time and opportunity to control their own destiny. A patriotic sentiment which is quite new and which is based on the hope of an independent life has been born in Austria as a result of the financial restoration undertaken there within the last two years by the League.

Fourth, the mandates. Under surveillance of the League, France exercises a mandate over Syria, the Kamerun, and Togoland. By agreeing to place the territories conquered by the armies of the Allies and Associates under mandates and to administer them under a system that admits full publicity, the open door, and the improvement of the natives' lot, France has taken her stand in favor of a definite colonial policy which she proposes to extend gradually to her other colonies.

In thus entrusting to the League the oversight of four matters of chief concern to her, France not only has given from the start

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the greatest proof of attachment to the League that she can give, but she has at the same time shown her preference for fair and objective policies.

There is yet another problem—to France the most important of all—which seems to her closely linked with the fate of the League of Nations. It is the problem of security. In the beginning France distrusted the League as one distrusts an institution which, however much one hopes from it, may merely give a false sense of security. Suppose France, believing herself protected by Articles X–XVI of the Covenant, and asking nothing more than rest, relaxation, and peace, were to weaken her vigilance, how rude an awakening might be prepared for her by a guaranty which vanished when danger appeared.

This fear was fed, when the Covenant was being drawn up, by the British and American refusal even to consider two French amendments whose object was to increase the power and authority of the League by preparing for the organization of an international force and the setting up of a mutual surveillance over armaments. Since that time these ideas have made progress. On the one hand, the Protocol provides that each member of the League shall indicate the forces it is willing to place, if needed, at the League's disposal in order to permit each member to carry out a reduction of armaments proportional to the aid on which it can rely. On the other hand, the Protocol provides that as soon as the mechanism of arbitration comes into play, and so long as it is operative, it is the duty of the League to see that none of the parties to the conflict augments its military strength. Demilitarized zones are even to be organized beforehand in the most exposed territories, so as to favor the control exercised by the League and make easier the designation of the aggressor. Discussion about the Protocol thus offers a method of measuring the progress made in five years towards understanding the importance of an international force and of control organized by the League of Nations. It is true that the United States and the British Empire, feeling that they need no one to protect them, are always hostile to these two ideas. But they have found warm exponents in most European countries.

France has something else to be afraid of. Her security depends on the execution of treaties. Now, most advocates of the revision of the peace treaties have long been talking of employ-

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ing the League of Nations for this purpose, and they have found support within the League itself. Does it not include most of the former neutral powers? To what purpose, say these people, prolong war bitterness in the very League that should be the scene for a reconciliation between conquered and conquerors? Why dwell upon the past when we should be organizing the future upon new bases? Why insist upon clauses in the treaties which keep ex-enemies out of the League when the League's essential purpose is to become universal at the earliest possible moment?

This attitude, which would have required the victors to apologize for having troubled the philosophic development of the League with their victory, would, if translated into action, have had no result save to detach the League from the realities on which it depends for prestige and for securing immediate action. Without the victory of the Allies there would have been no Assembly at all; when the war was over, if the Covenant had not been immediately concluded, even before the treaties, it would never have been concluded at all; and without the Covenant the treaties would have been quite different, since certain solutions adopted in them would have been impossible. Last of all, the Covenant and the treaties join the present members of the League in a solidarity of vital interests which it would be difficult to ensure for a new association in which nations were joined only by formal agreement.

The Assembly at Geneva has shown, however, that it is not indifferent to ideals of reconciliation when the ex-enemies exhibit a similar disposition. Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary have all been admitted. Germany and Turkey need only accept the ordinary rule. Even Turkey is not hostile to the League, since she has entrusted to it the task of tracing the frontier of the vilayet of Mosul.

But discussion about the relationship between the Covenant and the treaties and about a revision of the treaties by the League has been lessening year by year. At the first meeting of the Assembly, Switzerland and Holland asserted that they would adhere to the Covenant, but that, not having been parties to the treaties, they would ignore them. The situation of the powers was delicate, for on the one hand they could not admit that the League would ever undertake revision of the treaties, and, on the other hand, they had never pretended to

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oppose all such revision. The thesis which M. Léon Bourgeois managed to get accepted was that all articles of the Covenant could be amended by the Assembly, except those articles which relate directly to the treaties, since that would have permitted indirect revision of the treaties by powers not parties to them. All negotiation in regard to the treaties concerns the Allied and Associated Powers; all negotiation as to the Covenant must be carried on within the League of Nations. This severance of the two kinds of negotiations is a means of giving the Covenant the independent attitude which it ought to maintain toward the treaties and at the same time safeguards the link that unites them.

These, then, are the reasons why French distrust of the League has been transformed into confidence. The methods and spirit prevailing at Geneva are an added reason. The Secretariat and the various technical commissions provide the best mechanism now known for treating great international questions in a scientific spirit. The spirit of the Assembly in periods of political crisis—as in the Silesian affair, the question of Austria, the Corfu affair, or the problem of Mosul—or where great general problems are under discussion, such as the Protocol, the repatriation of Russian refugees, the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, or the fight against pestilence and sickness—is a source of great encouragement to a country like France which has been saved as if by a miracle so often during past centuries that she has come quite naturally to believe in moral force, in spiritual values.

II

The reasons for French confidence in the League of Nations also concern the future.

A land with a low birth-rate, busy repairing by immigration the gaps which war created among her producing population; a land which has not yet effaced from her soil the traces of invasion; which though formerly the world's creditor is today, as a result of the war, heavily burdened with internal and external debt; which is confronted with the enormous task of meeting continental, maritime, and colonial obligations; which is temptingly exposed to the covetousness of her neighbors, though herself desiring no new territory; which knows by experience that disturbances anywhere in the world will have repercussions on the Rhine (for the World War, though it did

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not come after Mukden and Liaoyang or after the Agadir crisis, did finally begin in the Balkans); which is aware that she saved the world from the surprise German attack, but is quite aware, too, that, having held out long enough for the public opinion and the armies of Great Britain and the United States to mobilize, she was herself saved in turn by her allies and associates,—what is it that such a country needs? Peace—above everything, peace. How, then, can a League established under a Covenant which declares war on war and describes every alteration wrought by force as a crime fail to interest her?

That a country as large as a continent, protected by oceans and deserts, with neighbors either weak in number or attached to her by profound affinities, possessed of the men, raw materials, and financial resources to defend herself and to influence the wills of others—that such a country should be impatient of any restriction upon her sovereignty and of foreign entanglements, and should declare her policy simply to be a matter of her own concern and limited only by her own moderation—that such a country should assume a high hand towards the League of Nations and determine to do as she wants where she wants, is quite natural. But France cannot afford such a luxury. In case of conflict, she runs the gravest risk of being dragged into it whether she wishes to or not. How then can she fail to help organize, as a means of prevention, that solidarity which has already saved her once? That solidarity, being slow and improvised, saved France at the cost of devastated regions which the German payments (diminished as they are by the reimbursements claimed by her ex-allies and associates), will not come near repaying, and at the cost of a million and a half dead and over seven hundred thousand wounded.

Is France therefore to be considered henceforward a country hostile to all change? If this were so she would be faithless to her past, for during the last century and a half—by the example of her own revolutions, by the tears she shed for the woes of Athens and Warsaw, by the blood she shed in America and Lombardy—France has been the instigator of the greatest political changes that have taken place in Europe, if not in the world. France is far from declaring that the new order born of the last war and defined by the treaties is never to be touched; but she supports the League of Nations, which asserts that modification is possible only on the terms of Articles X, XI, and

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XIX of the Covenant, and only in accordance with the principle there laid down—the right of peoples to dispose of themselves.

Economic reasons are most often advanced for believing that far-reaching changes are to occur in Europe in the future. The ink of the signatures to the treaties of peace was scarcely dry before the economists were predicting the worst sort of catastrophes if the political clauses were not readjusted. By giving too much satisfaction to national desires, they said, these clauses had left Europe bristling with frontiers and tariff walls and had left the instruments of production—which had been created by great peoples who understood how to use them—in the hands of little peoples without experience. As I have tried to show elsewhere,[1] the post-war economic difficulties were due less to political causes for which the new and weak countries were responsible than to economic measures taken by the great nations. In any case, these economic difficulties have been greatly exaggerated. Europe is returning to normal production and consumption far more rapidly than the experts expected. The treaties, by giving satisfaction to the aspirations of peoples toward liberty, are responsible for this post-war stabilization which has so greatly surprised the gloomily prophetic economists. The principal economic and financial regulations that have been introduced since the Treaty of Versailles have not aimed at correcting the political solutions of the peace treaties. Rather they have sought to consolidate them.

The unequal division of populations in comparison to raw materials between the various nations will no doubt be a source of difficulty. But the fact that one country is more densely populated than its neighbor or less provided with natural resources bestows on it no incontestable and unlimited right to take possession of the soil needed for its inhabitants, whether by force or by organizing annexationist propaganda among its nationals abroad. The spheres-of-influence policy is bankrupt. The material wealth of the American continent has been more rapidly utilized in the interests of the world by free peoples than it would have been by European colonies. Article XXIII of the Covenant, which calls for "equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League," opens the way for pacific discussion in order to permit more fairness in the exchange

[1] Lectures before the Institute of Politics at Williamstown in August, 1924, published by Yale University Press, 1925, under the title "The Reconstruction of Europe."

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of populations and raw materials. The technical commissions of the League of Nations on questions of economics, finance, and transport, have already paved the way for serious reforms and are about to undertake others still more important—all this without mentioning the International Labor Office. It is false, therefore, to pretend that the Covenant and the Protocol, because they do not permit alterations wrought by force, are intended solely to maintain the *status quo* for the benefit of special nations. Within the organization of the League of Nations itself, which subordinates the work of the technical commissions to such political bodies as the Assembly and the Council, there are indications that its spirit is not to base the relations between men on the relations between things, or to remake the map of Europe simply according to the requirements of production and consumption. The relative importance thus attributed to political and economic factors is one of the chief reasons for the confidence which the League inspires in France.

There is another reason: the League is universal in character. It is true that France has found firmest support for its aims among the other European members, for their problems are closer to her own; and it is also true that among the seventeen signatories of the Protocol, more than two-thirds are European. The temptation for France, then, would naturally be to favor the formation of a League of Nations more strictly European. Yet if such a policy should some day be imposed on France it will be against her will, for France understands that henceforward Europe represents too small a unit in the world to live a separate existence. Economically and financially she depends too much for her raw materials, capital and markets on lands beyond the sea. Politically, she is too exposed by reason of the diffusion of her capital and her populations as well as by her colonial interests to undergo or endure the backwash of a war which might break out in some far corner of the world. So that no country which, like France, dreams of peace would willingly restrict the League's organization to Europe alone. And what would be the position of England in a League of European Nations? Unable to enter with her Empire as a whole, she would stay outside.

The confidence of France in this universal League of Nations will naturally grow or decrease according to the way in which the great countries beyond the sea deal with Europe. For

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example, in conformity with paragraph 3 of Article XVI of the Covenant, paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Protocol provides that "the signatory States give a joint and several undertaking to come to the assistance of the State attacked or threatened, and to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchange as regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind, opening of credits, transport, and transit." Is it not clear that the way in which the interallied debts are handled will either destroy or intensify the confidence in this engagement? If all the interallied debts without distinction are treated as strictly commercial debts, the European debtor powers will conclude that the economic and financial support promised by the Covenant and the Protocol amounts simply to a promise that the States not directly attacked will be ready, as in the last war, to sell at one-sided prices fixed by themselves to those belligerents who are able to provide for delivery themselves or assure delivery by third parties. But why all these solemn engagements if nothing has changed? This is trade, not mutual aid, and the countries most threatened will come to believe that the money which they will eventually have to pay to allies or associates as a debt will be much better spent if preventively devoted to armaments which they will get at lower prices and which will keep their national industry alive. If debts contracted for a common cause among allies or associates are commercial debts, then there is no more Covenant, there is no more League of Nations. War is no more the common concern of all. Each for himself!

There is another danger. Whether the Disarmament Conference is held at Geneva or elsewhere matters little so far as the difference of place is concerned. But if the abandonment of Geneva implies that the place accorded by the Protocol to the idea of security, mid-way between the idea of arbitration and the idea of disarmament, is being neglected, then in European eyes the change would amount to something so radical that Europe could not consent to disarm. In the same way, a conference that did not reduce land and naval armaments equally could not succeed, for Europe too often finds that in the opinion of great naval powers land armaments have an especially dangerous and immoral character because they precipitate wars; whereas naval armaments, thanks to the economic power of the blockade, prevent continental conflicts and have a beneficent and virtuous

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influence. Such a distinction cannot be admitted. An international fleet controlled by the League of Nations might add to the security of continental peoples. A fleet flying the flag of a naval power not belonging to the Continent never could. Finally —in case naval and land disarmament should not proceed at the same rate—the reduction of continental armies, or their neutralization, would assure to certain nations which already happen to possess the means of economic and financial pressure, so much power (balanced by no counterweight) that it would only increase the feeling of insecurity in Europe. Such a solution of the disarmament problem would be fatal to the League of Nations.

The League is in no danger from Europe. But power has so departed from Europe that, it is to be feared, those lands where in the future power will be lodged may not realize to what extent the pact has taken root in Europe. Today the League of Nations is something more in the minds of the peoples than an idea. It is a necessity. If the League had remained a mere idea it is hardly likely that the governments would have gone to the expense of providing for it; but now that it has proved itself capable of undertaking great things in the same spirit in which it has undertaken more modest enterprises it is in a position to demand sacrifices. That is the opinion of the majority in France. I may add that, like most members of the League, they feel sure that though the United States remains outside the League it does not wish the League ill. When the time comes for the United States to act it will of its own accord make up its mind in favor of the ideas which the League represents; for those ideas emerge directly from a tradition which America knows well and which she will not disregard. Nor is it an American custom to destroy useful institutions and put nothing in their place. If America does want to demolish the present League it will be for her to substitute a new one, still more in conformity with the spirit of the Covenant.

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THE THREE MOROCCOS

By Walter B. Harris

THE modern history of Morocco may be said to have begun in 1904 with the Anglo-French Agreement of that year. For some time previous the Moorish Empire had been breaking up. A strong Sultan, Mulai Hassen, had died in 1894 leaving as heir to his throne one of his younger sons, Mulai Abdul Aziz, a mere boy. For several years the power lay in the hands of the Grand Vizier and it was not till his death in 1901 that the young Sultan emerged from the precincts of the secluded palace to take over the reins of government. Well-intentioned, weak, misled, and shockingly robbed, Mulai Abdul Aziz was incapable of maintaining order over the turbulent tribes whom a long period of repression and extortion had rendered only too ready to revolt. His plight was not rendered any the happier by the fact that the two powers most interested at that period in Morocco—England and France—were united by no ties of friendship. France, intent upon rounding off her great possessions in North Africa, coveted the rich but almost unknown country that lay between the Algerian frontier and the Atlantic Ocean. England, desiring nothing for herself in Morocco—unless it was Tangier, which she knew could never be hers—was firmly determined to combat all France's schemes to obtain a preponderating influence in the country. Accordingly the British Government strongly supported the young Sultan in resisting the constant French pressure. Germany and Spain, jealous of France's African possessions, gave England a moderate measure of support. But the bolstering up of the decaying Moorish Government could not save the situation. Tribal revolt, misgovernment, corruption, disturbances on the Algerian frontier and near the Spanish "Presidios" on the Mediterranean coast, indicated the end of Moorish independence. The British Government realized at length that no assistance that it was prepared to give—and the assistance had always been more in advice than in substance—could prolong for any but a very short period the life of the decaying empire.

There remained but one purpose that Morocco could serve—that of a pawn on the chessboard of Europe. It is possible that active intervention might have been a remedy, but active inter-

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vention was exactly what Great Britain was determined to avoid, and under no circumstances less than the seizure of Tangier by a foreign power would she have taken the risk. Only lately emerged from the throes of the South African War, England required a long period of peace. The death of Queen Victoria and the accession of King Edward VII had awakened a desire for a new foreign policy and for new friends in Europe. It had long been King Edward's wish to see an improvement in the relations between England and France. His arrival on the throne rendered this possible. He enjoyed great popularity in France. He was esteemed and trusted in England and his great ability was fully recognized. Under his influence the attitude of the two peoples toward each other changed and an exhibition of goodwill on both sides rendered an entente feasible. The first step was the elimination of the points of friction which existed between the two countries, and there were no more serious points of friction than Morocco and Egypt. It was realized that before any permanent entente could be reached these two disturbing elements must be got rid of. A simple formula was devised—the withdrawal by England and France of their political interests in Morocco and Egypt respectively. England was to have a free hand in Egypt to continue her work in that country, while the closed doors of Morocco were to be opened to France. The withdrawal of British political interests in Morocco, where they were paramount at the Court of Mulai Abdul Aziz, practically left Morocco in the hands of the power against the intentions of which the British Government had never ceased to warn the Sultan. It was only when the Anglo-French Agreement was signed that the Sultan learned that the staff on which he had always leaned had proved to be a broken reed.

It is to this Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 that the existing situation in Morocco owes its origin, for it contains the basis of all the subsequent arrangements, treaties and conventions which in any way confirm or modify the spheres of influence of France or Spain, or determine the status of Tangier. It is therefore essential, in reviewing subsequent events and the existing situation in Morocco, that the terms of this original agreement should be borne in mind. Briefly, as far as lay in the powers of the contracting parties, with certain non-political and commercial exceptions, it gave England in Egypt and France in Morocco full liberty of action. The benefits that accrued to

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England in Egypt are outside the scope of this article; we have to deal with Morocco alone.

By Clause II of the Agreement the British Government recognizes that it pertains to France to watch over the security of Morocco and to furnish the Moorish Government with all such assistance in administrative, economic, financial, and military reform as it may stand in need of. No hindrance will be put in the accomplishment of France's duty in this respect by the British Government provided the existing rights of Great Britain are not interfered with. In Clause IV the two governments mutually guarantee that in Egypt and Morocco respectively there shall be maintained an equality of treatment in the customs houses, and under all other forms of taxation, and in the transport of merchandize on the railways. In Clause VII the two governments undertake that they will allow the construction of no fortifications on the southern shore of the Straits of Gibraltar, or along the Atlantic as far south as the mouth of the Sebou River, or on the Mediterranean as far east as the Spanish "Presidio" of Melilla. Exception is, of course, made of Spain's fortresses and positions along the latter coast.

So far the Agreement was limited to the two contracting parties, England and France, but it was evident that Spain's geographical position and the fact that she possessed territory on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco gave her an indisputable right to be a party to any such arrangement. Ceuta, Peñon de la Gomera, Alhucemas, and Melilla had been Spanish territory for centuries, and in the far south, opposite the Canary Islands, Spain claimed a long-abandoned possession, Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña.

Article VIII states that the two governments, inspired by sincerely friendly sentiments toward Spain, take into particular consideration the interests that Spain has acquired by her geographical position and her territorial possessions on the Mediterranean coast. On this subject, it is stipulated, the French Government will concert with the Spanish Government and will communicate to the British Government the terms of the arrangement which may result between France and Spain. In the last clause the British Government undertakes to give the French Government its diplomatic assistance in carrying out the terms of the Agreement.

Such, briefly, are the contents of the Anglo-French Agreement

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of 1904. A separate and secret convention accompanied it, in which the proposed extent of the Spanish Zone was specified, but which at the same time gave the French Government entire liberty to negotiate this question of delimitation. So successful were the French in these negotiations that Spain was satisfied with a very much smaller sphere of influence than France was prepared to grant. The original proposition included not only the rich Gharb plains north of the Sebou River, but even Fez itself. It was a disappointment to the Spanish Government to learn after their agreement with France was signed that they might have included in their sphere of influence these valuable assets.

France and Spain having come to terms, the Spanish Government gave its formal adherence to the Anglo-French Agreement on October 3, 1904. This recognition by Spain was followed by a secret arrangement with France which was signed on October 30, and the next year a second secret Franco-Spanish convention was signed on September 1.

The following year (1906) a conference on the subject of Morocco was held at Algeciras, summoned by the Sultan at the instigation of the German Government, which had become anxious as to the intentions of England, France and Spain in regard to that country. The attitude adopted by the governments of those three powers, however, successfully prevented the introduction of any question that threatened the eventual operation of the terms of the agreements which had been signed between them during the previous two years. Certain reforms were introduced on an international basis and equality of treatment in commercial and industrial matters was guaranteed to the subjects of all the signatory powers in Morocco. The question of spheres of influence never arose, and the Germans and their supporters, who had hoped to raise the entire subject of Morocco's future, failed in their endeavors to do so. The ultimate results of Algeciras were to strengthen the position of France and Spain in Morocco.

In 1911 the German Government—having in the meantime left no stone unturned to hamper France's Moroccan policy, even to the sending of a warship, the *Panther*, to Agadir, and having at last realized that its efforts were in vain—proposed a deal. In return for territorial concessions in West Africa, Germany signed a treaty with France on November 4, 1911, by

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which she bound herself to adhere to the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904. There were a few modifications but none which affected the spirit of that Agreement. The German Government formally recognized the right of France to extend her control in, and her protection over, Morocco. This treaty also confirmed to France the privilege of the diplomatic representation of Morocco both in that country and abroad.

By this Franco-German treaty France's position in Morocco was greatly strengthened. Her predominance and liberty of action had now obtained the support of all the powers whose consent was of importance—England, Spain and Germany. With regard to the other powers, the interests of which were economic and commercial, the Act of Algeciras gave a sufficient guarantee of equality of treatment. France found herself authorized to introduce into the country all such "administrative, judicial, economic, financial, and military reforms" as she might think fit, provided they did not affect the status and rights of the subjects of other powers. In short, France became the recognized collaborator with the Sultan and the Moorish Government in every branch of administration.

It was the course of events in Morocco itself as much as this series of political arrangements outside of it that brought about in 1912 the negotiation and declaration of a French Protectorate over Morocco.

The Sultan, Mulai Abdul Aziz, whose authority at the moment when the British Government in 1904 had abandoned the task of trying to prop up the decaying Moorish Government had already become greatly diminished, lost the throne in 1908. His brother, Mulai Hafid, egged on and supported by the influential chiefs of the south, had raised the standard of rebellion. After a long campaign—in which an intense desire never to come to decisive action seems to have been the common aim of both parties—Mulai Hafid gained the day. Both Sultans, for at one period they both reigned in different parts of the country, were without adequate means to finance the campaign. The war was desultory and uneventful. Both were dependent upon the deserters of the other's army for troops, for the soldiers fought for whichever side could afford to pay them. On French advice and with French financial assistance Mulai Abdul Aziz set out from the coast with an expedition in August, 1908, for the reconquest of his southern capital, Marrakesh. Within a

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day or two's march of that city, owing to a rising of a supposedly friendly tribe against him, he was defeated. His camp was pillaged and he returned to the coast a fugitive. There he abdicated in favor of his brother. Mulai Hafid was proclaimed at Fez and at Tangier and all Morocco recognized him. He reigned for four years (1908–1912), and though at first he showed signs of a desire to restore the fortune of his country, it was too late. Chaos and corruption had done their work. Wearying of the struggle, at war with his tribes, at the mercy of the foreign powers, his treasury empty, Mulai Hafid abandoned hope. From month to month the situation became more difficult. At length in 1911, besieged in his capital by the tribesmen of the surrounding districts, he appealed to the French Government for assistance, and troops were despatched to Fez. It was the beginning of the end, and in March, 1912, he signed a treaty by which he recognized a French Protectorate over Morocco. It was the end of Morocco's centuries of independence.

As in the case of the Agreements with England of 1904, and with Germany in 1911, France's Treaty of Protectorate with the Sultan of Morocco included the whole of that country with the exception of Tangier. The French Government was charged with the foreign relations and the Sultan undertook to conclude no act of international character without the consent of France. The status of the French *Résident-Général*, whose powers are most extensive, was outlined; the control of practically the whole administration rested in his hands. To this there was only one exception. Tangier had been carefully eliminated from all these treaties and agreements, that is to say there had been inserted a clause in each of them by which it was agreed that the status of Tangier should be determined by a separate arrangement. It was clear, therefore, and undisputed, that Tangier and its little zone fell neither in the French Protectorate nor in the Spanish sphere of influence. Another exception to France's complete control of Morocco, though not mentioned in the Protectorate Treaty, was the Spanish Zone, which the French Government had by the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements of 1904 definitely engaged itself to recognize. On the subject of her Zone of influence Spain had not, and has not today, any direct treaty with Morocco. She has merely the agreement with France that she was to occupy and administer a section of northern Morocco extending from the Algerian frontier

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to a spot a little south of the town of Laraiche on the Atlantic coast, including the whole northern coast-line with the exception of Tangier. To this transaction the Sultan and Moorish Government were in fact not parties. The situation, briefly, was that France had negotiated with the Sultan of Morocco a treaty of protectorate over the whole of Morocco, excluding Tangier, but France at the time of the signature of this treaty had already pledged herself to sublet to Spain the northern section of this country and a district in the desert regions of the south. Spain's position in Morocco is based solely upon her treaties and agreements with France.

The moment had now arrived to study in detail the terms upon which the Spaniards were to administer their sphere of influence, and for the definite delimitation of its frontiers. The French Government, once the Treaty of Protectorate was signed, immediately opened negotiations with Madrid, and the result was the Franco-Spanish Treaty of November, 1912. By the first clause of this Treaty the French Government formally recognized that it pertained to Spain to keep watch over the security of the Spanish Zone and to grant the Moorish Government within the limits of the Zone all such administrative, economic, financial, judicial, and military assistance as might be needed. In fact by this first clause of the treaty France transfers to Spain the rights and responsibilities to fulfill the same functions in the Spanish Zone as Great Britain had recognized as pertaining to France over the whole of Morocco by the Agreement of 1904. Spain, by signing this treaty, accepted responsibility for the maintenance of order and the introduction of reforms. Clause II confirms the civil and religious authority of the Sultan over the Spanish Zone and agrees that it shall be administered, under the control of a Spanish High Commissioner, by a Khalifa chosen by the Sultan from two names to be submitted by the Spanish Government. The Khalifa is to reside in Tetuan and will be invested by the Sultan with full powers. The Spanish High Commissioner shall be the sole intermediary between the Khalifa and the local agents (consuls) of the powers in the Spanish Zone, but the Spanish Government recognizes Clause V of the French Treaty of Protectorate by which all relations with the diplomatic representatives of foreign powers are vested in the French *Résident-Général*, who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs for all Morocco. The authority of the Spanish

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High Commissioner in his relations with the foreign consuls is therefore strictly limited to questions of local interest.

The treaty, after stating the geographical limits of the Spanish northern and southern districts, stipulates that the Spanish Government shall under no circumstances alienate or cede even temporarily her rights over any part of them. Spain undertakes, as England and France had already done by the Agreement of 1904, to allow no fortifications to be erected on the coast of her Zone—with the exception, of course, of her "Presidios," which are Spanish territorial possessions. The Franco-Spanish Treaty also delimits the frontier of the little Tangier Zone and confirms the liberty of education and cults. Spain's right to spend on the upkeep of her sphere all such taxes as she may collect, together with the mining royalties, etc., is recognized and there are various further clauses which affect the functions of the Moroccan State Bank, the Tangier-Fez Railway and the protection of natives at home and abroad.

Spain, though possessing full powers to administer her sphere as she may deem fit, provided treaty rights are not affected, has legally no protectorate over her Zone of Morocco. Her powers are delegated by France whose protectorate extends over the whole of Morocco. But in the interests of practical government Spain's position in Morocco has been recognized as amounting to a protectorate. With the exception of the diplomatic relationship with the foreign powers, the Spanish High Commissioner enjoys in Spanish Morocco practically the same almost unlimited powers as does the French *Résident-Général* in the French Protectorate. In the same way the Khalifa in Tetuan plays the part of a Spanish protected monarch and is invested with all the paraphernalia of an oriental sultan. Even the imperial parasol is carried above his head on state occasions and, except in name, he is a sovereign. It has been the policy of both France and Spain to dissociate in fact, while preserving united in form, the two governments of the French Protectorate and of the Spanish Zone.

This system of splitting up into spheres of influence a country which, while nominally a unit, represents as a matter of fact different political and administrative entities, is not one that can be recommended. More especially is this the case where, as in Morocco, it was done without consultation with the ruler or the people of the country, and introduces frontiers that only

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to a very small extent are based upon natural or physical features—frontiers that pass through unexplored and unknown districts. An imaginary line was drawn from point to point, often varying with the supposed contour of the country, and the tribes through whose territory this arbitrary frontier passed were told that the inhabitants who lived to the north were subject to Spanish administration while those to the south fell in the French Protectorate. Naturally this delimitation required, as the country became better known, considerable readjustment. But even today there are large districts on both sides of the frontier which are still unoccupied by the French or the Spaniards, and which are almost unexplored.

Had the Spaniards shown in their administration of the Moslem population of their Zone a skill equal to that of the French the situation today would have been very different and far more hopeful. There is no need to describe here the admirable work that the French have accomplished under Maréchal Lyautey. It is an achievement that is perhaps unparalleled in the annals of African administration. The Spaniards have been less fortunate. Their intentions have been of the best but they have been hampered by want of previous experience, by sacrificing practical results to an exaggerated sentiment of *amour propre*, by disorganization and by lack of imagination. Today extensive districts of their Zone, occupied at great expense and entailing heavy loss of life, have been evacuated, and Spain finds herself, in the northwestern part of her Zone, back almost on the sea coast. But with the military side of the Spanish war in Morocco we have nothing to do here. It is the political results that cannot be ignored, and the most important of these for the moment is that by the withdrawal of the Spanish troops the extensive northern frontier of the French area has been left directly exposed to attack on the part of the Rifi and Jibala tribesmen. Admirably armed, and intoxicated with their successes over the Spaniards, Abdul Krim and his forces are menacing the French lines and threatening the security of the peaceful population which lives behind those lines. The French authorities in Morocco have watched with evident and justified anxiety the evacuation of so much of the neighboring Zone by the Spanish army.

The question of Spanish responsibility arises. To what extent, if any, can Spain be held responsible for the situation

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brought about by the retirement of her control from regions which, it is held, she had by treaty engaged herself to safeguard and pacify? On this point the views of Paris and Madrid are at direct variance.

The Spanish Directory, while largely reducing the occupied area of the Spanish Zone, states that Spain abandons none of the rights and privileges which by treaty she holds over the entire extent of that Zone. The treaty does not bind Spain, the Directory claims, to be in occupation or to control her whole Zone. The Directory asserts that the Anglo-French Agreement of April, 1904, which as it was previous to the Franco-Spanish arrangement of November of the same year therefore refers to the whole of Morocco, states in Clause II: "The Government of His Britannic Majesty recognizes that it pertains (*appartient*) to France . . . to watch over (*de veiller*) the security of that country (Morocco) and to lend its assistance for all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms that may be needed." The Spanish Government declares that by this clause Great Britain recognizes France's right to aid Morocco, but it does not consider that it lays any direct responsibility upon France to do so. France's rights, in so far as they concerned the Spanish Zone, were transferred to Spain by the subsequent Franco-Spanish Agreement of November, 1912. The Directory therefore claims that there is no obligation for Spain to occupy the whole of her Zone, but that she is free to do so how and when she pleases.

The French do not accept this point of view. It is claimed that the Spaniards are bound by Clause I of the Franco-Spanish Agreement of November, 1912, which states: "It pertains (*appartient*) to Spain to watch over (*de veiller*) the tranquillity of the said Zone (Spanish) and to lend assistance to the Moorish Government . . ." The French Government holds that this expression "*il appartient*" carries with it a distinct and direct obligation, just as the French Government itself accepted a distinct and direct obligation as resulting from the use of the same phrase in the Agreement (1904) with England. Even if this is straining a point by holding the Spanish Government to a too legal interpretation, Spain, the French authorities argue, is morally bound to restore and maintain order. She cannot be justified in laying claim to her Zone, which is only a portion of a larger country, from which it is separated by a purely arbitrary

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frontier, and at the same time leave it in a state of anarchy. The French Government is sincerely desirous that Spain should abandon none of her rights and responsibilities but trusts that she will take steps to carry out without undue delay the occupation and pacification of her Zone. The question rests there today. What will be the action of Spain with regard to the re-occupation of the evacuated districts and the establishment of order in those parts of her Zone which she has never occupied? What responsibility does she incur?

It is clear that Spain cannot by her treaty (1912) with France cede in any form or circumstances whatever the whole or any portion of her Zone to any party or person. To whom then, in case she abandoned her sphere of influence, would it revert? As far as England is concerned the answer is very clear, for by Clause IV of the *secret* Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 it is stated that "if Spain, invited to adhere to the previous clause (the offer to her of a Zone in Morocco), does not see her way to do so (*croyait devoir s'abstenir*), the arrangement already come to between France and Great Britain shall be none the less immediately applied." The "arrangement" here referred to conceded the rights over the whole of Morocco to France. There can be no doubt that should Spain decide to abandon her thankless task, the duty of restoring order in the Spanish Zone—an arduous one which the French Government has no desire whatever to undertake—falls to France. Would she accept it? Would she be allowed to obtain a preponderance on the Mediterranean coast? The answer is impossible to give.

There remains for consideration the question of the status of Tangier. It has already been pointed out that in the various treaties and agreements that had been concluded between the governments of the powers interested in Morocco, and in the Treaty of French Protectorate itself, there were inserted clauses which determined that the status of Tangier should be settled by a special ulterior arrangement.

Tangier for a century or more has been the diplomatic capital of Morocco in that it was the residence of the representatives of the foreign powers, for it had always been the policy of a long succession of sultans to close the interior of their country against all European influences. Force of circumstances, arising from questions of security of life and property and of hygiene, and other causes, had not only brought about the régime of the

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"Capitulations"—by which the subjects of the powers enjoyed the privilege of being under the jurisdiction of their respective consular authorities all over Morocco—but also special concessions in Tangier itself. The sultans had from time to time delegated to the foreign representatives at Tangier certain rights of participation in the local government. From this there grew up a sort of international régime, always, be it understood, under the sovereignty of the sultan. It was on the existence and recognition of this régime that the British Government, basing its policy on the great importance of the strategic position of Tangier, demanded its neutrality and its internationalization.

It can easily be realized that the position of the population of Tangier while awaiting the settlement of their fate was no enviable one. Friction and obstruction reigned supreme and the interests of its inhabitants, and of the place itself, were sacrificed to the pettiness of local jealousies. In 1913, however, a conference of the delegates of England, France and Spain met at Madrid, but the resulting convention was still unratified when war broke out in 1914. It was not till 1923 that the question was reopened and in October of that year a conference met at Paris. On December 18, 1923, a convention was signed, and shortly afterwards ratified by the British, French and Spanish Governments.

The new status of Tangier is based upon a charter of permanent neutral internationalization, under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco, who maintains control over Moslem and Jewish Moroccan subjects. The Sultan is represented by a high Moorish official—the Mendoub. The administration of the town and its zone, about 200 square miles in extent, rests in the hands of an Administrator and two Assistant Administrators, who carry out the decisions of the Legislative Assembly, subject to their ratification by the Committee of Control. For a period of six years the three Administrators will be British, French and Spanish subjects. After that period they will be chosen by the Assembly. A French and a Spanish engineer will superintend the public works. Over this administration is the Committee of Control, consisting of the consuls of all the powers —except ex-enemy powers—who signed the Algeciras Act. The Legislative Assembly consists of twenty-six members, chosen from the subjects of the powers represented in Tangier and from the Moorish and Jewish population. The number of the mem-

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bers representing each nationality is regulated by the local importance in population, trade and influence of the nationality in question. Clauses have been introduced for progressive modifications in the convention and in the codes at specified periods of time. Special legal codes have been drawn up based on those in use in the French and Spanish Zones. Justice will be administered in mixed tribunals by judges of different nationalities. A *gendarmerie* of 250 men, natives of Morocco, is placed under the command of a Belgian captain, with French and Spanish assistants. It is quite evident that this international scheme will be far more difficult to put into practice than it was to put upon paper, and already, although the new status of Tangier has not been officially recognized as existing, its path is not free from stumbling blocks.

The convention was signed at Paris in December, 1923. Yet today, nearly a year and a half later, the new government is only working provisionally as a bridge between the old régime and the administration that is to be. For the moment there is neither one nor the other. The International Legislative Assembly is sitting, the Administrators and the Judges are appointed, the preparatory work has begun, but little or no progress has been made. The old form of government, with its diplomatic control, is disappearing in its own atmosphere of scandal and of inefficiency. It was always hopeless, and was only permitted to exist by the obstruction of certain European powers to almost any form of progress. Everything was sacrificed to international jealousies, and Tangier was brought to its present condition of chaos and distress. The convention, though in itself an imperfect work, promises to the mixed races and religions of Tangier an improved administration and a voice in their own government. An intense desire for amelioration in their condition has brought about a new spirit of goodwill and fellowship. Whether this hopeful attitude will be adopted by the representatives of the powers, whose opportunities and temptations to pursue merely national policies will be many, is another question. It must be confessed that there exists amongst the public of Tangier a certain distrust, warranted by past experience, towards the governments of Europe, more especially those of them which, for political reasons, may have axes of their own to grind. The people of Tangier realize that the only means to escape this danger is by exerting to their

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full the independent powers and privileges of the International Legislative Assembly and by permitting no unauthorized intervention on the part of the representatives of the powers. As the Committee of Control the consuls of the powers have certain, but limited, rights. It is for the Assembly to see that these rights are kept within their limits. Already there exist suspicions that the consuls of certain powers are striving to return to the old system of "government by diplomacy," in reply to which the Assembly has already asserted its authority in a manner that cannot be misunderstood. It has shown, thus early in its existence, that it will brook no interference with its sovereign rights. Amongst its members there is, too, evidence of a spirit of international harmony which augurs well. But the future of Tangier, in spite of the many difficulties which have to be faced, is assured, not perhaps owing to this experiment in international government, but because of the city's unique situation on the Straits of Gibraltar and its geographical position as the nearest point in Africa to Europe.

For the welfare of the Moslem native of Tangier much remains to be done. The European governments, not content with obstructing all progress in the past, have as well shown a callous indifference to the sufferings of these unfortunate people, whose actual condition would anywhere else raise a storm of protest. There is no native hospital, beyond a few beds in a Mission House, no lunatic asylum, no "home"—and no help—for widows and orphans, no poor rates and no poor law, and no officially organized charity or relief. It is only by private subscription amongst Tangier's population—itself impoverished by misfortune—that a minimum of food is being distributed today to hundreds of half-starved people.

Of the present situation in the French Protectorate of Morocco, further south, little need be said in addition to what has already been set down. Agriculture, the staple industry of the country, is receiving every assistance and the cultivated area is increasing yearly. Railways are being constructed in many directions and excellent roads already facilitate communication all over the land. France has accomplished a great work in that part of Morocco entrusted to her care. With its fine old cities and its strange oriental life, and with its motor services and new hotels, the French Protectorate is meeting with great success as a tourist resort. Maréchal Lyautey's administration of this

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Islamic country may well serve as a model elsewhere. It is indeed a fine example of administrative ability.

In the Spanish sphere of influence the nature of the very difficult task with which the Spaniards have found themselves confronted has impeded progress. Weary of great sacrifices in men and money—sacrifices that have led to no very tangible results—General Primo de Rivera, the President of the Spanish Directory, instituted in the summer of last year a new policy. He has been successful, not without difficulty and heavy losses, in withdrawing all the outlying Spanish forces in the western part of the Zone to a new and strengthened line nearer the coast. It has necessitated the evacuation of much occupied territory, but the Spaniards are back now to where they were in 1917, having abandoned everything in that part of Morocco which they had conquered since that date. It was the wisest—very probably the only—policy, and General Primo de Rivera is to be congratulated on his courage in having inaugurated and carried it through in the face of considerable opposition. But Spain still stands face to face with the unconquered warlike tribes of the Rif and the problem of the future of the Spanish Zone remains to be solved. The intentions of the Spanish Government are not known; probably no decision has yet been taken. Apart from all question of the reconquest of the abandoned districts, apart from the still more difficult task of bringing the Rif tribes to submission, Spain's work is beset by innumerable difficulties, owing largely to the nature of the country and the character of the natives, and still more to the methods which the Spaniards themselves adopted in these past few years. In this there are signs of improvement and General Primo de Rivera can be trusted to bring about many changes in the vacillating and often hopelessly incompetent policy which the Spaniards formerly exercised. It is to the interests of the whole world that this protracted war, and all the miseries it entails, should cease. In the last six months of 1924 alone the cost to Spain has been over 20,000 losses in killed and wounded, besides a vast sum of money. Unfortunately its end is not yet in sight.

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THE EXPORT OF AMERICAN CAPITAL

By Herbert Feis

I

UNTIL recent years the United States was, on the net balance, a borrower, not a lender to foreign countries. In 1914 American investments abroad were limited almost entirely to Canada and the Latin-American countries, and were smaller in volume than those held by the peoples of the older industrial countries of Europe in American enterprises. Our varied and extensive natural resources, our rapid and unprecedented industrial expansion, our skill in improving and utilizing machine technique afforded constant and well-rewarded opportunities for all the capital which we accumulated. In fact, it might almost be said that American capital was accumulated so rapidly because there were such urgent uses for it. Thus comparatively little of it emigrated on the promise of better returns than might be won within the country. Capital, like our young men, "went west." In addition, there remained many attractive openings in America for foreign capital. American borrowings began in the Colonial period; Colonial plantations often were in debt abroad. Old records of the London Stock Exchange show that in 1825 nine issues of United States Government bonds were quoted in that market, besides a considerable number of state and city shares. In 1836, Baring Brothers of London arranged a two-million-dollar loan for the Baltimore and Ohio, the first of the long succession of investments made in American railroads by British, Dutch, and French citizens. The sum mounted; Sir George Paish, in an investigation made for the National Monetary Commission, estimated the total of foreign capital invested in the United States in 1910 at six and one-half billion dollars. But the war and its consequences, the re-sale of American securities in this country to discharge debts, the sequestration of the property of ex-enemies, has reduced that sum by more than half.

American investments paid their foreign holders well, by and large. English financial reviews, nervously regarding some of the present ventures of British finance abroad, reminiscently contrast the old American investments with the new. But even with the old there were some disappointments. The Annual

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Reports of the British Council of Foreign Bondholders still record the fact that the holders of the bonds of various Southern states, to the amount of sixty million dollars principal (interest at 6 percent for some fifty to eighty years), still are waiting to be repaid. Nor did foreign capital always escape the disastrous effect of early American railroad financing.

The situation has been reversed since 1914. Even leaving out of the reckoning the more than ten billion dollars of war and post-war loans owed to the American Government by foreign governments, we have become a creditor nation. On private account we have been investing vast sums in foreign securities and properties—exactly to what extent it is impossible to determine. A host of serious difficulties plague the statistical inquirer on the subject and make anything better than rough estimates impossible. The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce has published the following estimate of the sum total and geographical distribution of American investment abroad at the end of 1924.

VALUE OF AMERICAN INVESTMENTS ABROAD

(*Estimated, in Millions of Dollars, at the End of 1924*)

Region	*Gov't and Gov't Guaranteed Obligations*	*All Other Investments*	*Tota*
Canada and Newfoundland . . .	1060	1400	2460
Latin America	840	3200	4040
Europe	1500	400	1900
Asia and Oceania	440	250	690
Total	3840	5250	9090

This table requires a brief explanation. Included under the heading "Government and Government Guaranteed Obligations" is a great volume of loan transactions entered into by industrial enterprises (government owned and otherwise) on their own account, and tabulated as they are only because a government guarantees their security. Such, for example, are the more than three hundred million dollars of securities of the Canadian Government railway system owned in this country, as also the recent issues of French railway loans. The table thus does not indicate the division of our investment between economic uses (or productive uses, as it is sometimes called) and uses of another character, usually of purely governmental character.

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The grand total approximates nine billions. Canada appears as the greatest single field of our foreign investment. But taking all the Latin-American countries together we find an amount of over four billions, which is much greater than that of Canada; in Cuba alone our investments total over a billion and a quarter, and in the South American countries a similar sum—in Chile alone about four hundred millions. The whole represents a great diversity of enterprise. We already dominate many important industries in Latin American countries, as the Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce pointed out in a recent issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS,[1]—mining on the West Coast of South America and in Mexico, meat packing in the River Platte region, petroleum in Mexico, Colombia and Peru, and sugar, tobacco and railroads in Cuba. The distribution of our Canadian investment at the end of 1923 is shown by the following estimate:

AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN CANADA

(*Estimated, in Millions of Dollars, at the End of 1923*)

Federal, Provincial and Municipal Governments	701
General Industries	540
Railways	370
Forests, including pulp, paper, and saw mills	325
Mining	235
Public Utility	138
Land	50
Banking and Insurance	35
Miscellaneous	31
Total	2425

Estimates as to what has occurred in the field of our foreign investments during the year 1924 have a particular interest. Those given below are revisions of the figures published by the Bureau of Domestic and Foreign Commerce. The revision was undertaken especially to distinguish the loans made to industrial enterprises from loans of other varieties—irrespective of whether the former are or are not backed by a government guarantee. But it should be noted that even here the division is somewhat faulty, because some of the loans included under the heading of government loans were for industrial purposes (securities taken at par value; only public issues included).

[1] "Economic Rivalries in Latin America," by Julius Klein: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. 3, No. 2.

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FOREIGN SECURITY ISSUES SOLD IN THE UNITED STATES DURING 1924

(*In Millions of Dollars*)

	Loans Made to Industrial Enterprises	*Government Loans*	*Total*
Canada	98	34	132
Cuba	34	...	34
Mexico	...	...	...
Central America and West Indies	4	2	6
South America	11	79	90
Europe	112	440	552
Asia and Oceania	38	76	114
Total	297	631	928

To arrive at an exact estimate of the whole net addition to American investment abroad during the year 1924, various deductions and additions to the items in this table would be necessary—deductions for bankers' commissions, for spread between par and sales price, for re-sales to foreigners of previous issues—additions for American purchases of old issues, and for unrecorded private investments of many kinds. It is reasonably certain that the totals given are not exaggerations. Of the whole sum loaned in 1924 about 68 percent went to governments. The remainder went to corporate enterprises, in some cases government controlled or guaranteed. Geographically, the total was distributed as follows: Europe 60 percent, Latin-America 14 percent, Canada 14 percent, Asia and Oceania 12 percent. These percentages represent an under-estimate of the proportion of our total investment which went to Canada and Latin-American countries, because few investments, except those made through public security issues, are included.

This outline of the extent and direction of American foreign investment raises several questions. First, will this flow of American capital continue? There are strong reasons to believe that it will. The American industrial organization will remain capable of producing as much as in 1924; as large a sum will be available for foreign investment. Our efforts to expand our export trade and the tendency to establish branch factories will continue. Many American industries may be expected to acquire foreign properties to supplement their raw material

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supplies. The extension of railroad systems in Asia, South America and elsewhere will offer tempting opportunities, and many other fields of future activity for American capital are to be discerned. The investing public has shown a willing disposition to take the risks involved. The bankers have shown no reluctance in sponsoring foreign loans; the commissions are probably generous. So ready has the response been that it almost looks as if the country, by a queer psychological inversion, were trying to down its uneasy remembrances of the panicky course of isolation adopted in 1920. Barring international political or economic developments ominous enough to frighten the present investors, the flow of American capital abroad will continue. There are, indeed, good reasons to believe that the limits to this movement will not be so much our capacity to lend as the capacity of other countries to return interest and principal upon their borrowings. This will almost certainly be true as regards our European loans if we and other creditor countries should insist upon full payment of war debts.

But the flow of American capital will hardly continue at the rate of 1924. Special influences were at work to swell the 1924 total. It was the year of re-born hopefulness, the year of the Dawes Plan; it followed the period of the Ruhr bitterness and restricted international borrowing. Furthermore, extremely favorable conditions in the money market made it possible during the whole year to borrow at an unusually low rate. The future movement of American capital abroad will be spasmodic, will vary greatly in accordance with the international political prospect and with the money market conditions here and abroad. There may even be periods of fright and large re-sales. And before very long Great Britain, and perhaps other former creditor countries, will become more formidable competitors in the loan market; they may be able and willing to loan at lower interest rates than the United States. That is shown by the recent Swiss loan in Holland, to be used to pay off an outstanding American loan. Despite these factors, however, the volume of our new loans is sure to remain large.

A second question arises as to whether the distribution which marked our investments in 1924, both geographically and as between loans to governments and to private enterprises, will hold true of our investments in future years. Europe has been borrowing a greater part of the total than she is likely to ask or

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receive in the future—especially Western Europe. We have been loaning to countries such as France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, and Holland which before the war sent a great deal of capital abroad themselves. Their borrowing has been to meet budget deficits which must be ended, to restore liquid capital destroyed by war and inflation, and to reorganize banking and currency systems. If European economic recovery continues, these countries, with the possible exception of Germany, will be able to meet their own capital needs; indeed, if they do not do so, it will be a warning sign. As a result, a greater proportion of our foreign investments will again be in Canada, in Mexico, and Central and South America. Before very long China and Russia may become extensive fields of investment, though this does not seem in the immediate prospect. Even in the Australian and African continents we may do some venturing.

Furthermore, in the future a smaller proportion of our investments is likely to go to governments than was the case in 1924. Among the government loans of 1924 were the reconstruction loans—110 million to Germany, 100 million to France, 50 million to Belgium, and others of a similar character. The need for these, it is to be hoped, is passing. Yet the percentage of government loans will remain considerable. It is usually possible for governments to borrow in foreign markets at a lower rate than private enterprises. This may strengthen an already powerful tendency on the part of South American, Australian, and some European governments to undertake works of economic development through governmental rather than through private action.

II

We may now inquire into the chief economic and political consequences of this capital movement. Both are complex.

The position from the point of view of the private American investor is plain. There is reason to believe that the holdings of the more recent public issues are widely distributed. The National City Company is authority for the estimate, for example, that the Japanese loan of 1924, a loan of 150 millions, was sold to 44,000 different investors, and that the Austrian loan of 1923, of 25 millions, was sold to 9,000 investors. These American investors receive an interest return higher by at least 2 percent on the average than they would receive from similar

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government or industrial investment within the United States (slightly more than the difference of yield on British investments at home and in foreign countries before the war). It is obvious that they are taking a correspondingly greater risk. A considerable portion of this investment is in areas (as in parts of Latin-America) where political unrest is chronic and where legislation changes rapidly, or in areas in which there is a serious possibility of war or bankruptcy. The British experience of gains and losses in foreign investment is a mixed one. Up to the middle nineties of the last century frequent losses occurred through default by the Latin-American states, Turkey, Egypt, and China; Lehfeldt's estimate indicates that between 1888 and 1893 over forty percent of all British foreign investment was so affected. From the middle nineties to the outbreak of the war there were much fewer losses and much greater gains; the same study shows that less than one-half of one percent of the total bond investment met default during this period. But the French record was nowhere near as favorable. The war followed, bringing tremendous losses, especially to investors in Russia and the Balkan states—also, it should be recalled, to the holders of domestic securities in many countries.

The question regarding the national and international economic advantages and disadvantages arising from foreign investment (as distinguished from merely the advantages and disadvantages accruing to the investors) leads us into a still broader range of speculation. The results, from a purely national standpoint, are partly favorable, partly unfavorable; from an international standpoint, predominantly favorable.

Foreign investment ordinarily means the investment abroad of funds that would have been saved anyhow and invested in the home country. A little extra saving may be induced, but surely only a very small part of the total. If invested productively within this country, the exported capital would increase the effectiveness of American industry, and so add to our national income—that is, to the amount of goods and services at our command. That loss is the primary national sacrifice entailed in foreign investment.

To understand the gain secured from foreign investment requires consideration of a more extended chain of operations. When we make investments in foreign securities we do so in the first instance by giving a foreign enterprise or government

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command over liquid funds in the United States. The initial transfer is of liquid funds through the foreign exchange market. These funds may be spent by the foreign borrower within his own country, within the United States, or in other countries. It makes no important difference in which of these ways the funds are used so far as concerns the ultimate effect of such transactions on the economic relations between the borrowing country and the United States. For, in the final analysis, the loan is made by one or more of the following adjustments: 1. By additional exports (or lessened imports) of gold or other international money. 2. By additional exports (or lessened imports) of other securities. 3. By additional exports of goods, or additional rendering of services (such as banking, shipping, or insurance). 4. By reduction of the imports that otherwise would have been bought, or lessened utilization of foreign services. Only in these ways are the credits in the foreign exchange market, which are transferred to the borrowing country, created. These adjustments may sometimes take place before the foreign borrowing takes place, may even be a cause of the borrowing, not a consequence; but such cases do not seriously modify the general conclusions with which we are concerned.

There is no way of telling certainly in advance which of these adjustments will come about as the result of any single loan transaction or any given volume of loans. Within the past few months a small part of our loans have been made by the direct shipment of gold, as to Germany, and that outward flow may assume larger proportions. But such a movement would cease as soon as our present huge accumulation of gold is seriously diminished. As for the second mode of adjustment, that is still more unusual, for it means that while a country is loaning abroad it is also borrowing abroad. To a certain extent such is always the case, but rarely on a large scale; the investment in American securities which has taken place abroad since 1919 is the result of special causes. The chief methods of adjustment when foreign loans are made are the third and fourth, as the fluctuation in the American trade balance in past decades amply establishes. Our present foreign loans are being made by sending abroad more goods and rendering more services to foreigners than we otherwise would (it may be only preventing their decrease), or by receiving from abroad fewer goods and services. The interest payments to the lenders in this country and the

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repayment of the principal will likewise take place, in the main, through opposite movements of the same nature. Re-sales to us of American securities acquired in recent years of European fright may, however, have some importance.

This is a summary statement, more or less on traditional lines. A thorough account of the subject would pay attention to a multitude of minor but not negligible special cases and complexities. But important as are these special cases in any professional understanding of the subject, the preceding conclusions do not depart too far from the actual truth. If a doubt exists as to their adequacy, it is not because of these qualifications, but rather because the future holds a hidden possibility of another breakdown of the whole financial mechanism of foreign commerce, owing to the strain of the great volume of interest payments that will have to be made on these loans, on the inter-allied war loans, and under the Dawes scheme.

Studying these means of transferring our loans abroad, we can discern three possible gains. First, to the extent that the loans are made by the exportation of American goods or the use of American services (and not by the alternative ways), American export industries benefit and American shipping, banking and hotel services profit. But the national gain from these sources is probably not nearly so large as is often supposed. The same industries, or others employing the same resources and labor, would probably find occupation producing for domestic demands if the foreign ones were not made effective by our foreign loans. Still, some gain there doubtless is. But to what extent—it must be repeated—our foreign loans are made by the transfer of American goods rather than by other means is unascertainable; our high protective tariff policy, by making the terms of trade more difficult for other lands, hinders this outcome.

Secondly, the interest payments on these loans, and their repayment, will come to us in the same forms in which the loans were made, though perhaps in different proportion. Here several stages should be distinguished, though the various possible permutations cannot be traced out. For yet a while the interest payments due us may amount to less than the new loans we are making; and in this stage the interest payments, in part or whole, may be paid by merely making unnecessary the adjustments which otherwise would have followed the new loans. But the subject is too complex to permit of any short

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and accurate statement. That stage, however, will gradually yield to another one—in fact is almost ready to do so now (the net interest income of the United States from abroad reached 464 millions in 1924, according to the Department of Commerce calculations). Ultimately, the volume of interest payments to this country will exceed the new loans, and the movements discussed above will then be definitely reversed. We shall export fewer goods and services than if the loans had not been made, or, more likely still, the volume of our imports will swell greatly—how greatly will largely depend upon our own tariff policy. Without any further effort on our part, we shall receive from abroad a large volume of desirable goods or have desirable services performed, eat Cuban sugar, use Chilean copper, pass our summers in Swiss villas, or study art in France—not the same individuals as have made the loans, perhaps, but other Americans. And since the interest rate is higher than would have been received at home upon the invested capital, the return is greater than the loss of national income originally sustained (this conclusion is only presumptive, and depends on many things of which the safety of the foreign loans is only one and not the most important).

Thirdly, the loans we are making abroad may be used either for unproductive or for productive purposes. They may be used to prepare for or to wage war, as, for example, were many of the French loans to Russia and the Balkan States; on the other hand, they may be used to build houses, improve railroad equipment, establish new industries. The bulk of present loans are being used productively. To the extent that they are so used, other countries will benefit from our loans. That is our international service. And to the extent that the productivity of other countries is thus increased, we may receive a slight benefit through the extension of the demand for American goods.

Some incidental consequences of the economic strengthening of other countries, especially of countries still largely undeveloped, such as Canada and Argentine, require notice. American loans abroad may well be the means of working up hitherto untouched natural resources—fuel, such as oil; minerals, such as lead and copper; and other raw materials, such as pulp-wood. Some benefit would accrue to us from the greater and therefore cheaper supply, and we should be able more readily to conserve our own supply of valuable natural resources. On the other

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hand, this industrial growth in other countries may occasionally injure American industries by creating newly strong competition. There are already numerous instances of this kind to record. British capital figured in the erection of American cotton mills which have long competed with those of Great Britain. Argentine cattle, American owned, compete with our domestic steers. We may expect the list to grow. Yet there is little ground for grave apprehension. We have reached the stage of enormous variety in both our domestic and export industries. A few, an important few perhaps, may be seriously affected by this new competition. That will not be wholly unhealthy. Some may actually lose out and have to suspend operations; some costly and unwelcome adjustment of men and resources to other fields of activity may be compelled. But normally, the loss will be taken up in the expansion of the other industries. These imports will be procured more cheaply than they could be produced at home. And it is always likely that if American capital does not aid in developing foreign resources and industry, capital from other sources will—with no pleasanter results. Today the vigilance of enterprising capital is too great to leave unexploited any great economic opportunity anywhere in the world.

Such are some of the varied economic effects to be anticipated from the continuing flow of American capital to other lands—leaving out of account certain of the obscure and very indirect gains and losses that could only be disclosed by an intricate course of speculation. It is plain that the movement has not been the result of a cautious analysis of all its good and bad promise for national and international welfare. It has been rather an inevitable shift in our destiny. At the moment when other countries hold a fresh importance in our thoughts, and when our relationship and duty towards them is most unsettled, we possess huge amounts of capital available for investment abroad. Offers of high returns do the rest. A new economic interest has become firmly established in the community, that of the investors in foreign securities and the banking houses engaged in the distribution of these securities; simultaneously our export and import industries have assumed a greater importance in economic life. These new factors will play a part in the settlement of other international economic problems, such as the inter-allied debt problem. New differences of interest as regards the tariff are also forecast.

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III

The preceding economic analysis suggests that an increased interchange of goods and services with other lands will be a permanent characteristic of our economic life. Even though we do not permit ourselves to become vitally dependent upon the trade or supplies of other countries, it is to be anticipated that our prosperity will be seriously affected by economic and political events abroad. Owners and workers in industries engaged in export trade, or dependent on imports for supplies, in larger numbers than before, will feel the results of foreign happenings. Changes in foreign tariffs, in land and currency legislation and the like, will touch us more keenly because we have been loaning abroad. Our banking system, engaged now in a multitude of new transactions and relationships of recent growth (as, for example, the handling of foreign deposits), must watch with a new concern these same events. The holders of foreign securities, individuals as well as banking institutions, cannot now turn their eyes away from the affairs of the lands in which they have invested. A lender is always bound, though it be but lightly, to his borrowers. The ideal of isolation in thought certainly, in action probably, will become even more impracticable than at present—even if desirable. It is difficult to avoid that conclusion. The British people endeavored to avoid it during the nineteenth century; hence the epigram about an empire acquired in a fit of absent-mindedness.

The increase in our investments in Canada is not likely to produce any change in our political relations with that country, unless it be through tariff matters. American investments there have raised no serious political difficulties in the past; there seems no reason, in view of the excellent state of our relations with Canada, why they should in the future. Most of our investments in Western European countries, such an imposing element in the current movement, are, with the exception of Italy, probably only temporary. While they continue they will tend to make for a conciliatory and internationally-minded foreign policy. We are likely to watch the recovery of these industrial countries of Europe with more enthusiasm, and their difficulties with more sympathy and knowledge, because we have invested in them. Our investments in Austria and Hungary, in Poland and Czechoslovakia, are apt to remain and may even mount if the economic convalescence of that part of the

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world continues. And the security of these loans—of all our European loans in the final analysis—depends upon the success of the League of Nations in its task of maintaining international peace. We said we believed President Harding's assertion that the League was a dying institution; yet we make loans to countries which will be mutilated or extinguished if the promises of peace embodied in the Covenant of the League are not kept.

Our even more extended investment in Central American countries means that we shall become increasingly concerned with the life of these countries, and they with our policy. Already these investments have influenced American opinion and possibly the American Government in its foreign policy (as in Mexico), though perhaps not in a determining way. Already we have had a hand of one kind or another in the financial administration of Cuba, San Domingo, Haiti, Nicaragua and other Central American states, mainly because of events connected with foreign loans entered into by these countries. Our government has also helped these countries to secure loans, and determined in part the loan conditions. We are in a position approaching financial guardianship to these countries, in some instances by virtue of treaty arrangements, in others merely because of previous assumption of responsibility. In the event of serious financial difficulty touching the foreign debt, American intervention, invited or otherwise, is likely to occur; political consequences for which we are not prepared, which we may not desire, may follow in its train. Propinquity is certain to give us a position of economic dominance in every Central American country except, perhaps, Mexico, and to lead us to limit in some way their independence in international affairs. Whether this process will result in hatred or in friendship will largely depend on whether we define clearly by treaty (as we have in some cases), or otherwise, our financial relations with these countries, and act justly and with restraint in all of these relations.

The situation as regards the larger and stronger states of South America will be somewhat different, for these countries have access to the European capital markets, and European capital in a volume exceeding the volume of American capital is already invested there. Nevertheless, as American investment will certainly grow, the people of these countries will become increasingly conscious of the American hand in their affairs. We may expect to see the question of policy towards

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American interests and the United States become one of the central issues in their political life. Likewise, our growing investment in South America and our growing use of South American raw materials may determine our foreign policy, not only towards these nations but towards the rest of the world. The economic development of these regions for mutual benefit is all we now desire, but the fulfilment of that desire may often give rise to conflict, with or without any fault on our part. The long record of political instability, of dictatorship and of anarchy in many of these countries, suggests that their action towards foreign investors may be vacillating and sometimes unfair. On the other hand, American interests may in the future seek special advantages. In short, our foreign relations with these lands are likely to become more complicated than in the peaceful past. Here, too, it is urgent that a definite policy be formulated to govern our action in episodes arising out of our investments. As the stronger state—as the creditor state—we must be prepared to be suspected and hated in many South American circles even if we behave well. If we behave unfairly, these feelings, finding justification, will strengthen and spread.

There remain the still more troubled and largely undeveloped areas of the world, China, Russia, Turkey, Mesopotamia and the Balkan States. Before the war European countries were increasing their loans in these regions; large and unforseeable risks —big rewards to boldness, skill, unscrupulousness—finance often calling upon governments for aid, and governments using finance as means of forwarding political purposes—secret agreements and double design—these figured in many a deal. The situation in many of these regions does not seem to have changed essentially since 1914, despite all that has taken place, though there are some hopeful signs such as the nine-power agreement reached at the Washington Conference. Space does not permit even an aeroplane survey of the situation Our economic interests in these countries are only of secondary importance, but we are not likely to forego them. Furthermore, our political interests in some of them are primary. American capital will probably enter all these countries whenever it gets a favorable opportunity, may even enter with government support. We shall want to operate factories and sell machinery in Russia, build railroads in China, hunt for oil in Turkey and Mesopotamia. Nationalistic rivalry will lead to an exaggerated view of economic gains.

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It is impossible to catalogue the problems that will be presented to the State Department.

One main conclusion stands out from all these observations. There is every prospect that events arising out of our growing foreign investment will present us in the future with decisions involving war and peace, will bring us, whether we like it or not, to concern ourselves with distant causes.

There exist in writings on international law many attempts to classify the controversies which arise in this particular field of international affairs. Authorities differ greatly, however. For the sake of brevity and simplicity we may leave the legal classifications aside and take notice of three types of situations which arise with particular frequency. All three usually have complicated antecedents, and disputes over facts are usual when they arise; all three frequently bring up, besides, basic questions of political principle and behavior. Firstly, there is the possibility of default on either interest or principal by foreign governments. Sometimes there may be ample excuse for the defaults. At other times they may seem, and even be, wilful, caused by extravagance and mismanagement (as were the early Egyptian defaults) and by cold indifference to a solemnly assumed obligation; sometimes, also, the default represents a violation of a pledge given when the loan was made, as to the use to which the loan was to be put, or regarding the guarantee given for its security. There are instances, too, in which the original auspices of the loan were dishonest; others in which the terms of the loan were so unjustly drawn as to invite disrespect for the obligation, or the interest burden so heavy as to provoke default; still others in which the loan terms really represented a political design on the part of the lending power, and default has been welcomed rather than otherwise.

Then there is the possibility of some action on the part of foreign governments which might lessen or destroy the value of private investments abroad. Of such action, usually called "hostile legislation," we have had experience. It may involve the breaking of contractual obligations towards the investor, as in Venezuela, and even unfair discrimination in favor of citizens of the borrowing country. We have a recent instance of such legislation in the controversy between the Mexican Government and American owners of oil lands in that country over the application of Article 27 of the new (1917) Mexican constitution.

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The treatment of the Russian Government of foreign property may be considered merely as an extreme example of this type. Many of these disputes are not different, of course, from those which arise within this country when any powerful economic interest is adversely affected by governmental action. We know what genuine animosities may be stirred up in these domestic controversies. They are apt to become still more intense when the difference is between enterprises and governments of different nationalities. On the one hand, hostility to foreign corporations sometimes offers a tempting road to political success, or has seemed an easy way to enrich the treasury. And on the other hand, foreign corporations, existing on the scene of their operations solely for gain, have sometimes misused property and life. In particular instances, as in South Africa before the Boer War, they have shown a will to dominate political or fiscal affairs in the land of their domicile—usually to insure their own financial position.

A third type of situation, quick to stir national animosities, has recently received more public discussion than the two foregoing—namely, that of international conflicts arising out of the competitive search by private capital for concessions or other valuable economic advantages. The revelations of pre-war diplomacy, and recent controversies such as those over oil exploration rights in Mesopotamia, the Dutch East Indies, Albania and elsewhere, make further elaboration unnecessary. In such situations it sometimes happens that governments push their interference very far, especially if it is believed that control of some strategic area or a supply of some vital raw material is at stake. It is for dealing with these situations that we have formulated our policy of the "open door,"—a doctrine which, difficult to interpret in practice, has still to win its way completely even in the mandated territories of the League of Nations.

IV

Here are entanglements and enough. We shall not be able to ignore them, for they are within the field of national policy and diplomacy to stay.

The traditional American policy in regard to disputes between American citizens and foreign governments arising out of foreign investments has been, in general, one of non-intervention. There have been exceptions to that rule, however, and utterances of

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our State Department on various occasions indicate an effort to differentiate one case from the rest on the basis of some doctrine of international law. For example, we have taken action more readily in support of tortious claims arising out of indirect injuries committed by foreign governments against the persons and property of our citizens, than in support of claims arising out of broken contracts. These we ordinarily have been willing to submit to adjudication. We have been still more loath to act in cases of default on government loans than in cases of other broken contractual promises. It is well established, however, that (to adopt some phrases of Mr. Borchard) "intervention or the use of arms to collect public loans is a question of power and politics rather than a rule of law" is an observation that applies to the whole range of situations.

Opinion, both popular and professional, remains deeply divided on the issue of whether governmental aid or intervention should be undertaken in the types of situation which have been discussed. Questions of justice, of economic policy, of political wisdom, are all involved in the decision. On the one extreme, there is much support, though seldom outspoken, for the view that the question of intervention should be decided entirely on the basis of whether any important national political or economic end is to be served by such action. Governments have often acted on this policy and have sometimes pushed intervention much further than necessary to compensate the investor. On the other extreme, there is the view that national diplomacy or force should never be exercised in support of foreign investments, that all financial adventures in foreign lands and in foreign securities should be entirely at the adventurer's risk. A variety of positions exist between these extremes, which would distinguish between different cases chiefly on the basis of the justice or injustice of the treatment accorded the investor.

Opinion will remain hopelessly divided, and policy will remain opportunistic, as long as the question is one of power and politics, not of law. And as long as present conditions continue it is almost certain, in view of our national strength and economic enterprise, that there will be an extension of our governmental obligations to private capital and frequent engagements in the same sort of semi-political, semi-financial negotiations as occupied the European nations before the war. That way lies an American Empire of subordinate states.

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Acceptance of the policy of non-intervention under all circumstances, since it would retard American lending and make it more difficult for other countries to borrow, and since it runs contrary to strongly held conceptions of justice, is hardly a possibility, unless, indeed, other lending countries should agree to the same policy. Such agreement seems at present unattainable, but it may not always be so; an international agreement through the League of Nations suggests itself.

In several present tendencies there are perhaps the clues to satisfactory alternatives in internationally advantageous and peaceful policies. First, there is the recently initiated policy of the State Department of requesting that American financial interests should inform it of proposed transactions, "to the end that there may be opportunity to consider, in the light of public policy, the possible national interest that may be involved." The main object of this policy, according to the official statement on the subject, is to give the Department an opportunity to object to arrangements which seem likely to cause conflicts or lead to government entanglements, and it is understood that objections on this score have been made to the terms of several proposed loans. The official declaration also states that the Department "will not pass upon the merits of foreign loans as business propositions, nor assume any responsibility whatsoever in connection with loan transactions." Despite this statement, however, it seems clear that the results of the arrangement will be determined entirely by the way in which it is used. It is possible that it may be used in such a way as really to safeguard the country against future misunderstandings and political controversies. But it may be used in a way to produce far different results. Some manner must be found of controlling this practise so as to make it impossible for any governmental department to commit us morally, even if not officially, to the support of foreign ventures or arrangements without legislative consent. Such was the intent of a bill introduced into the Senate last session. Furthermore, at present the State Department has a virtually unchecked power to encourage or discourage foreign loans, if it chooses to exert it, by means of its advice and its influence over public opinion.

Further suggestions may be made looking to the establishment of a policy that is sound and advantageous from the international as well as the national point of view. In the first place,

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the terms of loans and other financial arrangements should include a provision for some form of arbitral or judicial settlement in case of controversy. Several American loans made to Central American states contain such provisions; the Czechoslovak loan of 1922 is another important precedent. Secondly, a way forward is pointed by the convention adopted at the Second Hague Conference which limited the recourse to arms "for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country by the government of another country as being due to its nationals,"—the famous Porter proposal, brought forward under the instruction of Elihu Root, then Secretary of State. This doctrine might be extended to all pecuniary controversies of the type under consideration, instead of being limited only to contract debts, and it should be supplemented by definite arrangements for arbitral or judicial settlement. The results might not always be as favorable to powerful creditor states as those that might have been obtained by the use of force; but that risk can rightly be thrown on private capital. Nor is there any good reason why this procedure should be limited to disputes between states on the American continent. The time is ripe, and more than ripe, for a series of general international conventions in this field, providing for international conciliation or adjudication. The Permanent Court of International Justice is an instrument suited to passing on such disputes. It has just heard its first case of the kind, in which the Greek Government brought suit against the British Government as mandatory for Palestine in order to establish the validity of a concession granted by Turkey in 1914 to a Greek subject. Finally, consortium arrangements, preferably of a nature to provide also for international adjudication, and treaties similar to the nine-power agreement of the Washington Conference, greatly lessen the chances of international strife in regions like China.

It is in these directions that we must move. And by so doing we shall also secure a broader platform on which to base those other principles of the "open door" and "equal access to commercial opportunity" for which we have been contending. Our national prestige and financial power are an ample guarantee that we shall not suffer in the outcome, and that our just aims will be sufficiently recognized.

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THE IRAQ DISPUTE

The special committee appointed to investigate the question of the frontiers between Turkey and Iraq has returned from its work on the spot and has been preparing its report, designed for presentation at the June meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. The problem to be solved is an arduous one, complicated by conflicting considerations of many kinds. The territory in dispute roughly corresponds to the former Turkish Vilayet of Mosul, although in theory the British deny this and declare



that there is no dispute as to Mosul, which is a part of Iraq, but only as to what should be its northern boundary. On the other hand, they claim certain districts not in Mosul proper. Officially they are only championing the demands of the state formed from the region they conquered and which until recently they governed under a mandate; indeed, in order to obtain the ratification by the Iraq parliament of the treaty which establishes the future relations between Great Britain and independent

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Iraq they undertook to secure for her her proper frontiers, *i.e.*, Mosul. But for the Turks Mosul is part of the territory, the recovery of which comes under their National Pact of January 28, 1920, the sacred foundation of their new national existence. At the conferences at Lausanne, the two claimants did not even approach agreement. It was therefore provided in the treaty of peace, July 24, 1923, that if they continued to be unable to reach a settlement, the matter should be referred to the League of Nations for arbitration.

We can only sum up here the principal difficulties in arriving at a decision which will be reasonably fair to all parties. Geographically the Mosul district has a certain natural unity which makes anything like an equal division arbitrary and artificial. Although in the main mountainous, one cannot determine with certainty whether it should go primarily with the mountains of which it is a fringe or with the valley of the lower Tigris which begins here. Economically it is of much value, owing to the great amount of oil known to be within its borders, not to speak of the still larger quantities suspected or imagined. This leads to dreams of wealth on the part of the eager claimants to the territory and explains the interest felt in the dispute by the world oil syndicates whose rival claims to concessions form a special chapter in the Iraq complications.

Historically Mosul has changed hands many times. Ethnographically the population is mixed. Although the region belonged to the Ottoman Empire for some three hundred years there are few Turks in it. In the west the Arabs are numerous, but in most of the disputed zone the Kurds predominate. These untamed mountaineers of uncertain race still maintain much of their old tribal organization. At the close of the World War there were plans for an independent or at least an autonomous Kurdistan; but it would hardly have been capable of self government. At any rate nothing came of the idea, and today the Kurd has the choice of being under the Turk or under the Arab. The Turks have vigorously asserted that they and the Kurds, many of whom are now full fledged citizens of the new Turkish Republic, have always been on excellent terms. Indeed, the identity of sympathy and interest between the two peoples has been one of the chief grounds on which the Turks have proclaimed that Mosul is properly theirs, and they have felt so sure of the result that they have even expressed their willingness to abide by the results of a fair plebiscite. The Kurdish revolt of this spring came, therefore, at a peculiarly inopportune moment. A small but interesting element is formed by the Assyro-Chaldeans, who were expelled by the war from their home in the mountains where they had maintained a heroic but precarious existence for many centuries. The remnant have found refuge in Iraq, where they are naturally firm supporters of British rule.

The real desires of the mass of the people, in so far as these have any, are not only hard to ascertain but are liable at any time to sudden change. The townsman may well prefer one régime, the tribesman another. Local feuds, personal ambitions, ridiculous hopes or fears, and all sorts of accidental circumstances are likely to determine the sentiments of the moment. A plebiscite could hardly be carried out in such a way as to have much moral value. Whatever settlement is made will produce fierce anger and may even endanger the peace, for there are great interests at stake and passions have already been aroused. The best solution would be a direct agreement, even at the eleventh hour, between the disputants themselves, for any kind of compromise freely accepted by both parties will mean less ill-feeling than an arbitral decision which will be unsatisfactory to at least one of them. But a settlement of some kind there must be and the sooner the better.

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THE ISLE OF PINES TREATY

By Benjamin H. Williams

The relinquishment by the United States of its claim to the Isle of Pines may be regarded as but a minor territorial adjustment, but it carries more than ordinary significance because of its effect upon the intangible prestige of this country. Here (leaving out of discussion all question of abstract justice) certain material interests were staked against Latin-American goodwill; and the fact that the latter consideration prevailed seems an augury of closer cooperation in the western hemisphere.

On July 30, 1898, in reply to a request from Spain for terms of peace, William R. Day, Secretary of State, set forth among other conditions: "First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba and her immediate evacuation of the island. Second. . . . the cession to the United States and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the island of Porto Rico *and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies.*" Thus there entered into the public documents the phrase in italics which was destined to be the subject of controversy for over a quarter of a century, for it inevitably raised the question: Was the Isle of Pines one of these "other islands"? The terms were accepted by Spain and in the protocol preliminary to a treaty of peace the words above quoted were repeated almost verbatim. Another stipulation in the protocol providing for the evacuation of the Spanish troops varied the phraseology somewhat, for it set forth one arrangement for the evacuation of "Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands" and another and separate arrangement for the evacuation of "Porto Rico and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies," thus raising a fair inference that in the minds of the diplomats the islands adjacent to Cuba were not included in the term "other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies."

On December 10, 1898, the treaty of peace was signed at Paris by the representatives of the two countries. William R. Day, the author of the disputed phrases, was one of those acting for the United States. The treaty again uses the unfortunately ambiguous wording: "Article I. Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. Article II. Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies."

The words of this treaty have been subjected to the most minute examination. On the one hand it was stated that they plainly ceded the Isle of Pines to the United States as one of the "other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies." On the other, it was asserted that the Isle of Pines is historically and geographically a part of Cuba, separated from it by only 35 miles of shallow water, and for centuries was considered as a part of it for governmental and administrative purposes. Hence, it was claimed, the Isle of Pines formed a part of Cuba and was disposed of under Article I, rather than one of the "other islands" ceded to the United States under Article II. (The "other islands" were such islands as Vieques, Culebra and Mona Islands near Porto Rico.) Following out this argument a little further, it was asserted that when Cuba secured her independence (which was recognized by Congressional resolution some eight months before the treaty of peace) she had included the Isle of Pines within her sovereign teritory. Accordingly, Spain would have been incompetent to convey it to the United States, even conceding the intention of the treaty so to do, for at the time of the treaty it did not belong to Spain but to Cuba.

What was the intention of the American commissioners when they participated in the framing of the treaty? There is testimony from various persons who knew Commissioners Davis and Frye that they thought the term "other islands" included the Isle of Pines and that it therefore became the property of the United States. Mr. Davis left no written word to this effect, but affidavits of friends and confidants in

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St. Paul were secured to show that he had so construed the treaty. Senator Clapp in 1909 was authority for the statement that Senator Frye had also entertained this view. However, Senator Frye was a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1906 and it is to be presumed that he concurred in the majority report of the Committee that the title to the Isle of Pines did not pass to the United States with the treaty, as a dissenting minority report was submitted in which Frye did not join. Mr. Day, the man who had coined the disputed phrases, was later appointed Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and while a member of that body concurred in the decision in Pearcy vs. Stranahan (205 U. S. 257), in which the following words appeared in the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Fuller: "In short, all the world knew that it (the Isle of Pines) was an integral part of Cuba, and in view of the joint resolution of April 20, 1898, it seems clear that the Isle of Pines was not supposed to be one of the 'other islands' ceded by Article II." Considering Mr. Justice Day's intimate connection with the origin of the words in question it is difficult to imagine that he was not consulted by the Chief Justice when this opinion was framed.



Following the war, Cuba and the Isle of Pines were for several years under American military occupation, during which time the island in dispute was combined with Cuba for purposes of administration. It was during this occupation that the conflicting claims concerning the island's status began to be made. In 1899 prospective investors and homeseekers directed numerous letters to the governmental departments asking about the land, products and climate of the Isle of Pines. These letters frequently inquired as to the political title to the island. On August 14, 1899, John J. Pershing, then Assistant Adjutant-General, in reply to a letter of inquiry stated: "I am directed by the Assistant Secretary of War to advise you that this island was ceded by Spain to the United States and is therefore a part of our territory." This same language was used on several subsequent occasions by the Assistant Secretary of War, G. D. Meiklejohn, and constituted what is probably the only direct claim to the Isle of Pines ever put forward in writing by any of the branches of the federal administration. The War Department had no authority, of course, to commit the United States on such a question. Furthermore, the statement was made by the Assistant Secretary without the knowledge of his chief, Elihu Root, Secretary of War, who subsequently wrote: "I have since learned that a former Assistant Secretary of War had previously, without my knowledge or authority, directed an Assistant Adjutant General to say that the island belonged to the United States. I never thought so." Thus the statement contained in the Pershing letter was only the personal guess of a subordinate; but it was sufficient for the promoter, who seized upon it and made wide use of it.

Meanwhile a number of American citizens had gone to the Isle of Pines to establish homes, while many others had made investments. Land companies had been formed for the purpose of buying land at an extremely low figure in order to reap the profit that was sure to come should the United States take over the island and admit its products duty free. On January 29, 1923, the Secretary of State estimated that

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10,000 Americans owned property which constituted 90 percent of the island and that 700 Americans were residing there permanently. Among the lands held by Americans were 10,470 acres of citrus fruit groves valued at $1,000 per acre. General Crowder, however, estimated the total value of lands held by Americans at not more than $15,000,000.

In anticipation of the withdrawal of its forces from Cuba the United States sought to secure promises from Cuba safeguarding American interests. These were enacted in the form of an amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill of 1901 as a condition precedent to withdrawal, and were later added as an appendix to the Cuban constitution and incorporated in the treaty of 1903 between the United States and Cuba. Article VI of the Platt Amendment provided: "That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty." Upon withdrawal of American troops the island was left *de facto* under the government of Cuba.

The Platt Amendment also provided that Cuba would lease or sell to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at points to be agreed upon with the President of the United States. On July 2, 1903, the American Minister and the Cuban Acting Secretary of State drew up two documents, one a lease to the United States of coaling and naval stations at Guantanamo and Bahia Hondo, and the other a treaty providing for the relinquishment of all American claims of title to the Isle of Pines in favor of Cuba. The treaty specifically states in Article II: "This relinquishment, on the part of the United States of America, of claim of title to the said Isle of Pines is in consideration of the grants of coaling and naval stations in the Island of Cuba heretofore made to the United States of America by the Republic of Cuba." The transaction was thus on the face of it a bargain.

The lease of coaling and naval stations went into effect as an executive agreement upon prompt ratification by the Presidents of the United States and Cuba. Thus we secured Guantanamo, our chief naval base in the West Indies and a vitally important part of the defenses of the Panama Canal. The treaty relinquishing claim of title to the Isle of Pines went before the Senate, failed to secure a favorable vote and was replaced by another treaty in 1904 which was identical with it. The second treaty remained before the Senate for twenty-one years longer.

During the closing weeks of the 68th Congress the treaty was placed upon the calendar and considered in open executive session. All of the old legal arguments in favor of giving Cuba a clear title were reviewed. In addition, the point was stressed that as Cuba had been in *de facto* control of the island since the withdrawal of American troops it was, as a practical matter, impossible for us to negotiate a treaty with her to relinquish her claims. The wisest course lay in agreeing to the treaty and thus putting an end to an impasse which had caused much criticism of the United States and had endangered the success of a genuine Pan-American program.

The 68th Congress came to a close without a vote upon the treaty; but it was immediately brought up again in the special session of the Senate of the 69th Congress. After a considerable discussion, during which an attempted filibuster against the treaty by Senator Copeland of New York failed, the treaty came to a vote and the resolution advising ratification passed on March 13 by a vote of 63 to 14. Immediately the beneficial effect of this action upon our international relations became evident. The Senate and Chamber of Deputies of Cuba each hastened to send to the United States Senate resolutions of thanks for this act of justice and good friendship. The President and also the President-elect of Cuba expressed in complimentary terms their gratitude to the United States. In other countries of Latin America highly favorable comments have been made. It is reasonable to believe that in relinquishing its title to this relatively unimportant island the United States, apart from the satisfaction of acting as it should act, has gained something intangible but valuable.

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SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By William L. Langer

General International Relations

A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. By William E. Hall. 8th edition, by A. Pearce Higgins. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925, 952 pp.

The latest edition of a standard work, revised to include consideration of the peace treaties and developments since 1918.

LA THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DES MANDATS INTERNATIONAUX. By J. Stoyanowsky. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1925, 254 pp.

A scholarly investigation.

THE GENEVA PROTOCOL. By David Hunter Miller. New York: Macmillan, 1925, 279 pp.

An authoritative examination of the Protocol's legal aspects by one of the advisers to the American Peace Commission.

FREE TRADE AND PEACE IN THE 19TH CENTURY. By Helen Bosanquet. London: Williams and Norgate, 1925, 155 pp.

An interesting examination of the effects of commercial interests on peace.

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A novel approach to the problem of the balance of power.

LA QUESTION DE L'INTEGRITÉ TERRITORIALE DANS LE PACTE DE LA SOCIETÉ DES NATIONS. By Titus Komarnicki. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1924, 282 pp.

A thorough juristic study of this important problem.

THE DOMINION OF SEA AND AIR. By Enid Scott Rankin. New York: Century, 1925, 339 pp.

The author suggests international control of the air as a means of furthering peace and universal coöperation.

TASCHENBUCH DER LUFTFLOTTEN, 1924–1925. Edited by Werner von Langsdorff. Munich: Lehmann, 1925, 536 pp.

A statistical handbook of military and commercial aeronautics in all countries.

THE WORLD'S INDUSTRIAL PARLIAMENT. By E. M. Oliver. London: Allen and Unwin, 1925, 63 pp.

The best short popular account of the International Labor Office.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES. By Tracy H. Lay. New York: Prentice Hall, 1925, 438 pp.

The standard work on the subject.

THE ISLES OF FEAR. By Katherine Mayo. New York: Harcourt, 1925, 372 pp.

A canvass of public opinion in the Philippines.

SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HENRY CABOT LODGE. New York: Scribners, 1925, 2 vols., 546, 572 pp.

An important source in studying American foreign policy.

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IMMIGRATION: A WORLD MOVEMENT AND ITS AMERICAN SIGNIFICANCE. By Henry Pratt Fairchild. New York: Macmillan, 1925, 520 pp.

A revised edition of a standard treatise.

RECOGNITION OF SOVIET RUSSIA. Compiled by James G. Hodgson. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1925, 111 pp.

A useful reprint of the best articles *pro* and *con*.

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THE ROOTS AND CAUSES OF THE WARS, 1914–1918. By John S. Ewart. New York: Doran, 1925, 2 vols.

A very able reëxamination of the whole problem by a well-known Canadian jurist.

THE CASE FOR THE CENTRAL POWERS. By Count Max Montgelas. New York: Knopf, 1925, 255 pp.

A translation of the best German account of the origins of the war.

DER WELTKRIEG, 1914–1918. I. DIE GRENZSCHLACHTEN IM WESTEN. II. DIE BEFREIUNG OSTPREUSSENS. Berlin: Mittler, 1925, 2 vols., 719, 390 pp.

The two first volumes of the official German history of the war.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE. By Louis Aubert. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925, 180 pp.

Williamstown Lectures, 1924, ably presenting the French point of view.

RECONSTRUCTION. By James D. Whelpley. New York: Funk, Wagnalls, 1925, 383 pp.

A keen appraisal of economic conditions in the countries most affected by the war.

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A thoughtful and original study by the editor of the *Svenska Dagbladet*.

LE PROBLÈME DU RÉGIONALISME. By Henri Hauser. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1924, 176 pp.

A thorough report of regional activities in the military and economic organization of France during the war.

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An excellent investigation of the post-war commercial policies of the European countries.

LES FINANCES PUBLIQUES DE LA FRANCE ET LA FORTUNE PRIVÉE. Paris: Payot, 1925.

One of the most enlightening discussions of French financial policy and its implications.

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A bitter attack on Poincaré, who is accused of having neglected to prepare sufficiently for war.

DEUTSCHLAND UNTER MILITÄR- FINANZ- UND WIRTSCHAFTS-KONTROLLE. By R. G. Quaatz and M. Spahn. Berlin: Stilke, 1925, 146 pp.

A concise presentation of the system of control as established by the peace treaties and the London Agreement.

DIE GEWERKSCHAFTEN IM RUHRKAMPF. By Lothar Erdmann. Berlin: Verlag des Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 1924.

Practically an official version of the part played by the Trade Unions, and an important contribution to the story of the occupation of the Ruhr.

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A surprisingly moderate account, by the former President of the Hungarian Republic, of his activities during the war. An important and interesting contribution.

AUSTRIA IN DISSOLUTION. By Count Burian. London: Benn, 1925, 455 pp.

Memoirs of the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister during the war.

DAS GELDWESEN IM KRIEGE. By Alexander Popovics. Vienna: Hölder, Pichler, Tempsky, 1925, 185 pp.

An authoritative financial history of the Dual Monarchy during the war, in the Carnegie series.

DIE OESTERREICHISCHEN VERFASSUNGSGESETZE DES BUNDES UND DER LÄNDER. By L. Adamovich and G. Froehlich. Vienna: Staatsdruckerei, 1925, 868 pp.

The standard treatise on the constitution of Austria.

CRONACHE QUADRIENNALI DI POLITICA ITALIANA ED ESTERA, 1919–1923. Edited by Ciccotti. Milan: Unitas, 1924, 2 vols.

A useful chronicle of events in Italy in the last years.

FATTI EUROPEI E POLITICA ITALIANA, 1922–1924. Milan: Imperia, 1924, 196 pp.

A survey of Italian foreign policy in the past two years.

LA PACE DI FIUME. By Giulio Benedetti. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1924, 323 pp.

This volume traces the Fiume question, especially its economic aspects, in the period from 1920 to 1924.

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A keen examination of the underlying causes for unrest in Italy.

PROGRAMMA DELLA DESTRA FASCISTA. By Volt. Florence: La Voce, 1924, 157 pp.

A philosophic discussion of the party's program.

IN MARGINE DEL FASCISMO. By General Filareti. Milan: Unitas, 1925, 421 pp.

A series of searching essays on the development and significance of the Fascist movement.

LAS RESPONSABILIDADES DEL ANTIGUO REGIMEN, 1875–1923. By Conde de Romanones. Madrid: Renacimiento, 1924.

The well-known liberal leader makes an investigation into the political and economic problems confronting modern Spain.

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An account of the agrarian reform in Czechoslovakia, by the chief of the Department of Agriculture.

LETTLANDS VOLKS UND STAATSWIRTSCHAFT. By Benjamin Siew. Riga: Müllersche Buchhandlung, 1925, 298 pp.

A survey of Latvia's economic condition.

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The diary of another revolutionary deportee who became disillusioned.

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A sound review of political, economic and intellectual conditions, by the correspondent of the *Prager Presse*.

COMMERCIAL YEAR BOOK OF THE SOVIET UNION. By L. Segal and A. A. Santalov. New York: Huebsch, 1925, 428 pp.

Statistical.

DIE RUSSISCHE WÄHRUNGSREFORM DES JAHRES 1924. By Hans Seraphim. Leipzig: Teubner, 1925, 106 pp.

A general account of the monetary situation before and since 1922

LENIN. By Leon Trotsky. New York: Minton Balch, 1925, 236 pp.

Deals chiefly with the years 1900–1903 and 1917–1918.

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A syllabus of English and Imperial history from the earliest times.

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING NATIONS. By G. W. Morris and L. S. Wood. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924, 416 pp.

An able review of the growth of the Empire and of the federative idea.

SOME ASPECTS OF IMPERIAL COMMUNICATIONS. By A. V. T. Wakely. London: Praed, 1925, 160 pp.

A scholarly discussion of the problem.

THE LEAGUE, THE PROTOCOL AND THE EMPIRE. By Roth Williams. London: Allen and Unwin, 1925, 174 pp.

A useful examination of the protocol as it affects the dominions and America.

KING EDWARD VII, A BIOGRAPHY. By Sir Sydney Lee. Vol. I. New York: Macmillan, 1925, 841 pp.

The first volume of the authoritative biography, covering the period prior to Edward's accession.

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The Near East

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The latest edition of a well-known text.

LA CONSTITUTION DU ROYAUME DES SERBES, CROATES, ET SLOVENES. By N. Yovanovitch. Paris: Sagot, 1925, 428 pp.
An authoritative examination.

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A full history of Rumania's part in the war, moderate in tone.

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A journalistic account of the developments of the last decade.

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A most valuable contribution to the story of the Near East in the last years, by the former English military attaché at Constantinople.

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Another attack on Allied and especially British policy, with a discussion of problems left unsettled at Lausanne.

REVOLUTIONS IN ISLAM. By Felix Valyi. London: Routledge, 1924, 240 pp.
A sympathetic account of the regeneration of Turkey, stressing particularly its spiritual aspects.

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A syllabus crammed with statistics and setting forth the radical point of view.

LA REVOLTE ARABE. By E. Jung. Paris: Bohrer, 1925, 224 pp.
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One of the most thoughtful and instructive studies of recent years.

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LE PROBLÈME NORD-AFRICAIN. By Raymond Peyronnet. Vol. I. Paris: Peyronnet, 1925, 500 pp.
The first volume of a great work, covering the history of North Africa and the Berbers.

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Well-informed and well-written, but not of great importance.

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THE POLITICAL AWAKENING OF THE EAST. By George M. Dutcher. New York: Abingdon, 1925, 372 pp.

A stimulating study of the influence of western political ideals on the nations of the East.

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AND ORIENTAL CIVILIZATIONS. New York: Stechert, 1924, 604 pp.

An exhaustive treatment of a fundamental problem of the missionary.

MISSIONARIES AND ANNEXATION IN THE PACIFIC. By K. L. P. Martin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924, 101 pp.

An excellent little study, particularly valuable in respect to Tahiti, New Zealand and Fiji.

THE CHINESE ABROAD. By H. F. MacNair. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1924, 340 pp.

A juristic study of Chinese emigration and the relations of the Chinese Government to its nationals abroad.

MANCHURIA, A SURVEY. By Adachi Kinnosuki. New York: McBride, 1925, 401 pp.

Enthusiastic; statistical.

GEOPOLITIK DES PAZIFISCHEN OZEANS. By Karl Haushofer. Berlin: Vowinckel, 1924, 453 pp.

An admirable discussion of the Pacific as a geographical and political unit.

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An exhaustive monograph on Central American financial policy.

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By the Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America.

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INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION for Air Navigation. Official Bulletin No. 7. December, 1924. [Paris, Ed. Blondel La Rougerie, 1925]. 46 double, 47–96 p. 31 cm.

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PROTOCOL amending Article 5 of the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of October 13, 1919. Signed at London, October 27, 1922. London, 1925. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 12 (1925). Cmd. 2328.) 1d.

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AGREEMENT effected by Exchange of Notes between the United States and Greece. According Mutual Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation treatment in customs matters. Signed December 9, 1924. Washington, 1925. 4 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series No. 706.)

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COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

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FAVORING MEMBERSHIP of the United States in the Permanent Court of International Justice. February 24, 1925. Report to accompany H. Res. 426. 20 p. 23½ cm. (H. Rept. 1569, 68th Cong., 2nd sess.)

HEARINGS before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 68th Cong., 2nd sess. on H. Res. 426 favoring membersnip of the United States in the Permanent Court of International Justice. January 21, 27, and 31, 1925. Washington, 1925. 91 p. 23½ cm.

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CUBA-UNITED STATES

ISLE OF PINES, papers relating to adjustment of title to ownership of Isle of Pines. 1924. iii, 319 p. (S. doc. 166, 68th Cong., 2d sess.) Paper, 30 cents.

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This important publication, originally announced as 20 volumes, is now planned to extend to 25, with various volumes in two parts. *Vols. 13-21 cover the period from 1897 to 1907.*

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INVENTAIRE de la situation financière de la France au début de la treizième législature présenté par M. Clémentel, ministre des finances. Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1924. 273 p. 30½ cm. 30 frs.

IMMIGRATION

CONFERENCE. Résolutions adoptées par la Conférence internationale de l'émigration et de l'immigration, tenue à Rome, dans ses séances plénières des 30 et 31 mai 1924. Rome, l'Universale, 1924. 46 p.

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CODIFICATION of American International Law. Projects of conventions prepared at the request on January 2, 1924, of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union for the consideration of the International Commission of Jurists, and submitted by the American Institute of International Law to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, March 2, 1925. Washington, Pan American Union, 1925. 121 p. 23 cm.

IRAQ

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LIQUOR

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